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Abstract 
 
 This dissertation explores questions on the substance and methods of economic 
history. Chapter one studies a little-known policy change in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries to explore the causal effects of political exclusion on the economic wellbeing of 
immigrants. Starting in the mid-19th century, twenty-four states and territories expanded 
their electorates to allow non-citizen immigrants the right to vote; from 1864-1926, 
however, these same jurisdictions reversed this policy, creating a mass 
disenfranchisement for which the timing varied across states. Using this variation as well 
as a discontinuity in nationalization proceedings of the era, I find that political exclusion 
led to a 25-60% reduction in the likelihood that affected immigrants obtained public 
sector employment. I also document significant negative intergenerational effects: 
individuals of immigrant parentage born around the time of disenfranchisement earned 5-
9% less as adults than comparable individuals of native parentage. I am able to rule out as 
mechanisms for this intergenerational effect a variety of policy and spending channels, 
but find evidence for a reduction in English-language proficiency among disenfranchised 
immigrants, which may have adversely affected the human capital of their children.  
Chapter two explores the causes of the adoption and repeal of alien voting in the 
United States. This policy shift offers a valuable opportunity to understand the forces 
determining political inclusion and exclusion in a formative period of American 
democracy, and contributes to the broader literature on theories of democratization. I use 
qualitative evidence from the historical record to outline competing theories of both 
xi 
 
adoption and repeal of alien voting, and then rationalize these hypotheses within the 
context of a median voting model. Using a discrete time hazard specification, I find 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that states used alien voting as a locational 
amenity, with the objective of inducing immigrant in-migration in order to foster 
agricultural development. The results indicate that the timing of repeal was driven by 
social costs, rather than economic or political factors, although there is evidence for 
heterogeneity in correlates of support for repeal across states. Finally, the costs of 
constitutional change were salient for both adoption and repeal: states for which it was 
less costly to re-write or amend the constitution were more likely to adopt and repeal 
alien voting.  
Chapter three is a co-authored methodological study intended to assess the 
efficacy of commonly used techniques to create name-linked historical datasets. The 
recent digitization of historical microdata has led to a proliferation of research using 
linked data, in which researchers use various methods to match individuals across 
datasets by observable characteristics; less is known, however, about the quality of the 
data produced using those different methods. Using two hand-linked ground-truth 
samples, we assess the performance of four automated linking methods and two 
commonly used name-cleaning algorithms. Results indicate that automated methods 
result in high rates of false matches – ranging from 17 to over 60 percent – and the use of 
phonetic name cleaning increases false match rate by 60-100 percent across methods. We 
conclude by exploring the implications of erroneous matches for inference, and estimate 
intergenerational income elasticities for father-son pairs in the 1940 Census using 
samples generated by each method. We find that estimates vary with linking method, 
xii 
 
suggesting that caution must be used when interpreting parameters estimated from linked 
data. 
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Chapter 1 
 
The Economic Consequences of Immigrant Disenfranchisement: Evidence from the United 
States 
 
What are the effects of disenfranchisement on immigrants? This paper studies a little-known episode in United 
States history in which twenty-four states and territories disenfranchised non-citizen immigrants from 1864 to 1926. 
This represented a significant shock to the political equilibrium of the time: mayoral and gubernatorial voting 
activity fell by approximately 10 and 5 percentage points, respectively. Moreover, disenfranchisement had real 
economic effects: the likelihood of having public sector employment fell by 25-60% for affected immigrants. There 
is no measured effect on other labor market outcomes, but it is possible this reflects the coarseness of the available 
data, rather than an absence of true impact. Consistent with this, I document significant negative intergenerational 
effects. Individuals of immigrant parentage born around the time of disenfranchisement earned 5-9% less as adults 
than comparable individuals of native parentage. I am able to rule out as mechanisms a variety of policy and 
spending outcomes, but find suggestive evidence for a reduction in the human capital of the children of immigrants 
as mediated through parental English-language proficiency.  
 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down a key provision of the 1965 Voting Rights Act 
requiring certain jurisdictions to obtain federal permission – “pre-clearance” - in order to amend 
their voting laws.1 This decision occurred in the midst of a broad movement towards restricting 
the franchise: since 2010, twenty states have implemented measures that have increased the costs 
of voting along several dimensions.2 Given the vast body of research linking political institutions 
and economic development (La Porta et al. 1997, Acemoglu et al. 2001), it is possible that this 
                                                          
1 Shelby County v Holder, 70 U.S. (2013) 
 
2 Measures include requiring photo ID in order to vote, reduction of early voting periods, restrictions on voter 
registration drives, felon disenfranchisement, and mandating documentation of citizenship (Brennan Center 2016). 
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movement could have adverse economic consequences for affected individuals or for the 
economy more broadly.   
However, in contrast to the large literature on the effects of enfranchisement, there has 
been less work on the consequences of disenfranchisement.3 This is likely a function of the 
progressive march of history: while the disenfranchisement of African-Americans in the Jim 
Crow South provides a notable exception, developed nations are more characterized by 
extensions, rather than contractions, of the franchise. This study addresses this gap using a little-
studied series of state-level constitutional changes that, from 1864-1926, repealed the right to 
vote for non-citizen immigrants in twenty-four states and territories (Keyssar 2000, Hayduk 
2006).4 These changes directly disenfranchised recent immigrants who were not yet eligible for 
citizenship and, among other immigrants who were not citizens, increased the cost of becoming 
eligible to vote by requiring naturalization. I exploit the timing of these repeals to estimate the 
effects of disenfranchisement on the economic wellbeing of immigrants and their children. 
There are several theoretical channels through which losing the right to vote may affect 
the economic lives of immigrants. Vote-maximizing public officials may direct expenditure 
away from disenfranchised immigrants, toward more electorally valuable constituencies. To the 
extent that public spending is responsive, the adverse effects may be borne by either the 
immigrants themselves (if, for example, public employment was redirected) or their children 
                                                          
3 Papers that have studied the effects of enfranchisement include Miller 2008, Lott and Kenny 1999, Fujiwara 2015, 
Hoffman et al. 2016, Carruthers and Wannamaker 2015, Funk and Gathman 2006, Aidt et al. 2006, Aidt and Dallal 
2008, Cascio and Washington 2014, Hinnerich and Petterson-Lidbom 2014, Hodler et al. 2015, Kose et al. 2015. 
Naidu (2012) addresses the impact of disenfranchisement in the Jim Crow south, and is the sole recent work I have 
been able to locate on the topic. 
 
4 One legal scholar declared the “history of alien suffrage” as being “largely unwritten” (Raskin 1993). While I 
know of no economic research that has explored the effects of alien (dis)enfranchisement in the United States, 
Vernby (2013) explores the effects of Swedish alien suffrage on public spending.  
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(through, for example, reductions in education spending). Direct effects on labor markets are 
possible: employers may react to the reduced political voice of the disenfranchised group and 
offer lower wages to affected employees, and the disenfranchised may out-migrate if the right to 
vote is a strong enough locational amenity. Finally, formal civic exclusion may have reduced the 
benefits of social and cultural assimilation, leading to less integration into labor markets or 
reduced human capital accumulation of the children of immigrants. 
Econometrically, the challenge of estimating the consequences of disenfranchisement is 
to distinguish the effects from the underlying causes. If unobserved forces drove the repeal of 
alien voting, then it is possible that any estimated effects could be a result of these forces rather 
than disenfranchisement per se. In this setting, this concern is mitigated by the fact that these 
disenfranchisements were constitutional, rather than statutory. States vary significantly in the 
process of amending their constitutions, and I present evidence that heterogeneity in the 
amending procedures generated an element of exogeneity in the timing of the 
disenfranchisements (Tarr 1996), 
I test for the relevance of the disenfranchisements in two ways. First, I use newly 
assembled data on elections from 1870-1940 to assess the effect of disenfranchisement on 
political participation. Using an event-study specification that leverages the staggered timing of 
these disenfranchisements, I find that disenfranchisement led to significant reductions in voting 
activity: effect sizes are 2-4, 5-10, and 10-20 percentage points for presidential, gubernatorial, 
and mayoral elections, respectively. These are robust to multiple specifications, and the timing of 
effects suggests a causal role for disenfranchisement. Moreover, there is evidence of substantial 
spillovers in voting: the estimated impact on vote totals in mayoral and gubernatorial elections 
exceeded the magnitude of the disenfranchised population by a factor of at least two.  
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Second, using Census samples from 1900-1930, I estimate the effect of 
disenfranchisement on citizenship status. Whereas, prior to disenfranchisement, immigrants that 
had only begun citizenship proceedings – that is, filed “first papers” - had been allowed to vote, 
these disenfranchisements restricted the electorate to immigrants that had completed citizenship 
proceedings. Without the benefit of voting eligibility, immigrants that never intended to 
complete citizenship proceedings may have had less incentive to initiate those proceedings; 
therefore, disenfranchisement should have led to a reduction in the average incidence of filing 
first papers. However, if monitoring was costly in elections from this era, or if immigrants were 
not politically engaged, then the disenfranchisements may have had little actual impact (Allen 
and Allen 1981).  
I test for this using a specification that exploits a discontinuity in the naturalization 
procedure of the era. Immigrants were required to maintain five years of continuous residence in 
the U.S. in order to qualify for citizenship, but could file first papers at any time after arrival 
(Department of Commerce and Labor 1909; Muir 1898). This delineates a pool of immigrants – 
those with fewer than five years of residence – that were rendered ineligible to vote following 
disenfranchisement, and allows for a triple-difference specification that compares outcomes for 
recent and less recent immigrants around this cutoff, before and after repeal, across states that 
did and did not disenfranchise immigrants. This specification nets out unobserved shocks 
common to all immigrants, and I find evidence that disenfranchisement affected the decision to 
initiate citizenship: the incidence of filing first papers fell by a statistically significant 50-54%. 
Taken together with results of disenfranchisement on aggregate voting activity, this suggests that 
the repeal of alien voting represented a significant shock to the political equilibrium of the era. 
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Using this same triple-difference specification, I estimate the short-run effect of 
disenfranchisement on labor market outcomes from 1900-1930. I find a 25-60% reduction in the 
likelihood of holding public sector employment for recent immigrants relative to the baseline 
mean, and this is robust to alternative specifications and definitions of public employment. 
Patronage employment - in which government employment was traded for electoral support - 
was legal for most states and cities in this era, and there is evidence that public-sector jobs paid 
significantly higher wages than comparable private sector positions (Rauch 1995, Troesken 
1998). These results imply that politicians responded to disenfranchisement by shifting targetable 
public spending away from politically expendable constituencies. 
I find null effects on other labor market outcomes, but this may reflect data availability 
rather than a lack of true impact. Census microdata samples with immigration covariates are only 
available from 1900-1930, which spans only part of the time period in which states 
disenfranchised immigrants, and these samples contain only relatively coarse measures of labor 
market outcomes.5 Unobserved effects, however, may be manifested in the next generation; 
therefore, as a check, I estimate intergenerational effects of disenfranchisement.  Using variation 
in paternal nativity, birthplace, and birth year in the 1940 full count Census and Census samples 
from 1950 and 1960, I estimate cohort-based event study specifications and find evidence for the 
intergenerational impacts of disenfranchisement. Adult males of immigrant parentage who were 
exposed to disenfranchisement at a young age obtained less education, and earned 5-9% less as 
adults, than comparable individuals of native parentage. These latter results are statistically 
significant, and are robust to alternative specifications and placebo checks.  
                                                          
5 Wage and salary income, in particular, was not collected until the 1940 Census. 
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Controlling for educational attainment explains only approximately ¼ of the observed 
intergenerational effect on income. What else might drive this result? I test for environmental 
mechanisms by estimating the effect of disenfranchisement on a variety of aggregate 
demographic and political outcomes. I find no evidence for effects on migration, state-level 
political control, state- or city-level public spending, legislative preferences as captured by the 
Poole-Rosenthal index, or state-level Congressional support for federal immigration restrictions 
from 1897-1917. I do find suggestive evidence consistent with reduced social assimilation as a 
result of disenfranchisement: following repeal, immigrants were 7.6-11.0% less likely to speak 
English. Given the evidence on the importance of parental language skills on outcomes for 
children, this result suggests that reduced cultural assimilation and a consequent reduction in 
human capital for children may have been a factor driving the intergenerational effect (Bleakly 
and Chin 2008; Casey and Dustmann 2008). 
This paper contributes to three literatures. First, it augments what is known about the 
effects of changes in electorate on policies and outcomes. As noted, there is a voluminous body 
of literature on the effects of enfranchisement of various groups on voter turnout, public 
spending, infant mortality, and long-run educational outcomes, but much less on the effects of 
disenfranchisement (Naidu 2012, Kousser 1974). Second, it contributes to the literature on 
immigrant assimilation in the early 20th century. The United States experienced a massive wave 
of immigration from 1850-1930, and while scholars are beginning to understand the processes of 
economic and social assimilation of these immigrants, relatively little is known about the 
political assimilation of immigrants in this era (Abramitzky and Boustan 2016; Shertzer 2016; 
Bandiera et al. 2016). Moreover, that disenfranchisement has adverse impacts on the children of 
immigrants suggests that assimilation may be a more complex process than previously thought. 
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Finally, it adds to the literature on the political economy of public finance in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. The research is mixed on the extent to which public spending was politically 
motivated in this era (Eli and Salisbury 2015; Wallis 1998), and this paper provides new 
evidence that government employment was highly responsive to voting eligibility.  
1.2 Historical Context and Causes of Disenfranchisement 
1.2.1 Historical Context  
  Starting with Wisconsin in 1848, twenty-three other states and territories from 1848-
1890 adopted provisions in their state or territorial constitutions that allowed non-citizen 
immigrants the right to vote in local, state, and federal elections (Hayduk 2006, Keyssar 2000). 
The pattern of adoption was regional, and proceeded largely in three waves: Midwestern states 
and territories enacted these provisions in the late 1840s and 1850s; Western territories during 
the Civil War, and Southern states following the Civil War. Qualitative and quantitative evidence 
suggests a development motivation: labor-scarce states with relatively undeveloped economies 
used alien voting as a locational amenity, intended to stimulate in-migration (Henderson 2017; 
Neumann 1992; Raskin 1993). 
An important feature of these provisions is that they were intended as a “pathway to 
citizenship”: they enfranchised those non-citizen immigrants who had initiated citizenship 
proceedings by filing a “Declaration of Intent”. During this era, naturalization was a two-part 
process in which first, the would-be citizen filed a Declaration of Intent – also known as “first 
papers” – that stated his intention to become a citizen of the United States. This declaration was 
not binding, and could be filed at any point following arrival at any “competent court”, of which 
there were approximately 5,000 nation-wide (Rosberg 1977). No less than two years after filing 
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first papers, and after a total period of residence of no less than five years, the applicant could 
file a petition for citizenship. Obtaining citizenship was not a requirement in this era, and many 
immigrants never even initiated the citizenship process: among adult male immigrants who had 
been in the United States for at least five years, the fraction who were not citizens was 30% in 
1900, 34% in 1910, 48% in 1920, and 35% in 1930 (Ruggles 2015).6  
States and territories began to repeal alien voting provisions starting with Nevada 
Territory in 1864, when it drafted a state constitution and was admitted to the Union (see figure 
1.1 for a map of the dates of repeal by state). South Carolina followed in 1868, with its 
reconstruction constitution, and then Idaho Territory in 1874 and Georgia in 1877; ten states and 
territories repealed their provisions in either 1889 or the 1890s; three in the first decade of the 
20th century; and eight after the outbreak of World War I. I approximate the magnitude of the 
shock by estimating the fraction of the adult male population that was non-citizen at the time of 
disenfranchisement using Census samples from 1870-1930 (see table 1.1). The fraction of the 
voting population that was affected varied by state, ranging from under 1% in Alabama, 
Arkansas, and Georgia to over 20% in North Dakota and Nevada. Dates of repeal are from 
Hayduk (2006), Keyssar (2000), the NBER/Maryland state constitution database, state blue 
books, legislative manuals, and other administrative reports. 
1.2.2 Causes of Disenfranchisement 
Legal scholars generally agree that these non-citizen voting provisions were repealed 
largely due to rising anti-immigrant sentiment in the late 19th and early 20th century (Rosberg 
1977, Raskin 1993, Tienda 2002). Nativism was growing strongly during this period due to 
                                                          
6 Although the fraction of all immigrants who were not citizens may be a more complete representation of 
immigrant behavior, the Census only collected citizenship status for adult males in 1900 and 1910. 
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factors such as the changing composition of immigrants from Northwest Europe to Southeast 
Europe, the Panic of 1893 and ensuing depression, the assassination of President McKinley in 
1901 by a second-generation immigrant, and the United States’ involvement in World War One 
(Jaret 1999; Van Nuys 2002). Quantitative evidence is consistent with this: Henderson (2017), 
finds that the fraction of the population that was immigrants was a significant predictor of repeal, 
with, in some specifications, a one standard deviation in the fraction foreign born in a given state 
nearly tripling the hazard of disenfranchisement. 
It is important to note that legal basis for non-citizen voting was constitutional, rather 
than statutory. Because states vary in the costs of amending their constitutions, this raises the 
possibility that these costs were also a factor in the timing of disenfranchisement (Tarr 1996). 
Constitutional amendment is a “highly deliberative process… more difficult than that used for 
normal legislation” and during this era, constitutional amendments were primarily legislatively 
referred: they originated as statutes in the state legislature, and then had to win a popular vote for 
ratification at a general election (Lutz 1994). This multi-step process meant that, in some cases, it 
took states decades from when the state legislature would have disenfranchised non-citizens, to 
when non-citizens finally were disenfranchised.7 
Furthermore, states varied along three dimensions of the constitutional amending process: 
the majority required for initial legislative passage (1/2 – 2/3), the number of successive passages 
in the state legislature (once or twice), and the fraction required for ratification by popular vote. 
                                                          
7 There are examples of this in the historical record. Alien disenfranchisement reached the point of popular 
referendum in Missouri in 1912, Oregon in 1894, and Texas in 1919 implying that it had first passed in both houses 
of the state legislature, but did not achieve majorities of the popular vote (Official Manual of State of Missouri 
1913-1914; Sunday Oregonian 1894; Dallas Morning News 1919). Missouri would go on to repeal in 1924, Oregon 
in 1914, and Texas in 1921. 
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A summary table of state amending procedures is presented in table 1.2. Crucially, certain states 
required a majority of all voters in a given election for passage; other states only required a 
majority of voters voting on that particular issue in a given election. This generates variation in 
the effective standard for passage because of the practice of  “roll-off voting”, in which voters 
vote only on a subset of questions on a ballot, with abstentions increasing in the number of 
questions (Bullock and Dunn 1996, Augenblick and Nicholson 2016, Stephens and Charles 
2013). Given a certain amount of roll-off voting, states that required a majority of all electors 
effectively imposed a higher passage rate for the amendment than states that required only a 
majority of voters voting thereon in the referendum.8,9 
There is qualitative evidence that variation in the amending procedures introduced an 
element of randomness in the timing of non-citizen voting.10 In 1920, voters passed a proposed 
amendment in Arkansas that would have restricted the franchise to citizens, 87,237-49,757. 
Given that 190,113 total votes were cast in the election, however, the votes for the proposed 
amendment did not constitute a majority of all voters at the election (which would have been 
190,113/2 = 95,057), and so the measure failed (Alysworth 1931). Similarly, Nebraska in 1910 
attempted to disenfranchise non-citizen immigrants and the referendum passed, 100,450-74,878, 
                                                          
8 Consider two states, A and B, each with 100 voters. If there is 20% roll-off voting, then only 80 voters in each state 
vote on the proposed amendment. If state A mandates a majority of all voters for passage, then passage requires 51 
voters, or an effective majority of 100*(51/80) = 64%. If state B requires only a majority of the voters voting 
thereon, then only 41 votes are needed for passage.  
 
9 A measure of the importance of this provision is implicitly provided by Section 16 of the Nevada state constitution 
of 1864, which discusses the procedures for amending the state constitution. It specifies that “in determining what is 
a majority of the electors voting at such election, reference shall be had to the highest number of votes cast at such 
election for the candidates for any office or on any question.” 
 
10 The issue of roll-off voting in contests for constitutional amendment is explicitly addressed in the Massachusetts 
state constitution of 1780, as amended in 1918. Constitutional amendments originating via initiative process – a 
rarity at the time – were required to obtain the support of at least 30% of all voters at a “state election”, and a 
majority of voters “voting on such amendment”. This suggests that roll-off voting was recognized as a salient factor 
in elections for constitutional amendments (Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1918). 
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but failed to achieve a majority of the 243,390 electors voting in the election (Nebraska Blue 
Book and Historical Register, 1918). Only in 1918 did voters in Nebraska pass the constitutional 
amendment with a majority of all voters voting at the election.11 The determinants of repeal are 
addressed systematically in Henderson (2017), who finds that states requiring on a majority of 
voters voting thereon were eight times more likely to repeal alien voting in a given decade than 
those requiring a majority of all voters. 
It is possible that structural change in the demand for immigrant labor was a salient factor 
determining the timing of disenfranchisement. Given that the adoption of alien voting in the mid-
19th century was in part due to increased demand for labor in order to spur economic 
development, declining demand may have driven the repeal of these provisions (although 
Henderson (2017) finds no evidence of economic determinants of repeal). While this would be 
problematic for estimating effects of disenfranchisement, this is mitigated by the variation in 
timing of repeal introduced by nuances of constitutional amending procedures. Furthermore, I 
am able to control for shocks common to all immigrants by leveraging a discontinuity in the 
naturalization proceedings of the era, which I explain in more detail in section 1.3.2.   
1.3 Relevance of Alien Disenfranchisement 
Were these disenfranchisements binding? There is a body of literature arguing that 
election fraud was pervasive during this era (Allen and Allen 1981), and there are examples of 
urban political machines conducting widespread immigrant naturalization for political purposes 
(Orth 1914).12 Such behavior would argue against the importance of immigrant 
                                                          
11 123,292 for, 51,600 against, with 225,717 total votes cast (Nebraska State Canvassing Board, 1918) 
 
12 About the New York City political machine, the authors write “Most observers were convinced that Tammany’s 
grip on New York City government was based in large part upon wholesale election fraud in the foreign-born, 
working-class districts.” (Allen and Allen, pp. 158) 
12 
 
disenfranchisement: if it were possible to generate immigrant votes via “naturalization mills”, for 
example, then the repeal of alien voting may not have been binding. Similarly, if monitoring in 
elections was costly in this era, then provisions delineating voter eligibility – like alien 
disenfranchisement – may not have affected actual voting behavior. I test for the relevance of 
disenfranchisement in two ways: first, I assess the effect on aggregate vote totals; second, I use 
Census samples from 1900-1930 to test for the effect on initiating naturalization proceedings.  
1.3.1 Effect of Disenfranchisement on Aggregate Vote Totals  
I explore the effect of disenfranchisement on political participation using data on mayoral 
elections from 1880-1924 and gubernatorial and presidential elections from 1870-1940. The 
mayoral data is a newly assembled dataset of vote totals for a panel of seventeen large cities.13 
Leveraging the staggered timing of alien disenfranchisement, I estimate event-study models at 
the state (or city)-year level to assess the relevance of the disenfranchisement on political 
activity. These specifications identify the effect of disenfranchisement based on sharp changes in 
voting activity in years relative to the year of repeal, net of changes in states (or cities) that had 
never enacted alien voting. The intuition is similar to that of differences-in-differences, but 
flexibly allowing the effect to differ over time relative to the date of disenfranchisement. 
Specifically, I estimate: 
𝑦𝑗𝑡 =  𝑎𝑗 +  𝑐𝑡 +  𝑡 ∗ 𝑎𝑠 + ∑ 𝐷𝑗𝜋𝑓 ∗ 1(𝑡 −  𝑅𝑗 ∈ 𝑓)
ℎ
𝑓= −ℎ +  𝛽𝑋𝑗𝑡 +  𝜀𝑗𝑡     (1) 
                                                          
 
13 I was unable to find data for any cities other than those in my sample. The cities in the sample are Baltimore, 
Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Orleans, New York, 
Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Diego, San Francisco, and Seattle. All cities except San Diego and Seattle 
are from Holli and Jones (1982). Historical San Diego mayoral results are available from 
https://www.sandiego.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/city-clerk/pdf/mayorresults.pdf; Results from Seattle are 
available from http://www.seattle.gov/cityarchives/seattle-facts/historical-election-results 
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Yjt is the ratio of total votes to the estimated population of males age 21 and up in area j 
(city or state) in year t. This is my preferred measure of aggregate political activity because it 
captures political engagement in a jurisdiction while implicitly controlling for a migration 
response.14 Because frequency of mayoral and gubernatorial elections varied across cities and 
states in this era – ranging from one to four years in my sample – I use four-year event-time bins 
in the event-study specification. Dj is a 0/1 indicator for whether area j was in an alien 
disenfranchisement state.15 Rj is the year of disenfranchisement in area j; h denotes the number 
of event-time bins used; and f indicates that voting outcome in year t, relative to year of repeal, is 
grouped into a particular event-time bin. The coefficients of interest are 𝜋𝑓, which trace out the 
effect of disenfranchisement over time, net of changes in states or cities that had never enacted 
alien voting. As formulated in specification (1), 𝜋𝑓 are not identified; therefore, I omit the event-
time bin immediately prior to repeal, and so estimates of 𝜋𝑓 should be interpreted as relative to 
the omitted category. I estimate three pre- and post-disenfranchisement bins for mayoral 
contests, and, because of greater data availability, four for gubernatorial and presidential.  
Xjt is a vector of state or city level controls. Because the disenfranchised population 
varied significantly across states, I control for intercensal estimates of the fraction of adult males 
that were non-citizens in area j and year t.16 Furthermore, to account for the possibility that 
                                                          
14 If migration was a primary response to disenfranchisement, then aggregate vote totals would fall sharply as voters 
left the state, spuriously implying a large disenfranchisement effect on current residents. I address the possibility of 
migration in greater detail in section 6.  
 
15 I prefer to use this indicator for ease of exposition and interpretation of coefficient estimates, but results are 
consistent using, instead of a 0/1 indicator, a measure of the “dose” of disenfranchisement as captured by the 
fraction of adults that were not citizens at the year of disenfranchisement. Results are available upon request. 
 
16 Because of data availability, I am unable to do this at the city-level; instead, I control for the fraction of the 
population that is foreign-born. This is highly correlated with the fraction of adult males that are non-citizens: in 
states from 1870-1940, the correlation coefficient is .96.  
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restrictions on immigrant voting coincided with other significant changes in voting policy in this 
era, I include a indicators for the presence of female suffrage, poll taxes, and literary tests (from 
Lott and Kenny, 1999). In my baseline specification, I include year and state or city fixed effects; 
in Model 2, I also include state- or city-specific linear trends in order to account for smoothly 
evolving unobservables. Coefficients are estimated using OLS. For mayoral elections, standard 
errors are calculated using wild bootstrap to account for the small number of clusters (Cameron 
et al. 2008); for all other specification, standard errors are clustered at the state level.  
Results are presented in figures 1.2 (mayoral), 1.3 (gubernatorial), and 1.4 (presidential), 
where coefficients from the event-time indicators are plotted for the two models. Underlying 
regression results are in appendix tables 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.1.3. The mayoral estimates are 
measured with some noise – which is not unexpected, given the small sample – but both models 
indicate that the share voting fell significantly upon immigrant disenfranchisement: at face value, 
the estimates suggest that the share voting fell by 10-12 percentage points initially, and then fell 
further to approximately 20 percentage points. I am unable to statistically differentiate the post-
disenfranchisement coefficients in either specification (F = .43, p = .75 in baseline; F = .23, p = 
.87 in Model 2) but I am able to strongly reject that the post-disenfranchisement coefficients 
jointly equal zero (F = 5.45, p < .001 in the baseline; F = 3.74, p = .006 in Model 2). That the 
results are similar for both the baseline specification and Model 2 suggests that unobserved 
trends in political participation were not correlated with the timing of disenfranchisements. 
Moreover, consistent with a causal effect of disenfranchisement, there is no evidence of a pre-
trend influencing the results: I cannot reject the hypothesis that the pre-repeal coefficients are 
jointly zero (F = .80, p = .50 in the baseline; F = .77, p = .52 in Model 2).  
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I find a similar pattern of results for gubernatorial elections in figure 1.3. There is an 
immediate and statistically significant drop in voting activity of 5-7 percentage points for 
gubernatorial elections in Model 2, with these effects remaining approximately constant for 
sixteen years. As above, the similarity of the estimates across the two models suggests that the 
econometric model is properly specified; however, controlling for state-specific trends adds to 
the precision of the estimates. There is no evidence of a pre-trend in either specification: pre-
repeal coefficients do not jointly statistically differ from zero (F = .77, p = .55 in the baseline; F 
= .93, p = .43 in model 2). Effects are similar, albeit smaller, for presidential elections (figure 
1.4). I document a reduction in political participation of 2 - 4 percentage points persisting for at 
least 16 years. Again, the time-path of effects suggests a causal role for disenfranchisement, as 
pre-repeal coefficients do not jointly differ from zero in either specification (F = .08, p = .97 in 
baseline; F = 1.08, p = .37 in Model 2). While the individual coefficients are not generally 
statistically precise, the time path of effects suggests that disenfranchisement served as a 
negative shock to voting activity. 
Are these effect sizes reasonable? Immigrants constituted 44.3% of the adult male 
population in my sample cities, and 24.7% in my sample states (Ruggles et al., 2015). These 
provisions directly disenfranchised those immigrants who had filed first papers and were not yet 
citizens, and from 1900-1930, this constituted 11.6% of the adult male immigrant population. 
Assuming all of these individuals would have voted had they not been disenfranchised, the 
expected effects of disenfranchisement on aggregate voting activity range from 5.1 percentage 
points in cities to 2.9 percentage points in states. My estimates are approximately double that in 
both mayoral and gubernatorial elections, but are in line with the effect on presidential voting.  
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This can be rationalized by the fact that the act of voting is, itself, an equilibrium 
decision. The benefits of voting include any direct utility from participating in the democratic 
process and the expected value of casting the decisive vote in the election (Downs 1957). A 
reduction in the perceived competitiveness of an election –caused, for example, by exclusion of 
non-citizens from the electorate – would tend to reduce the likelihood of casting a decisive vote, 
and therefore lower the overall utility gain from voting. The competition-turnout link has been 
documented in certain electoral settings (Settle et al., 2014; Grofman et al., 1998) and implies 
that the magnitude of the aggregate voting response may exceed the scale of the direct 
disenfranchisement. This phenomenon can also explain why there is no evidence of spillover 
reductions in presidential elections: the level of public attention is high, so the direct utility gain 
from voting is large compared to that from the perceived likelihood of casting the decisive vote.  
1.3.2 Effect of Disenfranchisement on Citizenship Status 
As a second check for the relevance of the disenfranchisements, I estimate their effect on 
the incidence of filing first papers for adult male immigrants. Immigrants that intended to 
become citizens would have been relatively unaffected by the repeal of alien voting provisions: 
the repeal simply deferred eligibility for voting until after the five-year residency period. 
However, individuals that did not intend to become citizens – possibly because they did not 
intend to remain in the United States long enough to become eligible – would, following 
disenfranchisement, have had little incentive to initiate naturalization proceedings.17 Therefore, if 
                                                          
17 Citizenship conferred few benefits for immigrants in this era. Williams (1912) writes: “To the foreigners in 
Nebraska, practically the only advantages which accrue from American citizenship are protection abroad, certain 
homestead rights, and the inheritance of citizenship to minor children.” Moreover, I have been able to find no 
evidence that changes in these few benefits of citizenship were correlated with the timing of disenfranchisement.  
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the disenfranchisement was binding, there should be a negative effect on the average incidence 
of filing first papers (that is, initiating naturalization proceedings) for immigrants.18 
Identification is threatened by the underlying causes of the disenfranchisements. While 
there is evidence that nuances of procedures to amend state constitutions determined the timing 
of disenfranchisement, it is possible that structural shifts in labor demand for immigrants were 
also a factor. If so, then any estimated effects of disenfranchisement may be attributable to these 
underlying shifts, rather than disenfranchisement per se. I account for this by exploiting 
institutional details of the naturalization process in this era. As set forth in the Immigration Act 
of 1798, immigrants were required to maintain a residence of five continuous years in the United 
States in order to obtain citizenship; however, immigrants could declare their intent to file for 
citizenship at any time after arrival. Thus, this five-year discontinuity identifies a pool of 
individuals – that is, immigrants with fewer than five years of residence - that were eligible 
voters prior to the disenfranchisement, and that were rendered ineligible following 
disenfranchisement. This motivates a specification in which outcomes are compared between 
recent immigrants and less recent immigrants, before and after repeal, between states that did and 
did not have alien voting. To the extent that these recent and non-recent immigrants are similar 
on unobservable characteristics, this effectively nets out all shocks affecting immigrants, 
including those generated by shifts in underlying demand for immigrants.   
                                                          
18 Contemporary observers noted that alien suffrage – or lack thereon – strongly impacted citizenship behavior of 
immigrants. Williams (1912) cites the report of the Commission-General of immigration which notes that “in 
Indiana [which has alien suffrage] there were filed last year about 5000 declarations, while but 276 petitions were 
made for citizenship… in Ohio, on the other hand [which has citizen suffrage], where about the same number 
declared their intention to become citizens, 1676 petitions were filed…”. Chaney (1894) notes that “in the 
[Michigan] convention of 1867, delegate Blackman said that in nine cases out of ten the alien who had sworn his 
intention to become naturalized do declared simply for the purpose of becoming a voter, and that he left the matter 
there five, ten, fifteen, or twenty years, without fulfilling his declared intentions.” 
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For estimation, I use Census samples from 1900-1930 (Ruggles 2015). These Censuses 
recorded detailed citizenship information, and, importantly, differentiate non-citizens between 
those that had filed first papers, and those that had not. I estimate the following specification: 
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 =  𝑎𝑠 +  𝑐𝑡 +  𝜌𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝛽𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 +  𝛾𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 +  𝐺𝑠𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡    (2) 
 Yist is an indicator for having filed first papers for individual i in state s and year t. Xist is 
a vector of individual controls comprised of age, age squared, literacy status, and an indicator for 
urban residence. Newist is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for immigrants with 
fewer than five years of residence in the U.S., and Repealst is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of 1 following repeal, in states that had repealed the provisions. The coefficient of interest 
is 𝛾: this is an estimate of the differential effect of residing in an alien voting state following 
repeal between recent and less recent immigrants, net of changes in non-alien voting states. The 
sample is restricted to non-citizen foreign-born males aged 21 and over that had resided in the 
United States for fewer than fifteen years.  This implicitly defines a “control” group as those 
immigrants that had resided in the U.S. for five to fifteen years (results are robust to alternative 
definitions of the control group: five to ten years and five to twenty years). 
State fixed effects, as, and year fixed effects, ct, are included to account for fixed factors 
within states and common shocks across time. Gst is a state-level 0/1 variable presence of laws 
barring aliens from public employment (Holmes 2003; Fishback et al. 2009).19 I also include a 
state-level 0/1 variable indicating the decade prior to repeal of the voting provisions intended to 
capture, in the repeated cross-section, unobserved forces leading to repeal. I add two sets of 
controls in order to account for unobserved trends potentially driving results. First, in order to 
                                                          
19 17 states had enacted this type of law as of 1924 (Holmes 2003; Fishback et al. 2009). There is little overlap 
between this group and the states that had repealed, alien voting: only Indiana and Oregon are common to both. 
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account for the changing sending regions of immigrants over time, I include a linear trends in 
year of immigration interacted with birth region. This allows for the effect of origin region 
(categorized into North, West, East, Southern Europe, and non-Europe) to vary over time. I label 
this “Model 2”. Second, in order to control for potentially changing demand for immigrant labor, 
I also include state-specific census year linear trends. I label this “Model 3”. Coefficients are 
estimated using WLS (utilizing IPUMS person weights), and standard errors are clustered at the 
state level (Bertrand et al., 2004). 
Results are presented in table 1.3. I find stable, statistically significant results indicating 
that immigrants responded to disenfranchisement by reducing the incidence of filing first papers: 
a reduction of 6.7 – 7.3 percentage points, which scales to 50-54% relative to the baseline mean 
for pre-repeal recent immigrants (13.5 percentage points). Interestingly, there is evidence of 
significant spillover effects: following disenfranchisement, all non-citizen immigrants, not only 
recent immigrants, were less significantly likely to file first papers. I now turn to estimating the 
effects of disenfranchisement on short-run labor market outcomes.  
1.4 Immediate Effects of Disenfranchisement on Labor Market Outcomes 
Economic theory provides multiple channels through which disenfranchisement may 
affect short-run labor market outcomes. No longer accountable to the disenfranchised population, 
elected officials may redirect public spending toward more valuable constituencies. Public sector 
employment was not subject to civil service regulations in most states and cities in this era, 
suggesting re-allocation of this employment as a potentially direct labor market consequence of 
disenfranchisement (Ujhelyi 2014, Folke et al. 2011).20 Disenfranchisement may spur 
                                                          
20 While data on public employment levels is scarce before 1930, Libecap (2007) estimates that federal civilian 
employment grew from 240,000 in 1901 to almost 400,000 in 1913; adjusting this by state and local government 
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outmigration of the disenfranchised, which, depending on the selection into migration, could 
have positive or negative effects on remaining immigrants. Finally, employers may respond to 
the reduction in political voice by discriminating against affected immigrants. 
I test for the effects of disenfranchisement on short-run labor market outcomes by re-
estimating specification (2) but using as outcomes labor force participation, occupational 
standing, and an indicator for public sector employment.21 The Census Bureau did not 
specifically record public sector employment until 1940, so I construct three alternative measures 
based on IPUMS occupation codes (see appendix 1.2 for details). The estimation sample is non-
farm foreign-born males aged 21-64 with fewer than 15 years of residence in the U.S.  
Results for labor force participation and occupational standing are in table 1.4. Columns 
(1) and (2) present results from the baseline model; columns (3) and (4) from model 2; and 
columns (5) and (6) from model 3. Consistent with other cross-sectional evidence on immigrant 
assimilation into U.S. labor markets in this era, I find that recent immigrants experienced a 
penalty in both labor force participation and occupational standing, although this varies in 
statistical precision (Abramitzky et al., 2014). There is no evidence of an effect of 
disenfranchisement on immigrants (as captured by the interaction between Repealst and Newist), 
and the estimated effects are sufficiently small as to rule out even modest effects: sample means 
are approximately .95 for labor force participation and 25.0 for occupational standing.  
                                                          
share of total spending, I estimate that 600,000 to 1.2 million individuals were employed in some form of public 
service starting in 1900 (excluding military). 
 
21 Occupational standing is an IPUMS-constructed variable that assigns to each occupational category the median 
wage from the 1950 Census. This is provided in lieu of wages and income, which were not measured in the Census 
until 1940. The limitations of this measure are well known, but it is useful as an indicator of labor market outcomes 
in this era. See Abramitzky et al. (2014) for further discussion. 
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There is some evidence of negative spillovers for the wider population of immigrants. In 
both the baseline and Model 2, disenfranchisement has a negative effect on the labor force 
participation of all immigrants in the sample, although the effect size is small, and this is not 
statistically precise across specifications. As a further check for spillover effects, I re-estimate 
specification (2) on a sample that ought to have been directly unaffected by repeals: native adult 
males. Results are in table 1.5. I find weak evidence for positive spillover effects: adult native 
males in states following alien disenfranchisement were more likely to participate in the labor 
force, and work in a higher-status occupation.  
Results for public sector employment are presented in table 1.6. For brevity’s sake, I omit 
results from the baseline specification, and report results only from Model 2 and Model 3 
(baseline results are not substantively different; full results available upon request). I find that 
disenfranchised immigrants were significantly less likely to be employed in the public sector: 
depending on the definition of public sector employment, the effect size ranges from .002-.004. 
While small in magnitude, these effect sizes are large relative to baseline means for recent 
immigrants prior to repeal: .009 (public 1), .008 (public 2), and .005 (public 3). The estimates 
scale to effect sizes of 25% - 60%, and the effects are statistically significant for two of the three 
definitions of public employment. There is little evidence of spillovers, either among the 
remaining immigrants in the sample, or in a placebo check using native men as an alternative 
treatment group (results reported in table 1.7). Given that public sector employment in this era 
was well compensated relative to private sector positions – Troesken (1998) estimates a wage 
premium of 25% - these results suggest that politicians directed lucrative positions away from 
immigrants that, because of disenfranchisement, had lost their political value.   
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1.5 Intergenerational Effects of Disenfranchisement 
 That disenfranchisement led to a strong reduction in public sector employment of 
affected immigrants suggests that voting power affected the economic wellbeing of immigrants; 
however, data availability from this era limits the extent for analysis of short-run labor market 
impacts. Census microdata samples with immigration covariates are only available from 1900-
1930, which spans only part of the time period in which states disenfranchised immigrants. 
Immigrant-heavy states Michigan, Minnesota, and North Dakota, repealed in the 1890s; if true 
effects are larger in more immigrant-heavy areas, then estimated effects, based on the sample of 
states with smaller immigrant populations, will be biased downward. Moreover, the Census 
samples from 1900-1930 contain only relatively coarse measures of labor market outcomes. 
Income, a key measure of labor market success, was not collected by the Census until 1940; 
labor force participation varied little across the population of adult males; and measures of 
occupational standing do not allow for effects within occupations.  
The true impact of disenfranchisement, however, may be reflected in the outcomes of the 
children of the disenfranchised.22 Therefore, I estimate the intergenerational effects of 
disenfranchisement on the outcomes of adults from 1940-1960, who, as children, were exposed 
to disenfranchisement. In order to capture effects net of potential spillovers, I employ an 
econometric intergenerational design in which, instead of comparing children of disenfranchised 
immigrants to non-disenfranchised immigrants, outcomes are compared between children of all 
immigrants and children of natives. I restrict attention, however, to native-born individuals, 
                                                          
22 A very large literature documents intergenerational correlations of income; see Lee and Solon (2009). Moreover, a 
growing literature has established that shocks to parental wealth or wellbeing have effects in the outcome of children 
(Leininger and Kalil 2014; Black et al. 2014; Currie and Rossin-Slater 2013). 
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thereby imposing that any disenfranchisement effects are indirect: either via parental 
transmission or changes to the environment. 
Using variation in paternal birthplace, birth state, and birth cohort in the 1940 full-count 
Census and IPMS 1950-1960 Census samples, I leverage the staggered timing of 
disenfranchisement across states to estimate the following event-study model: 
𝑦𝑖𝑏𝑐𝑠𝑡 =  𝑏𝑏 + 𝑐𝑐 +  𝑔𝑡 + 𝑗𝑠 + ∑ 𝐷𝑏𝜋𝑓1(𝑐 ∈ 𝑓)
ℎ
𝑓= −ℎ +  ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑏𝑐𝐷𝑏𝛼𝑓1(𝑐 ∈ 𝑓)
ℎ
𝑓=−ℎ +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑏𝑐 + 𝜀𝑖𝑏𝑐  (3) 
Yibct is an outcome – either the natural log of real income, or years of completed education - for 
individual i born in birth state b, in birth cohort c, observed in census year t in state of residence s 
(for brevity, I omit the t and s subscripts on all other individual-level covariates in the 
specification). The sample is restricted to sample-line native-born males aged 25 and over, so 
that the individuals likely would have completed their education at the time of observation.23 
When income is used as the outcome, I further restrict the sample to individuals under age 65 in 
order to avoid conflating effects of age with effects of disenfranchisement. I use only variation in 
paternal nativity, rather than paternal and maternal, because of the institutional structure of the 
era: women in most states could not vote until 1920, and, until 1922, foreign-born women were 
assigned the citizenship status of their husbands (Smith 1998). 
The event-time indicators are grouped into bins of five years, with membership of 
individual born in cohort c in bin f denoted by 1(𝑐 ∈ 𝑓). These are a measure of exposure to the 
repeal of alien voting; for example, an individual born in 1906 in Wisconsin (which had a repeal 
year of 1908) will receive a value of 1 for the indicator denoting birth year 0-5 years prior to 
repeal, and a value of 0 for all other years. Individuals not born in alien voting states will receive 
                                                          
23 Parental nativity in 1940 and 1950, and income in 1950, were census sample-line variables (Ruggles et al. 2015). 
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a value of 0 for all exposure indicators. Pibc is an indicator for having a foreign born father. The 
coefficients of interest are 𝛼𝑓: these trace the time path of the father-nativity differential for birth 
cohorts in relation to the year of repeal of alien voting. In order to identify 𝛼𝑓, an event-time bin 
must be omitted. In order to facilitate interpretation of the coefficient estimates, the omitted bin 
is for individuals born 30 years or more, prior to disenfranchisement. This implies that 𝛼𝑓 should 
be interpreted relative to individuals who would have been adults, and therefore unaffected by 
childhood exposure, at the time of disenfranchisement. 
As in specification (2), I include two sets of interactions intended to control for the 
changing composition of the immigrant population over time, as well as unobserved non-linear 
state-specific trends in the demand for immigrant labor. “Model 2” includes a set of birth-region 
specific trends in birth year for each parent; “Model 3” includes a set of birth-state specific 
trends in birth year. I control for fixed factors within birthplaces and factors common across birth 
years by including birthplace and birth cohort fixed effects. Individual controls are race 
indicators, age, age squared, father and mother birth region indicators and an indicator for 
father’s nativity (either foreign born or native). Census year fixed effects are included to control 
for the aging of the population. Coefficients are estimated using WLS. I employ IPUMS-
provided individual-level weights in estimation (sample-line weights for 1940 and 1950 samples, 
person-weights for 1960). Standard errors are clustered at the birth state level.  
 It is important to note that exposure indicators imperfectly capture true exposure. 
Individuals born in a repeal state may move out of state prior to repeal, thus avoiding exposure to 
the post-repeal environment, and individuals not born in a repeal state may do the opposite. If 
such migration does not systematically vary with labor market potential, then it should only 
serve to attenuate my estimates. If, however, disenfranchisement spurred out-migration among 
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positively selected individuals, then the composition of the remaining individuals, and their 
children, may generate a spurious negative intergenerational effect of disenfranchisement. Such a 
migration response would only be consistent with a very high implicit valuation of the right to 
vote; therefore, this possibility is unlikely. I return to this question in section 1.6, in which I 
discuss potential mechanisms for observed results.  
See figures 1.5 and 1.6 for the plot of 𝛼𝑓 from specification (2) for outcomes, 
respectively, years of completed education and the natural log of income due to wages and 
salary. I report the underlying coefficients in appendix tables 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.24 Each point in the 
figures represents the coefficient from the interaction term between period of birth relative to 
year of repeal and an indicator for whether the father is foreign-born, and each figure plots the 
evolution of the differential between outcomes for native adult males with foreign-born fathers, 
and native males with native fathers. This specification allows for evaluation of a natural placebo 
group: those individuals that would have been adults (that is, aged 20 or older) at the time of 
disenfranchisement, and who would, therefore, have not been exposed directly to the effects of 
disenfranchisement as children.   
The results from figure 5 indicate a negative effect of immigrant disenfranchisement on 
the educational attainment of children born around the time of disenfranchisement: the 
educational attainment differential – not statistically different from zero for older cohorts -
widens sharply for cohorts born 5-10 years before disenfranchisement. These individuals would 
have been in prime schooling age at the time of disenfranchisement, and the effects for cohorts 
born 5-10 years prior to disenfranchisement, and cohorts both 10-15 years prior, are statistically 
                                                          
24 For the sake of brevity, I report only the 𝛼𝑓, and not the event-time estimates for native males (that is, 𝜋𝑓). Full 
results available upon request. 
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distinguishable from one another (F = 3.47, p = .07 in Model 3). The effects are stable across 
specification: a reduction in educational attainment of .24.- .28 years for cohorts born 5-10 years 
prior to disenfranchisement, relative to those born 10-15 years prior. Results are robust to 
sequentially dropping birth regions (see appendix table 1.4.1). It is reassuring to note that the 
magnitude of these effects is roughly in line with previous research (Kose et al. 2015).25  
I also find a negative effect on real adult income for exposed cohorts. Specifically, I find 
that individuals of immigrant parentage that are exposed to disenfranchisement at an early age – 
those born fewer than five years before repeal of alien voting – earn significantly less in income 
as adults relative to individuals of native parentage born in the same state and year. Point 
estimates of the income penalty for these cohorts are individually statistically significant and 
range from 5 - 9% across specifications. Results are substantively robust to sequentially dropping 
birth regions (see appendix table 1.4.2). In order to assess the extent to which the reduction in 
income is driven by the reduction in education, I re-estimate specification (4) for the natural log 
of income but include, as a covariate, completed education. These regression results are reported 
in appendix table 1.5 with, and without, the control for educational attainment. The inclusion of 
education can explain approximately ¼ of the observed effect on income. 
The narrative evidence presented in section 1.2 suggests that there was an element of 
exogeneity in the timing of disenfranchisements due to nuances in the amending processes of 
state constitutions. It is still possible, however, that anti-immigrant attitudes may have partially 
driven disenfranchisement. If so, and if unobserved anti-immigrant sentiment peaked 
concurrently with the timing of the disenfranchisements, then the estimated intergenerational 
                                                          
25 Kose et al (2015) estimate that women’s suffrage led to up to a year of additional education for exposed children.  
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effect may be attributable to anti-immigrant attitudes, rather than disenfranchisement per se. I 
address this by leveraging the fact that women were assigned the citizenship status of their 
husbands until 1922 (Smith 1998). This provision implies that foreign-born women who were 
married to native men would not have been directly affected by the disenfranchisement, as they 
would have been assigned citizenship at the time of marriage, but, because of their nativity, 
would have been exposed to any unobserved prevailing anti-immigrant sentiment. Therefore, I 
repeat specification (3), but further restricting the sample only to individuals of immigrant 
parentage: those with a foreign-born father comprise the “treatment” group, and those with a 
foreign-born mother and native father comprise the “control” group. As this only applied until 
1922, I include only those alien-voting states that repealed their provisions prior to 1910, and 
restrict attention only to the 1940 Census. Results are in appendix figures 1.1 and 1.2, and, while 
somewhat noisy, are substantively similar to results presented in figures 1.5 and 1.6. This 
suggests that intergenerational effects are not driven by unobserved anti-immigrant attitudes. 
1.6 Mechanisms for Intergenerational Effects 
What drives the intergenerational effects? Unfortunately, as noted above, data availability 
precludes more detailed analysis of the immediate effects of disenfranchisement on economic 
wellbeing. However, using estimates of intergenerational elasticity of income, it is possible to 
back out the effect on wages that would have generated the observed intergenerational effects. 
Feigenbaum (2015) estimates the intergenerational elasticity of income from 1915-1940 to be 
.249; given that educational attainment explains ¼ of the observed 5-9% effect, a reduction of 
15-27% in wage income for immigrants relative to natives could explain the remaining 
intergenerational effect.  
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While such a penalty would be substantial, it is not unrealistic: public sector jobs in the 
late 19th century - from which recent immigrants were largely excluded following 
disenfranchisement - enjoyed a wage premium of 25% over the private sector (Troesken 1998). 
Moreover, Naidu (2012) estimates that the disenfranchisement of African-Americans in the 
South led to a loss in black income of at least 15%, which is in line with the magnitude of the 
effect that could rationalize the intergenerational effects. However, alternative mechanisms are 
possible. Below, I test for three channels for the intergenerational effect: migration, shifts in 
policy and spending, and cultural assimilation.  
1.6.1 Migration Response 
Scholars have shown that labor was relatively mobile in this era (Fishback 1998), which 
raises the possibility of a migration response to disenfranchisement: recent immigrants may have 
“voted with their feet” and re-located to states with immigrant voting provisions still in place or, 
failing that, returned to their home countries. While mass out-migration could effectively 
improve labor market outcomes for the immigrants that remain, positively selected out-migration 
could generate a spurious compositional effect: the estimates based on the remaining immigrants 
will, mechanically, appear to have worsened.   
There are two factors, however, arguing against such a migration response: first, for 
immigrants who had resided in the United States for at least five years, applying for citizenship 
was a means of regaining the vote, thus mitigating the need for migration. While this did entail 
certain costs – waiting the appropriate residency period, filing paperwork, and paying small fees 
– they were almost certainly far less than costs of relocation. Second, anecdotal evidence from 
this time suggests that the price of an individual vote relatively low: a single vote, according to 
one observer in Indiana in 1896, cost “sandwiches and liquor and $5 a head” (Allen and Allen 
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1981). Theoretically, the value of the right to vote at any moment is the present discounted value 
of the future stream of benefits of voting. At this modest period valuation of a vote, even 
permanent disenfranchisement would generate little financial incentive for an individual to move 
to a jurisdiction in which voting was permitted; temporary disenfranchisement generated by the 
repeal of alien voting would have provided even less. Consistent with this, Miller (2008) finds no 
evidence of a migration response to women’s suffrage, and contemporary observers documented 
no migration effects of alien voting. 26 
However, I empirically test for a migration response of disenfranchisement. Using 
IPUMS samples and published Census aggregates, I create a state-decade panel from 1870-1940 
and test for effects of disenfranchisement on overall immigrant population, the fraction of the 
population that is immigrant, and, in order to assess the extent of selection into migration, the 
fraction of immigrants in the population that are illiterate. I repeat Model 2 from specification (1) 
and estimate an event-study model controlling for state fixed effects, year fixed effects, state-
specific trends, and indicators for women’s suffrage, literacy tests, and poll taxes. The data – 
occurring only at decadal intervals – is not fine enough to estimate precise treatment effects, but 
allows for general assessment of the extent to which migration may be driving the estimated 
results (either through its effects on labor supply, or the composition of remaining workers). 
Results are in table 1.8. I find little evidence of a systematic migration response. Both 
total population and foreign-born population were falling in alien voting states over this period – 
                                                          
26 Chaney (1894) writes that “immigrants flocked into Illinois, which required citizenship, and in doing so passed 
through Indiana which was satisfied with a declaration of intention.” This is echoed in Williams (1912): “Alien 
suffrage was a drawing card used by western states to attract foreign immigration… the failure of alien suffrage to 
accomplish its original purpose appears from the fact that foreigners today do not hesitate to leave Nebraska [in 
which alien suffrage still held] for Colorado, Montana, Wyoming and other states in which they cannot vote, 
provided they can better their economic condition.” 
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foreign-born slightly faster than total – but the effect is largely statistically insignificant. More 
importantly, it does not appear that the out-migration was driven by the foreign-born: the fraction 
of the overall population that is foreign born falls slightly in alien voting states following 
disenfranchisement, but the coefficients are not jointly statistically distinguishable from zero (F= 
.94, p = .48). Finally, there appears to be a reduction in the incidence of illiteracy among the 
foreign-born following repeal – suggesting, if anything, negative selection out of the state – but, 
again, these coefficients are not jointly distinguishable from zero (F = .28, p = .96). If anything, 
this selection effect should serve to bias the negative effects of disenfranchisement toward zero.  
1.6.2 Policy Responses 
A growing body of research has established the importance of political regime and 
individual policies for labor market outcomes (Beland, forthcoming; Beland and Unel 2015). 
Scholars have also demonstrated the link between enfranchisement and allocation of public 
resources (Miller 2008; Lott and Kenny 1999) and the pernicious effects of childhood exposure 
to political unrest (Smythe et al. 2004). I test for the salience of policy channels by repeating 
Model 3 from event-study specification (1) on the following outcomes: share voting democratic 
in gubernatorial elections; Poole-Rosenthal index (which measures Congressional political 
ideology, with larger index values denoting more conservative positions); the share of upper and 
lower houses of the state legislature that are held by democrats (presented in figure 1.7.1); and 
the log of real per capita state-level total spending and budget shares devoted to education, 
transportation, and social services (all presented in figure 1.7.2).  
In order to test for the effect on local spending, I entered city-level total government 
spending and spending on educational services from odd years ranging from 1899-1929, 
collected from the Financial Statistics of Cities Having a Population of over 100,000 and Bureau 
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of Labor Statistics Bulletins 20 and 36. To test for shifts in sentiment against immigrants, I 
leverage the fact that Congress attempted to impose a literacy requirement for immigration on 
thirteen separate occasions from 1897-1917, and calculate the share of congressmen in a given 
state and year voting in favor of immigration restriction (Goldin 1994; Swift et al. 2009).27 These 
votes are all either affirmative votes on enacting restrictions or attempted overrides of 
presidential vetoes, implying that a higher share of the congressmen in a particular state and year 
voting for this legislation indicated strong anti-immigrant sentiment. For both outcomes, I 
collapse the event-time indicators into a pre- and post-repeal indicator. Results from city 
spending and legislative voting are presented in table 1.9.  
The results almost uniformly indicate a lack of effect of immigrant disenfranchisement on 
these outcomes. There is no appreciable effect on measures of democratic vote share or 
democratic presence in either chamber of the state legislature. I do find a modest increase in the 
Poole-Rosenthal index following disenfranchisement indicating a conservative shift in 
congressional ideology, but this is not statistically precise. Moreover, any shift in ideology is not 
reflected in specific attitudes toward immigration: legislators were no more likely to vote for 
immigration restrictions. There is no effect on public expenditures at either the state- or city-
level. While these results certainly do not preclude the possibility of governmental response, they 
suggest that alien disenfranchisement was not accompanied by large swings in state or municipal 
spending or policy. 
1.6.3 Social Assimilation 
                                                          
27 Goldin (1994) documents that, from 1897-1917, the literacy test was passed by the House of Representatives four 
times, and by the Senate five times. The House voted to override Presidential vetoes twice, and the Senate once, in 
1917, when the literacy test finally went into effect.  
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Evidence on immigration during this period has established that greater cultural and 
social assimilation of immigrants led to improved contemporary and future economic outcomes 
(Abramitzky et al. 2016, Goldstein and Stecklov 2015). Using more recent data, scholars have 
shown that the English-language skills of parents are salient for outcomes for offspring: greater 
language fluency leads to improved educational attainment and labor force performance for 
children (Bleakly and Chin 2008; Casey and Dustmann 2008). If immigrant disenfranchisement 
led to a reduction in the benefits of social assimilation, then it may have reduced incentives for 
immigrants to acquire English-language skills. This, in turn, could have led to lower human 
capital for children of immigrants, thus rationalizing the observed intergenerational effect. 
To test this, I repeat specification (2) on adult male immigrants in Census samples from 
1900-1930, but use as an outcome variable an indicator for English language proficiency. I 
include foreign-born males living on farms in this sample, although the results are robust to 
restricting to non-farm males. Results are presented in table 1.10. While I find no differential 
negative effect on English language proficiency for recent immigrants relative to less-recent 
immigrants, all immigrants in this sample are significantly less likely to be proficient in English 
following disenfranchisement. The magnitudes of the effect are large, ranging from 4.9 to 7.1 
percentage points. Relative to a pre-repeal baseline mean of 64.3%, this reduction scales to 7.6-
11.0%. The fact that this result is robust to the inclusion of birth region-specific linear trends in 
immigration year suggests that it is not driven solely by an increasingly negatively selected 
immigrant pool.  
While this suggests that the cultural assimilation of immigrants as measured by English 
language skill may have driven, in part, the adverse intergenerational effects of 
disenfranchisement, I interpret this evidence as only suggestive. The fact that this result applies 
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to all immigrants in the sample, rather than recent immigrants, implies that I cannot distinguish 
between the effects of disenfranchisement per se, and the unobserved effects of anti-immigrant 
sentiment that may have led to the timing of disenfranchisement (after accounting for the 
exogeneity introduced by variation in constitutional amending procedures). I leave the task of 
untangling these two effects to future research. 
1.7 Conclusion. 
This paper presents novel evidence on the effects of immigrant disenfranchisement on 
labor market outcomes using a little-studied set of state-level constitutional changes that 
disenfranchised non-citizen immigrants in twenty-four states and territories from 1864-1926. I 
document that these disenfranchisements had significant effects on political participation at the 
time: vote totals as a share of men aged 21 and over fell by approximately 3, 5, and 10 
percentage points in presidential, gubernatorial, and mayoral elections, respectively. A first-order 
consequence of disenfranchisement appears to be an overall reduction in electoral 
competitiveness, with significant spillovers: the magnitude of the effect on political participation 
in gubernatorial and mayoral elections is double the magnitude of the disenfranchised 
population. Given recent research on the beneficial effects of political competition, this suggests 
the possibility of lasting negative consequences on economic growth (Besley et al. 2010). 
Using difference-in-difference-in-difference specifications, I find that disenfranchisement 
significantly reduced public sector employed for affected immigrants. This is robust to 
alternative specifications and definitions of public employment in this era, and implies that 
politicians responded to disenfranchisement by shifting targetable spending away from 
electorally expendable populations. There is little evidence of an effect on other labor market 
outcomes, but it is possible that this masks unobserved effects due to the coarseness of the data.  
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As an implicit check for this, I estimate the effects of immigrant disenfranchisement on 
outcomes for exposed children. I find statistically significant evidence of a lasting shock: 
educational attainment fell sharply for children of immigrants, relative to children of natives, 
who were aged 5-10 at the time of disenfranchisement. Moreover, individuals of immigrant 
parentage exposed to the disenfranchisement at an early age earn approximately 5-9% less wage 
income as adults relative to comparable individuals of native parentage. There is no evidence 
that this intergenerational effect was driven by migration or shifts in the policy or spending 
environment; instead, I find suggestive evidence that disenfranchisement led to a reduction in 
English-language proficiency for all immigrants, which may have adversely affected the human 
capital accumulation of the next generation.  
Taken together, these results suggest that alien disenfranchisement had widespread, 
negative, lasting effects. Therefore, despite the potential short-run electoral advantages to raising 
the cost of voting, current policy-makers considering measures that restrict the franchise would 
be wise to consider the lessons of history. 
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Figure 1.1: Dates of Repeal of Alien Voting 
 
 
Notes: dates of repeal are based on Hayduk (2006), Keyssar (2000), and state constitutions. 
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Figure 1.2: Effect of Disenfranchisement on Mayoral Vote Totals 
 
 
Notes: data on mayoral votes totals is from Holli and Jones (1981) and the city of San Diego. The cities in the sample are Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, 
Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Diego, San Francisco. 
Controls are fraction foreign born and an indicator for the presence of women’s suffrage, poll taxes, and literacy tests. The specification includes city 
and year fixed effects and city-specific linear trends. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. Standard errors are calculated via wild bootstrap.  
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Figure 1.3: Effect of Immigrant Disenfranchisement on Gubernatorial Vote Totals 
 
 
Notes: gubernatorial election data are from Burnham et al. (1991). State level controls are fraction of adult males that are non-citizen and indicators for the 
presence of women’s suffrage, the poll tax, and presence of literacy tests. WA, ID, OK, and NV are excluded from the sample because they repealed alien voting 
upon entry to the U.S., and so have no pre-repeal observations in the sample. 95% confidence intervals are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Figure 1.4: Effect of Immigrant Disenfranchisement on Presidential Vote Totals 
 
Notes: presidential election data are from Clubb et al. (2006). State level controls are the fraction of adult men that are not citizens and indicators for the presence 
of women’s suffrage, the poll tax, and presence of literacy tests. WA, ID, OK, and NV are excluded from the sample because they repealed alien voting upon 
entry to the U.S., and so have no pre-repeal observations in the sample. 95% confidence intervals are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Figure 1.5: Intergenerational Effect of Parental Disenfranchisement on Years of Completed Education 
 
 
Notes: Data are from the full count 1940 Census and IPUMS 1950 and 1960 Census samples. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25 and older. 
Individual level controls include age, age squared, educational attainment, race indicators, father nativity, and father and mother indicators. All specifications 
include birthplace fixed effects, birth cohort fixed effects, state of residence indicators, and survey year fixed effects. “Model 2” includes a set of birth-region 
specific trends in birth year for each parent; “Model 3” includes a set of birth-state specific trends in birth year. IPUMS sample line weights are used in 
estimation. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the birth state level.  
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Figure 1.6: Intergenerational Effect of Parental Disenfranchisement on Ln(Income) 
 
 
Notes: Data are from the full count 1940 Census and IPUMS 1950 and 1960 Census samples. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25-64 
(inclusive). Individual level controls include age, age squared, educational attainment, race indicators, father nativity, and father and mother indicators. All 
specifications include birthplace fixed effects, birth cohort fixed effects, state of residence indicators, and survey year fixed effects. “Model 2” includes a set of 
birth-region specific trends in birth year for each parent; “Model 3” includes a set of birth-state specific trends in birth year. IPUMS sample line weights are used 
in estimation. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the birth state level. 
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Figure 1.7.1: Political Responses to Disenfranchisement, 1870-1940 
 
 
Notes: gubernatorial election data are from Burnham et al. (1991). Data on compsition of state legislatures are from Burham et al. (1989). “DWNOM1” was used 
from the Poole-Rosenthal index. State level controls are the fraction of adult males that are non-citizen, and indicators for the presence of women’s suffrage, poll 
taxes, and literacy tests. All specifications include state-specific linear trends. WA, ID, OK, and NV are excluded from the sample because of data availability. 
95% confidence intervals are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Figure 1.7.2 State Expenditure Responses to Disenfranchisement, 1870-1940 
 
 
 
 
Notes: state spending data are from Lott and Kenny (1999). State level controls are the fraction of adult males that are non-citizen, and indicators for the presence 
of women’s suffrage, poll taxes, and literacy tests. All specifications include state-specific linear trends.  WA, ID, OK, and NV are excluded from the sample 
because of data availability. 95% confidence intervals are shown. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. 
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Table 1.1: Fraction of Males age 21 and over that were Non-Citizens in year of Disenfranchisement 
State Fraction Non-citizen 
AL .008 
AR .004 
CO .110 
FL .047 
GA .004 
ID .142 
IN .042 
KS .038 
LA .035 
MI .130 
MN .158 
MO .028 
MT .181 
ND .226 
NE .059 
NV .300 
OK .019 
OR .143 
SD .061 
TX .090 
WA .166 
WI .173 
WY .135 
Notes: the fraction affected is defined as the population of non-citizen foreign-born males over age 21 divided by the entire population of males over age 21. For 
1870 and 1900-1930, IPUMS census samples contain citizenship information, and were used in construction. For 1890, Census aggregates from Haines (2010) 
and table 71 from the 1890 Census were used. Numerator and denominator were linearly interpolated (separately) between decades. Nevada and Georgia, which 
repealed their provisions in 1864 and 1877, respectively, are assigned values from the 1870 Census. 
49 
 
 
Table 1.2 – Details of State Constitution Amending Process 
State Year Repeal Year Enter 
Union 
Relevant Constitutional 
Amending Article 
Legislative 
Majority 
# Passages 
Needed 
Election Majority 
Standard 
AL 1901 1819 17 2/3 One All voters 
AR 1926 1836 19 ½ One All voters 
CO 1902 1876 19 2/3 One Voting thereon 
FL 1894 1845 17 3/5 One Voting thereon 
GA 1877 1788 12 2/3 Two  
ID 1874 1890 20 2/3 One All voters 
IN 1921 1816 16 ½ Two All voters 
KS 1918 1861 14 2/3 One Voting thereon 
LA 1898 1812 256 2/3 One Voting thereon 
MI 1894 1837 20 2/3 One Voting thereon 
MN 1896 1859 14 ½ One Voting thereon* 
MO 1924 1821 15 ½ One All voters 
MT 1894 1889 14 2/3 One Voting thereon 
ND 1898 1889 15 ½ Two Voting thereon 
NE 1918 1867 15 3/5 One All voters 
NV 1864 1864 16 ½ Two Voting thereon 
OK 1890 1907 24 ½ One Voting thereon 
OR 1914 1859 17 ½ One Voting thereon 
SD 1918 1889 23 ½ One Voting thereon 
TX 1921 1845 17 2/3 One Voting thereon 
WA 1894 1889 23 2/3 One Voting thereon 
WI 1908 1848 12 ½ Two Voting thereon 
WY 1894 1890 20 2/3 One All voters 
Notes: amending information taken from state constitution in year of repeal (Wallis). Italics indicate that the state repealed alien voting upon entry into the 
Union.  
*This was amended in 1898 to “majority of all voters having voted at said election” 
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Table 1.3 - Effect of Disenfranchisement on Incidence of Filing First Papers 
 
 Filed First 
Papers? 
Filed First 
Papers? 
Filed First 
Papers? 
Repeal -0.152 -0.133 -0.068 
 (0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.037) 
New -0.137 -0.063 -0.061 
 (0.010)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)*** 
New * Repeal -0.073 -0.067 -0.072 
 (0.019)*** (0.021)*** (0.020)*** 
    
Specification Baseline Model 2 Model 3 
    
R2 0.13 0.17 0.18 
N 161,821 161,170 161,170 
 
Notes: Data are from IPUMS Census samples, 1900-1930. Sample is restricted to non-citizen, foreign-born males over age 21 with less than 15 years of 
residence in the U.S. All specifications include individual level controls (age, age squared, literacy status, urban status), state and year fixed effects, and state-
level controls: an indicator for the pre-repeal period in alien voting states, and an indicator for the presence of state regulation barring aliens from public 
employment (Fishback et al. 2009). Model 2 includes birth-region specific linear trends in year of immigration. Model 3 includes state-specific census-year linear 
trends. IPUMS person weights are used in estimation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.4 - Short-run effects of Disenfranchisement on Labor Market Outcomes for Immigrant Males 
 
 In Labor 
Force 
(1) 
Occupational 
Standing 
(2) 
In Labor 
Force 
(3) 
Occupational 
Standing 
(4) 
In Labor 
Force 
(5) 
Occupational 
Standing 
(6) 
Repeal -0.011 -0.183 -0.011 -0.052 -0.003 0.375 
 (0.006)* (0.486) (0.006)* (0.421) (0.007) (0.312) 
New -0.003 -1.227 -0.000 -0.175 0.000 -0.171 
 (0.002) (0.108)*** (0.003) (0.159) (0.003) (0.160) 
New * Repeal -0.000 0.083 0.000 0.132 -0.001 0.144 
 (0.005) (0.293) (0.005) (0.226) (0.005) (0.242) 
       
Specification Baseline Baseline Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 
       
R2 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 
N 205,309 205,309 204,675 204,675 204,675 204,675 
 
Notes: Data are from IPUMS Census samples, 1900-1930. Sample is restricted to non-farm males age 21-64 (inclusive), with less than 15 years of residence in 
the U.S. All specifications include individual level controls (age, age squared, literacy status, urban status), state and year fixed effects, and state-level controls: 
an indicator for the pre-repeal period in alien voting states, and an indicator for the presence of state regulation barring aliens from public employment (Fishback 
et al. 2009). Model 2 includes birth-region specific linear trends in year of immigration. Model 3 includes state-specific census-year linear trends. IPUMS person 
weights are used in estimation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.5 – Short-run effects of Disenfranchisement on Labor Market Outcomes of Natives for Native Males 
 
 In Labor 
Force 
(1) 
Occupational 
Standing 
(2) 
In Labor 
Force 
(3) 
Occupational 
Standing 
(4) 
Repeal 0.002 0.093 0.002 0.256 
 (0.004) (0.164) (0.006) (0.212) 
     
Specification Baseline Baseline Model 3 Model 3 
     
R2 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.07 
N 1,757,589 1,757,589 1,757,589 1,757,589 
 
Notes: Data are from IPUMS Census samples, 1900-1930. Sample is restricted to native non-farm males age 21-64 (inclusive). All specifications include 
individual level controls (age, age squared, literacy status, urban status), state and year fixed effects, and state-level controls: an indicator for the pre-repeal 
period in alien voting states, and an indicator for the presence of state regulation barring aliens from public employment (Fishback et al. 2009). Model 3 includes 
state-specific census-year linear trends.  IPUMS person weights are used in estimation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.6 – Effect of Disenfranchisement on Probability of Obtaining Public-Sector Employment for Immigrant Males 
 
 Public 1 
(1) 
Public 2 
(2) 
Public 3 
(3) 
Public 1 
(4) 
Public 2  
(5) 
Public 3 
(6) 
Repeal -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.007 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003)* (0.006) (0.001) 
New 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001) 
New * Repeal -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.001) (0.001)** 
       
Specification Model 2 Model 2 Model 2 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 
       
R2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 
N 204,675 204,675 204,675 204,675 204,675 204,675 
 
Notes: Data are from IPUMS Census samples, 1900-1930. Sample is restricted to non-farm males age 21-64 (inclusive), with less than 15 years of residence in 
the U.S. All specifications include individual level controls (age, age squared, literacy status, urban status), state and year fixed effects, and state-level controls: 
an indicator for the pre-repeal period in alien voting states, and an indicator for the presence of state regulation barring aliens from public employment (Fishback 
et al. 2009). Model 2 includes birth-region specific linear trends in year of immigration. Model 3 includes state-specific census-year linear trends. IPUMS person 
weights are used in estimation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.7 –Effect of Disenfranchisement on Probability of Obtaining Public-Sector Employment for Native Males 
 
 Public 1 
(1) 
Public 2 
(2) 
Public 3 
(3) 
Public 1 
(4) 
Public 2  
(5) 
Public 3 
(6) 
Repeal -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
       
Specification Baseline Baseline Baseline Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 
       
R2 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 
N 1,757,589 1,757,589 1,757,589 1,757,589 1,757,589 1,757,589 
 
Notes: Data are from IPUMS Census samples, 1900-1930. Sample is restricted to native non-farm males age 21-64 (inclusive). All specifications include 
individual level controls (age, age squared, literacy status, urban status), state and year fixed effects, and state-level controls: an indicator for the pre-repeal 
period in alien voting states, and an indicator for the presence of state regulation barring aliens from public employment (Fishback et al. 2009). Model 3 includes 
state-specific census-year linear trends.  IPUMS person weights are used in estimation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.8 - Migration Response to Disenfranchisement, 1870-1940 
 
 Ln(Total Pop) 
(1) 
Ln(Total Foreign 
Born Pop) 
(2) 
Fraction 
Foreign Born 
(3) 
Fraction Foreign Born 
Illiterate 
(4) 
More than 30 years pre repeal 0.025 -0.061 -0.049 0.015 
 (0.276) (0.431) (0.050) (0.030) 
20-30 years pre-repeal 0.175 0.157 -0.010 0.026 
 (0.251) (0.318) (0.019) (0.026) 
10-20 years pre-repeal 0.031 0.045 -0.009 0.017 
 (0.130) (0.176) (0.014) (0.027) 
0-10 years post-repeal -0.066 -0.084 0.011 -0.007 
 (0.140) (0.180) (0.010) (0.010) 
10-20 years post-repeal -0.303 -0.342 0.022 -0.011 
 (0.226) (0.287) (0.017) (0.020) 
20-30 years post-repeal -0.638 -0.738 0.028 -0.014 
 (0.342)* (0.423)* (0.025) (0.021) 
30 +  -1.200 -1.266 0.045 -0.008 
 (0.447)*** (0.560)** (0.029) (0.032) 
     
R2 0.97 0.95 0.91 0.76 
N 479 479 479 479 
 
Data are from IPUMS samples, published Census aggregates from 1890 (Haines 2010), and table 37 from the 1890 Census. The dependent variable in column 4 
is the ratio of the number of foreign-born individuals over age 10 that is illiterate to the entire population of foreign-born. All specifications include state fixed 
effects, decade fixed effects, and state-specific linear trends, and indicators for the presence of women’s suffrage, poll taxes, and literacy tests (Lott and Kenny 
1999). Standard errors are clustered at the state level.* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.9 - Effect of Disenfranchisement on Legislator Voting Behavior and Municipal Public Spending 
 
 
 Votes for imm. Restriction Municipal Spending Outcomes 
 Fraction Yes 
 
Fraction Yes 
 
Log Real 
spending 
per capita 
Log Real 
spending 
per capita 
Share on 
Education 
Share on 
Education 
Repeal -0.130 -0.043 0.010 0.024 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.135) (0.074) (0.070) (0.090) (0.006) (0.010) 
Fraction Foreign Born 4.779 2.051 -0.207 -0.543 -0.018 -0.017 
 (3.882) (7.184) (0.351) (0.288)* (0.041) (0.049) 
Fraction Foreign Born ^2 -28.162 -14.429     
 (12.230)** (19.770)     
       
State (city) fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State (city)- specific linear trends N Y N Y N Y 
       
R2 0.39 0.62 0.81 0.87 0.72 0.79 
N 565 565 3,124 3,124 3,114 3,114 
 
Dates of votes are from Goldin (1994). I use all votes listed in table 7.1, except those on 12/14/98, 5/27/2, 6/25/6, and 4/19/12. Roll-call data are from Swift et al. 
(2009).  City spending data are from the Financial Statistics of Cities and Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletins 20 and 36. I use odd-numbered years from 1899-
1929 in my sample except for 1913: data for that year is missing, so 1912 is used instead. All specifications include year fixed effects, indicators for the presence 
of women’s suffrage, poll taxes, and literacy tests, and the fraction foreign-born. Standard errors have been clustered at the state (or city) level. * p<0.1; ** 
p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 1.10 – Effect of Disenfranchisement on English Language Proficiency of Immigrants 
 
 Speak English Speak English Speak English 
Repeal -0.071 -0.049 -0.050 
 (0.029)** (0.025)* (0.015)*** 
New -0.230 -0.307 -0.456 
 (0.017)*** (0.019)*** (0.026)*** 
Repeal * New 0.019 0.018 0.018 
 (0.030) (0.024) (0.022) 
    
Specification Baseline Model 2 Model 3 
    
R2 0.28 0.34 0.35 
N 225,453 224,775 224,775 
 
Notes: Data are from IPUMS Census samples, 1900-1930. Sample is restricted to foreign-born males age 21 and over with less than fifteen years’ residence in 
the U.S. All specifications include individual level controls (age, age squared, literacy status, urban status), state and year fixed effects, and state-level controls: 
an indicator for the pre-repeal period in alien voting states, and an indicator for the presence of state regulation barring aliens from public employment (Fishback 
et al. 2009). Model 2 includes birth-region specific linear trends in year of immigration. Model 3 includes state-specific census-year linear trends. IPUMS person 
weights are used in estimation. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Figure 1.1 – Alternative Specification for Intergenerational Effect of Parental Disenfranchisement on Years of 
Completed Education 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are from the full count 1940 Census. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25 and older, born in states that either never had alien 
voting, or that repealed alien voting prior to 1910. Individual level controls include age, age squared, educational attainment, race indicators, father nativity, and 
father and mother indicators. All specifications include birthplace fixed effects, birth cohort fixed effects, state of residence indicators, and survey year fixed 
effects. “Model 2” includes a set of birth-region specific trends in birth year for each parent; “Model 3” includes a set of birth-state specific trends in birth year. 
IPUMS sample line weights are used in estimation. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the birth state level. 
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Appendix Figure 1.2 – Alternative Specification for Intergenerational Effect of Parental Disenfranchisement on Ln(Income) 
 
 
 
Notes: Data are from the full count 1940 Census. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25-64 (inclusive). Individual level controls include age, 
age squared, educational attainment, race indicators, father nativity, and father and mother indicators. All specifications include birthplace fixed effects, birth 
cohort fixed effects, state of residence indicators, and survey year fixed effects. “Model 2” includes a set of birth-region specific trends in birth year for each 
parent; “Model 3” includes a set of birth-state specific trends in birth year. IPUMS sample line weights are used in estimation. 95% confidence intervals are 
displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the birth state level. 
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Appendix Table 1.1.1 - Effect of Disenfranchisement on Mayoral Voter Activity, 1880-1924 
 
 Voting 
Activity 
Voting 
Activity 
12+ Years Pre -0.071 -0.131 
 (0.059) (0.167) 
8-12 Years Pre -0.029 -0.096 
 (0.031) (0.086) 
4-8 Years Pre -0.023 -0.062 
 (0.079) (0.093) 
0-4 Years Post -0.120 -0.110 
 (0.081) (0.050)** 
4-8 Years Post -0.178 -0.140 
 (0.061)*** (0.048)*** 
8-12 Years Post -0.242 -0.114 
 (0.077)*** (0.117) 
12+ Years Post -0.249 -0.065 
 (0.223) (0.079) 
   
Specification Baseline Model 2 
   
R2 0.66 0.73 
N 254 254 
Notes: data on mayoral votes totals is from Holli and Jones (1981) and the cities of San Diego and Seattle. The cities in the sample are Baltimore, Boston, 
Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Orleans, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, San Diego, San 
Francisco, and Seattle. City level controls an indicator for the presence of women’s suffrage, poll taxes, literacy tests, and the fraction of the population that is 
foreign born. Baseline specification includes city and year fixed effects. Model 2 includes city-specific trends. Standard errors are calculated via wild bootstrap.  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 1.1.2 - Effect of Disenfranchisement on Gubernatorial Voting Activity, 1870-1940 
 Voting 
Activity 
Voting 
Activity 
16+ Years Pre 0.037 0.021 
 (0.051) (0.041) 
12-16 Years Pre 0.006 0.001 
 (0.037) (0.029) 
8-12 Years Pre 0.044 0.036 
 (0.034) (0.029) 
4-8 Years Pre 0.009 0.005 
 (0.022) (0.022) 
0-4 Years Post -0.032 -0.054 
 (0.028) (0.025)** 
4-8 Years Post -0.058 -0.060 
 (0.036) (0.031)* 
8-12 Years Post -0.050 -0.067 
 (0.042) (0.035)* 
12-16 Years Post -0.036 -0.062 
 (0.053) (0.047) 
16+ Years Post -0.087 -0.056 
 (0.060) (0.054) 
   
Specification Baseline Model 2 
   
R2 0.83 0.93 
N 1,169 1,169 
Notes: gubernatorial election data are from Burnham et al. (1991). State level controls an indicator for the presence of women’s suffrage, poll taxes, literacy tests, 
and the fraction of the adult male population that is non-citizen. Baseline specification includes state and year fixed effects. Model 2 includes state-specific 
trends. WA, ID, OK, and NV are excluded from the sample because there are no pre-disenfranchisement observations. 95% confidence intervals are shown. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 1.1.3 - Effect of Disenfranchisement on Presidential Voting Activity, 1870-1940 
 Voting 
Activity 
Voting 
Activity 
16+ Years Pre 0.021 0.066 
 (0.064) (0.056) 
12-16 Years Pre 0.010 0.029 
 (0.050) (0.045) 
8-12 Years Pre 0.015 0.037 
 (0.052) (0.047) 
4-8 Years Pre 0.010 0.014 
 (0.030) (0.030) 
0-4 Years Post -0.014 -0.039 
 (0.036) (0.030) 
4-8 Years Post -0.032 -0.048 
 (0.033) (0.023)** 
8-12 Years Post -0.016 -0.036 
 (0.044) (0.036) 
12-16 Years Post -0.015 -0.034 
 (0.041) (0.037) 
16+ Years Post -0.077 -0.039 
 (0.054) (0.038) 
Specification Baseline Model 2 
R2 0.86 0.95 
N 744 744 
Notes: gubernatorial election data are from Clubb et al. (2006). State level controls an indicator for the presence of women’s suffrage, poll taxes, literacy tests, 
and the fraction of the adult male population that is non-citizen. Baseline specification includes state and year fixed effects. Model 2 includes state-specific 
trends. WA, ID, OK, and NV are excluded from the sample because there are no pre-disenfranchisement observations. 95% confidence intervals are shown. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 1.2 - Public Sector Employment Codes 
 
Coding 1 (“Public 1”). Government job indicator equals 1 if occupation equals: 
 
1900: Clerks in government offices; employees of government (not clerks); Officials of Government 
 
1910 and 1920: Firemen – fire department; guards, watchmen, and doorkeepers; garbagemen and scavengers; other laborers (public 
service); detectives; marshals and constables; probation and truant offices; sheriffs; Officials and inspectors – city; officials and 
inspectors – county; official and inspectors – state; postmasters; other United States officials; policemen; life-savers; lighthouse 
keepers; other occupations (public service) 
 
1930:  Firemen – fire department; Guards, watchmen, and doorkeepers; garbagemen and scavengers; detectives; marshals and 
constables; probation and truant offices; sheriffs; Officials and inspectors – city; officials and inspectors – county; official and 
inspectors – state; officials and inspectors – United States; policemen; other public service pursuits 
 
Coding 2 (“Public 2”): Government Job indicator equals 1 if IND1950 (“Industry, 1950 basis”) equals: 
“Postal Service”, “Federal Public Administration”, “State public administration”, “local public administration”, and “Public 
Administration, level not specified” 
All instances when the occupation string indicated a military position (for example, “Soldier”, “Sailor”, “U S Navy”) were excluded 
from this definition. 
 
Coding 3 (“Public 3”) Government Job indicator equals 1 if IND1950 (“Industry, 1950 basis”) equals: 
“Local Public Administration” 
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Appendix Table 1.3.1 - Coefficients for Intergenerational Effect of Parental Disenfranchisement on Educational Attainment 
 Highest Grade Highest Grade Highest Grade 
Age at Repeal 25-30 -0.002 0.142 0.117 
 (0.250) (0.238) (0.251) 
Age at Repeal 20-25 -0.363 -0.235 -0.281 
 (0.223) (0.213) (0.224) 
Age at Repeal 15-20 -0.378 -0.270 -0.340 
 (0.301) (0.290) (0.291) 
Age at Repeal 10-15 -0.256 -0.175 -0.276 
 (0.256) (0.251) (0.247) 
Age at Repeal 5-10 -0.497 -0.451 -0.556 
 (0.243)** (0.239)* (0.243)** 
Age at Repeal 0-5 -0.373 -0.356 -0.459 
 (0.228) (0.234) (0.226)** 
Age at Repeal -5-0 -0.314 -0.330 -0.417 
 (0.202) (0.217) (0.206)** 
Age at Repeal -5--10 -0.278 -0.305 -0.372 
 (0.198) (0.222) (0.213)* 
Age at Repeal -10--15 -0.135 -0.184 -0.212 
 (0.196) (0.220) (0.213) 
Age at Repeal -15--20 -0.098 -0.147 -0.124 
 (0.188) (0.191) (0.189) 
Age at Repeal <-20 0.127 0.013 0.116 
 (0.157) (0.174) (0.176) 
Specification Baseline Model 2 Model 3 
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 
N 3,751,233 3,751,233 3,751,233 
Notes: Data are from the full count 1940 Census and IPUMS 1950 and 1960 Census samples. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25 and older. 
Individual level controls include age, age squared, educational attainment, race indicators, father nativity, and father and mother indicators. All specifications 
include birthplace fixed effects, birth cohort fixed effects, state of residence indicators, and survey year fixed effects. “Model 2” includes a set of birth-region 
specific trends in birth year for each parent; “Model 3” includes a set of birth-state specific trends in birth year. IPUMS sample line weights are used in 
estimation. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the birth state level. 
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Appendix Table 1.3.2 - Coefficients for Intergenerational Effect of Parental Disenfranchisement on Ln(Income) 
 Ln(Income) Ln(Income) Ln(Income) 
Age at Repeal 25-30 0.084 0.062 0.084 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.103) 
Age at Repeal 20-25 -0.018 -0.041 -0.018 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) 
Age at Repeal 15-20 -0.013 -0.031 -0.012 
 (0.044) (0.042) (0.046) 
Age at Repeal 10-15 -0.011 -0.021 -0.016 
 (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) 
Age at Repeal 5-10 -0.017 -0.028 -0.024 
 (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) 
Age at Repeal 0-5 -0.067 -0.074 -0.078 
 (0.041) (0.042)* (0.044)* 
Age at Repeal -5-0 -0.084 -0.089 -0.098 
 (0.038)** (0.042)** (0.041)** 
Age at Repeal -5--10 -0.061 -0.065 -0.075 
 (0.028)** (0.031)** (0.032)** 
Age at Repeal -10--15 -0.069 -0.070 -0.080 
 (0.032)** (0.037)* (0.037)** 
Age at Repeal -15--20 -0.056 -0.051 -0.051 
 (0.029)* (0.030) (0.029)* 
Age at Repeal <-20 -0.017 0.001 0.002 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Specification Baseline Model 2 Model 3 
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18 
N 2,479,828 2,479,828 2,479,828 
Notes: Data are from the full count 1940 Census and IPUMS 1950 and 1960 Census samples. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25-64 
(inclusive). Individual level controls include age, age squared, educational attainment, race indicators, father nativity, and father and mother indicators. All 
specifications include birthplace fixed effects, birth cohort fixed effects, state of residence indicators, and survey year fixed effects. “Model 2” includes a set of 
birth-region specific trends in birth year for each parent; “Model 3” includes a set of birth-state specific trends in birth year. IPUMS sample line weights are used 
in estimation. 95% confidence intervals are displayed. Standard errors are clustered at the birth state level. 
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Appendix Table 1.4.1 – Intergenerational Effect on Education, sequentially dropping Regions (Model 3) 
 Highest Grade 
(no South) 
Highest Grade 
(no West) 
Highest Grade 
(no Midwest) 
Highest Grade 
(no Northeast) 
Age at Repeal 25-30 0.270 0.107 -0.041 0.015 
 (0.291) (0.254) (0.336) (0.238) 
Age at Repeal 20-25 -0.100 -0.319 -0.371 -0.351 
 (0.233) (0.225) (0.406) (0.206)* 
Age at Repeal 15-20 -0.097 -0.360 -0.599 -0.429 
 (0.278) (0.294) (0.574) (0.266) 
Age at Repeal 10-15 -0.046 -0.351 -0.512 -0.356 
 (0.241) (0.239) (0.560) (0.216) 
Age at Repeal 5-10 -0.272 -0.641 -0.927 -0.633 
 (0.160)* (0.240)** (0.593) (0.204)*** 
Age at Repeal 0-5 -0.274 -0.546 -0.519 -0.545 
 (0.156)* (0.223)** (0.585) (0.188)*** 
Age at Repeal -5-0 -0.235 -0.507 -0.580 -0.486 
 (0.137)* (0.212)** (0.480) (0.160)*** 
Age at Repeal -5--10 -0.267 -0.426 -0.500 -0.464 
 (0.129)** (0.223)* (0.514) (0.176)** 
Age at Repeal -10--15 -0.195 -0.285 -0.121 -0.302 
 (0.150) (0.226) (0.466) (0.186) 
Age at Repeal -15--20 -0.329 -0.183 0.575 -0.280 
 (0.134)** (0.206) (0.250)** (0.194) 
Age at Repeal <-20 -0.083 0.173 0.471 -0.020 
 (0.135) (0.224) (0.321) (0.188) 
R2 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.21 
N 2,421,948 3,524,605 2,507,488 2,799,658 
Notes: Data are from the 1940 full count Census and 1950 and 1960 Census samples. Sample is restricted to  sample line native males aged 25 and older. 
Individual level controls include age, age squared, race indicators, birth place indicators, birth year indicators, father birth region indicators, and mother birth 
region indicators. Model 3 includes linear time trends in birth year for each mother and father birth region and linear time trends for each birthstate. All 
specifications include state of residence and census year fixed effects. IPUMS sample line weights are used in estimation. p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 1.4.2 – Intergenerational Effect on Ln(Income), sequentially dropping Regions (Model 3) 
 Ln(Income) 
(no South) 
Ln(Income) 
(no West) 
Ln(Income) 
(no Midwest) 
Ln(Income) 
(no Northeast) 
Age at Repeal 25-30 0.169 0.083 -0.069 0.053 
 (0.111) (0.104) (0.037)* (0.101) 
Age at Repeal 20-25 0.029 -0.024 -0.065 -0.044 
 (0.042) (0.035) (0.041) (0.038) 
Age at Repeal 15-20 0.051 -0.024 -0.112 -0.040 
 (0.034) (0.044) (0.093) (0.047) 
Age at Repeal 10-15 0.042 -0.013 -0.135 -0.045 
 (0.043) (0.048) (0.024)*** (0.045) 
Age at Repeal 5-10 0.003 -0.037 -0.053 -0.056 
 (0.045) (0.043) (0.076) (0.039) 
Age at Repeal 0-5 -0.029 -0.089 -0.136 -0.110 
 (0.039) (0.045)* (0.067)** (0.041)** 
Age at Repeal -5-0 -0.087 -0.120 -0.048 -0.130 
 (0.049)* (0.044)*** (0.047) (0.040)*** 
Age at Repeal -5--10 -0.032 -0.073 -0.169 -0.109 
 (0.027) (0.033)** (0.047)*** (0.030)*** 
Age at Repeal -10--15 -0.057 -0.098 -0.050 -0.114 
 (0.037) (0.039)** (0.073) (0.035)*** 
Age at Repeal -15--20 -0.058 -0.048 -0.009 -0.087 
 (0.025)** (0.033) (0.053) (0.029)*** 
Age at Repeal <-20 -0.013 0.001 0.038 -0.036 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.029) (0.021)* 
R2 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.19 
N 1,628,456 2,315,560 1,698,762 1,796,706 
Notes: Data are from the 1940 full count Census and 1950 and 1960 IPUMS Census samples. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25-64 
(inclusive). Individual level controls include age, age squared, race indicators, birth place indicators, birth year indicators, father birth region indicators, and 
mother birth region indicators. Model 3 includes linear time trends in birth year for each mother and father birth region and linear time trends for each birth state. 
All specifications include state of residence and census year fixed effects. IPUMS sample line weights are used in estimation. p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 1.5 - Intergenerational Effect on Ln(Income), controlling for Educational Attainment (Model 3) 
 Ln(Income) Ln(Income) 
Age at Repeal 25-30 0.084 0.052 
 (0.103) (0.078) 
Age at Repeal 20-25 -0.018 -0.022 
 (0.035) (0.036) 
Age at Repeal 15-20 -0.012 0.004 
 (0.046) (0.037) 
Age at Repeal 10-15 -0.016 -0.004 
 (0.047) (0.034) 
Age at Repeal 5-10 -0.024 0.001 
 (0.042) (0.034) 
Age at Repeal 0-5 -0.078 -0.057 
 (0.044)* (0.032)* 
Age at Repeal -5-0 -0.098 -0.072 
 (0.041)** (0.036)* 
Age at Repeal -5--10 -0.075 -0.053 
 (0.032)** (0.024)** 
Age at Repeal -10--15 -0.080 -0.068 
 (0.037)** (0.030)** 
Age at Repeal -15--20 -0.051 -0.047 
 (0.029)* (0.025)* 
Age at Repeal <-20 0.002 -0.005 
 (0.020) (0.016) 
Education Control? N Y 
R2 0.18 0.23 
N 2,479,828 2,479,828 
Notes: Data are from the 1940 full count Census and 1950 and 1960 IPUMS Census samples. Sample is restricted to sample line native males aged 25-64 
(inclusive). Individual level controls include age, age squared, race indicators, birth place indicators, birth year indicators, father birth region indicators, mother 
birth region indicators. Model 3 includes linear time trends in birth year for each mother and father birth region and linear time trends for each birth state. 
Column 1 repeats results for Model 3 from Appendix table 3B. Column 2 controls for completed education. All specifications include state of residence fixed 
effects. IPUMS sample line weights are used in estimation. p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 69 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
What Drives Expansions and Contractions of the Electorate? Evidence from Alien Voting 
in the United States 
 
In a little-known episode of United States history, 24 states and territories expanded the franchise from 1848-1890 to 
include non-citizen immigrants. From 1864-1926, however, these same states and territories repealed this right to 
vote, creating a mass disenfranchisement that affected up to 20% of the voting population in certain states. This 
policy shift offers a valuable opportunity to understand the forces determining political inclusion and exclusion in a 
formative period of American democracy, and contributes to the broader literature on theories of democratization. I 
use qualitative evidence from the historical record to outline competing theories of both adoption and repeal of alien 
voting, and then rationalize these hypotheses within the context of a median voting model. Using a discrete time 
hazard specification, I find evidence consistent with the hypothesis that states used alien voting as a locational 
amenity, with the objective of inducing immigrant in-migration in order to foster agricultural development. The 
results indicate that the timing of repeal was driven by social costs, rather than economic or political factors, 
although there is evidence for heterogeneity in correlates of support for repeal across states. Finally, the costs of 
constitutional change were salient for both adoption and repeal: states for which it was less costly to re-write or 
amend the constitution were more likely both to adopt and repeal alien voting.   
 
2.1 Introduction 
In a little-known chapter in American history, twenty-four states and territories extended 
the right to vote to non-citizen immigrants from 1848-1890. This constituted a significant 
departure from existing voting policy, which formerly had restricted the franchise only to citizens 
of the United States. From 1864-1926, however, these same states and territories repealed those 
provisions, returning to the standard of citizen voting. This latter shift affected up to 20% of the 
voting population, and had adverse consequences for the political engagement and economic 
wellbeing of immigrants and their offspring (Henderson 2017). 
Theoretically, an expansion of the franchise to include individuals lower on the income 
distribution results in increased demands for redistribution via public expenditure (Meltzer and 
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Richard 1981). This is supported by a considerable – although not universal – body of empirical 
evidence, from a variety of settings, finding that expanding the right to vote results in increased 
and more widely distributed public spending (Miller 2008; Lott and Kenny 1999; Aidt and Dallal 
2008; Cascio and Washington 2014). Given that increasing the electorate has predictable effects 
upon redistribution, a deeper economic question is: why would a group voluntarily dilute its own 
stake in the determination of resource allocation, thereby possibly sacrificing a portion of those 
resources? And, once included in the electorate, why would the included group allow itself to be 
voted out?  
In this paper, I explore the determinants of expansion, and then contraction, in state-level 
immigrant voting rights from the mid-19th to early-20th centuries. Scholars acknowledge that 
relatively little work exists on alien voting in the United States, but have advanced several 
hypotheses for the causes of adoption and repeal.1 Using qualitative and narrative evidence, I 
first present the competing hypotheses – economic, political, and social – and then rationalize 
these in the context of a median voting model, in which the pivotal voter decides whether or not 
to expand (or contract) the electorate based on the costs and benefits of doing so. 
To test these hypotheses, I pursue two complementary empirical strategies: first, I 
assemble a state-decade dataset from 1850 – 1930 containing information on the timing of 
adoption and repeal of alien voting, economic development, political control, demographics, and 
the prevailing methods of constitutional amendment. I use a discrete-time proportional hazard 
specification in order to quantify the factors that affected the hazard of adoption or repeal of 
alien voting. I find that labor scarcity was a predictor of adoption: a one standard deviation 
                                                          
1 Raskin (1993) notes that “legal observers who have ventured into this field have correctly noted the dramatic 
absence of professional historical accounts of alien suffrage.” (Page 1393) 
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increase in the fraction of the population that was adult men was associated with a 76.2% 
reduction in the hazard of adoption. Moreover, adoption was less likely to occur in more 
economically developed states: one standard deviation increases in the fraction of acreage in the 
state that was agriculturally improved and the real value of manufacturing output per capita were 
associated with, respectively, reductions in the hazard of adoption of 80%, and 49%. This is 
consistent with qualitative evidence suggesting that alien voting was used as a locational 
amenity, intended to induce in-migration into labor-scarce states in order to accelerate economic 
development. I find no statistical evidence of political or social forces affecting the hazard of 
adoption of alien voting.  
There is also no evidence for systematic economic or political determinants of repeal of 
alien voting; instead, the results suggest that repeal was driven by the social costs of immigration 
during this era. I find a positive relationship between the proportion of the population that is 
foreign born and the hazard of repeal, and this strengthens in both magnitude and statistical 
significance with the exclusion of outliers. Finally, I document that the costs of constitutional 
change were relevant for both adoption and repeal: states with lower costs of constitutional 
change were over twenty times more likely to adopt alien voting, and eight times more likely to 
repeal alien voting, in a given decade. The salience of the costs of constitutional change has been 
overlooked in the alien voting literature, and, to the extent that amending procedures do not vary 
systematically across states, suggests that the timing of repeal of alien voting may be (partially) 
exogenous to underlying attitudes toward immigrants.  
Hazard models cannot account for fixed factors within states. Therefore, my second 
empirical strategy uses newly assembled county-level election data from thirteen states in order 
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to explore the determinants of within-state support for disenfranchisement.2 I further leverage the 
fact that Missouri voted twice for alien voting – first, unsuccessfully, in 1912, and then 
successfully in 1924 – to control for unobserved, time-invariant, county-level factors. I find that, 
consistent with high social costs of immigration in this period, support for repeal was generally 
greater in counties with a higher fraction of the population that was foreign born, although this is 
not statistically significant and there is evidence of heterogeneity among states.  
This paper contributes to four literatures. First, it adds to the large existing body of work 
on the causes of democratization, ranging from the enfranchisement of working class men in 
Europe (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000 and 2001; Conley and Temimi 2001; Lizzeri and Persico 
2004) to men in colonial British America (Nikolova 2015), to women in Europe (Bertocchi 
2011) to women in the United States (Braun and Kvasnicka 2013).  This paper not only studies a 
original setting and population – immigrants in late 19th and early 20th century America – but 
also is among the first, to my knowledge, to systematically address causes of franchise 
contraction in any setting.  
Second, this paper complements the growing literature on immigration in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries in the United States., and, particularly, the nascent literature on endogenous 
policy responses to immigration. Scholars have leveraged the widespread digitization of 
historical data to understand more about immigrant socio-economic assimilation in this period, 
ranging from labor market assimilation, to social assimilation, to return migration behavior 
(Abramitzky et al 2012; Abramitzky et al 2014; Abramitkzy et al 2016; Bandiera et al 2013; 
Ward and Greenwood 2016). There has been less work on the interaction of immigration and 
                                                          
2 Amending a constitution requires that the proposed amending pass a popular vote for final ratification. I collected 
these county-level vote totals for 13 of the 14 alien voting states that repealed via constitutional amendment. I was 
unable to locate county-level returns for Oregon.  
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political outcomes, however, and scholars are only just beginning to address the impact of 
immigration on policies of the era (Bandiera et al 2015; Abramitzky and Boustan 2016).  
Third, this paper relates more broadly to institutional change in U.S. economic history. 
Broadly construed, institutions shape economic interaction, and scholars have long recognized 
their importance for economic development.  Recent evidence highlights the responsiveness of 
institutions to economic and demographic forces in the 19th and early 20th centuries (Rosebloom 
and Sundstrom 2009; Wallis 2005; Benmelech and Moskowitz 2005), and the role of institutions 
shaping public finance and infrastructure investment (Lamoreaux and Wallis 2016). By focusing 
on the expansion and contraction of alien voting rights, I am able to analyze determinants for 
institutional change within a given set of institutions over time. 
Finally, this contributes to the growing literature on the effects of constitutions.  This has, 
until recently, been relatively unexamined in economics (Persson and Tabellini 2003), although 
it has long been the subject of political science research (Sartori 1994, Powell 1982, Lijphart 
1994). Results from this paper point to the importance of constitutional amending procedures in 
determining the pace of constitutional change, which, in turn, suggests that research using 
identification based on constitutional change should take these procedures into account. 
In section 2, I discuss the context for the expansion and contraction of alien voting, and in 
section 3, present narrative evidence on causes of alien voting adoption and repeal. Section 4 
rationalizes the competing hypotheses in a median voter model, and Section 5 presents empirical 
evidence for the state-level determinants of adoption and repeal. Section 6 explores support for 
repeal within-state, and Section 7 concludes. 
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2.2 Historical Context  
2.2.1. Adoption 
Starting with Wisconsin in 1848, twenty-three other states and territories from 1848-1890 
adopted provisions in their state or territorial constitutions that allowed non-citizen immigrants 
the right to vote in local, state, and federal elections (Hayduk 2006, Keyssar 2000). These 
provisions enfranchised those immigrants that had completed the first of a two-step 
naturalization procedure by declaring their intent to become citizens (also known as “filing first 
papers”).3 There was substantial variation in terms of the timing and geography of this franchise 
expansion: Midwestern states and territories enacted these provisions in the late 1840s and 
1850s; Western territories during the Civil War, and Southern states following the Civil War. No 
states in the Northeast adopted alien voting. See figure 2.1.1 for a map of the adoption of alien 
voting. 
Of the twenty-four alien voting states and territories, ten existing states adopted alien 
voting as part of a new state constitution; six new states continued the existing policy of alien 
voting enacted when the state was a territory; two states that, as territories, did not allow alien 
voting, adopted it upon admission to the Union; and six territories allowed declarant aliens to 
vote, but ended the practice upon their admission to the union. This is summarized in appendix 
table 2.1.1, along with detailed sources for establishing the date of adoption.4 Two features are 
notable: first, of the ten existing states that adopted alien voting, seven were Southern states that 
                                                          
3 As opposed to the wholesale enfranchisement of all immigrants, this “intermediate” enfranchisement of 
immigrants was “framed in the spirit of compromise” (Page 230, The Convention of 1846). Given the low costs of 
declaring an intent for citizenship, however – this could happen at any point after arrival, at any one of 5,000 
“competent courts” around the county – this compromise may have been broader than was initially intended. 
 
4 In the territories, voting qualifications were initially specified by a Congressional Organic acts, with subsequent 
policy left to the jurisdiction of the territorial legislatures (Porter 1918).  
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did so in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War, when all former confederate states were 
required to draft new constitutions as a condition of re-joining the Union (Hill and Hill, 2008). 
Second, none of the existing states adopted alien voting via constitutional amendment. I discuss 
both points in greater detail below. 
2.2.2  Repeal 
All twenty-four alien voting states and territories eventually disenfranchised declarant 
aliens, returning to the standard of citizen-voting. The timing does not mirror that of alien 
enfranchisement: the correlation coefficient between the year of adoption and year of repeal is    
-.19, implying that later-adopting states tended to repeal earlier, and there is considerably more 
variance in the timing of repeal (standard deviation of 17.9) than the timing of adoption (standard 
deviation 10.5). See figure 2.1.2 for a map of the year of repeal, by state. The modes of repeal 
also differed from the modes of adoption (see appendix table 2.1.2 for details). Of the twenty-
four states and territories that contracted their electorates, fourteen did so via constitutional 
amendment – that is, replacing only a portion of the relevant constitutional article, rather than 
creating an entirely new constitution - and four as part of an entirely new constitution. Four 
territories disenfranchised non-citizen aliens upon entry to the Union, and two did so via 
territorial legislation while still a territory.  
2.3 Narrative Evidence for Determinants of Adoption and Repeal 
2.3.1 Adoption 
Legal scholars and historians agree that one of the primary reasons for alien 
enfranchisement was economic self-interest: immigrants were expected to respond to the 
amenity of voting by migrating in large numbers, thus facilitating economic and agricultural 
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development (Raskin 1993, Rosberg 1977).5 The contemporary evidence for this view abounds. 
For example, in the Michigan constitutional convention of 1850, Delegate W.V. Morrison of 
Calhoun County contended: 
"I consider that by extending the right of suffrage to foreigners, we are advancing the best 
interests of the State. We have expended thousands to induce emigrants to reside with us, and 
what have we effected? Wisconsin [which enacted non-citizen voting in 1848] has opened her 
doors - she has extended to them the right of suffrage, and thousands have poured in, developing 
the resources and adding to the riches of the State. Thousands have gone 'round by the Lakes; 
and if you question the travelers upon the Central Railroad, they will tell you they are going to 
Wisconsin. If any of them remain, their friends in Wisconsin tell them that rights are given there 
that are withheld in Michigan; and at the first opportunity they leave us and take up their abode 
there. And we may expend money by our emigration agents, but if we persist in our narrow 
policy, it will have but little effect."  
The enthusiasm with which immigrants were embraced as engines of economic 
development is mirrored in the convention support for alien voting adoption: it passed 
unanimously in Wisconsin in 1848 and Minnesota in 1857, 89-10 in Indiana in 1850, and lost by 
only nine votes in Illinois (Porter 1918). Similar sentiment can be found in the proceedings of 
other constitutional conventions - for example, Montana in 18896 – as well as academic work 
and judicial decisions from the era (McCulloch 1929; Porter 1918; Harper-Ho 2000).7 This 
                                                          
5 It is worth noting that scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries noted that this expected surge of migration 
due to voting did not materialize: Chaney (1894) writes that “immigrants flocked into Illinois, which required 
citizenship, and in doing so passed through Indiana which was satisfied with a declaration of intention.” This is 
echoed in Williams (1912): “Alien suffrage was a drawing card used by western states to attract foreign 
immigration… the failure of alien suffrage to accomplish its original purpose appears from the fact that foreigners 
today do not hesitate to leave Nebraska [in which alien suffrage still held] for Colorado, Montana, Wyoming and 
other states in which they cannot vote, provided they can better their economic condition.” 
 
6 Mr Middleton, of Custer: “It does not seem to me that that amendment offered by the gentleman from Silver Bow 
should be made. The qualification of requiring a man to be a full citizen of the United States [in order to vote]… 
does not seem to me to be conducive to that kind of immigration that we want to have. … I do not believe that it is 
desirable in the interests of a new state as sparsely settled as this is at the time, and of such vast territory, to make 
that sort of qualification.” Page 352, Proceeding and Debates of the Constitutional Convention Held in the City of 
Helena, Montana, July 4th 1889, August 17th 1889. McCulloch (1929) writes: “when… much-needed settlers were 
pouring into the central part of the United Sates, states in that section began to offer extra inducements by allowing 
aliens to vote after taking out first papers.” Porter (1918) concurs: “to offer [immigrants] elective franchise very 
soon after their arrival seemed to be an effective way of attracting them.”  
 
7In Spragins v Houghton (1840), the Illinois Supreme court noted that the intent of granting the right to vote to 
immigrants was to “induce a flood of emigration to the state, and cause its early and compact settlement.” 
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motivation was not limited to Midwestern states: scholars have hypothesized that the 
proliferation of alien voting in the postbellum South was due to the need to attract cheap 
immigrant labor following the emancipation of slaves (Hayduk 2006). 
The prospect of a flood of in-migration would have conferred benefits in addition to that 
driven by the marginal product of the additional labor force. Congressional apportionment in this 
era was based on the “number of [free] persons”, suggesting that increased Congressional 
representation may have been another benefit of in-migration (Porter 1918). Furthermore, as 
indicated in the above-quoted passage, jurisdictional competition in this era may have heightened 
the perceived need for, and benefit from, immigration.  
It is possible that the economic case for alien voting was bolstered by the state budgetary 
crises of the early 1840s. Eight states and the territory of Florida defaulted on their debt, and 
three nearly did; in the wake of this crisis, states amended their constitutions to restrict modes of 
financing “internal improvements” (Wallis 2005). States, therefore, may have viewed the 
possibility of migration induced by alien voting as a relatively riskless means of development. 
This was implied during Illinois’ constitutional convention of 1847, where one delegate 
explicitly linked the recent budgetary crisis with the prospect of a large-scale migration response 
to enfranchisement: “Is it our policy, as a state burdened with debt and sparsely settled, to restrict 
the right of suffrage, and thus prevent immigration to our soil?” (Keyssar 2000, pg 38).  
Finally, states may have expanded their franchise – or not – for political reasons. Keyssar 
(2000, Pg 40) writes that “the Democratic embrace of alien suffrage… was unmistakably 
motivated in part by the party’s desire to enroll and win the support of immigrant voters.” 
Neuman (1993) echoes this, citing the dynamics of alien suffrage in Wisconsin: “in the 
Wisconsin Territory of the 1840s, the Democratic Party sought the support of the large 
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immigrant population.” Raskin (1993) arrives at a similar conclusion regarding Michigan’s 
expansion of alien suffrage in 1850: delegates “linked alien suffrage to both democratic and 
Democratic politics.”8  
2.3.2   Repeal 
There is little narrative evidence to suggest that political motivations drove the repeal of 
alien voting. A sole opinion piece - in the Detroit Free Press in 1894 - suggests a role for politics 
in the repeal of alien voting, arguing that the Michigan amendment is “Republican in origin”, 
and stems from the fact that “it has been unable to secure [the foreign voting bloc’s] support 
except to a very limited extent.” An exhaustive search of America’s Historical Newspapers for 
articles relating to alien voting, however, reveals no other evidence that commenters imputed 
political motivations to alien disenfranchisement.9 I was also unable to find any suggestion – 
scholarly or contemporary - that the timing of repeal was related to economic forces. However, 
this is not evidence of absence: the broad time pattern of repeal suggests that the economic crisis 
of the 1890s may have been a motivating factor – four states (FL, MI, MN, LA) repealed from 
1894-1898 - and Goldin (1994) documents that support for immigration restriction was higher in 
areas with a greater negative impact of immigration on native wages. 
                                                          
8 While the relatively immigrant-heavy Northeastern states did not adopt alien voting, there is little to support the 
argument of Braun and Kvasnicka (2013), who argue that women’s suffrage originated in the American West 
because a “scarcity” of women in the region implied that allowing women to vote imposed little cost upon male 
voters by potentially changing the balance of power. Indeed, several early adopting Midwestern alien voting states 
had among the highest proportion of adult male immigrants in the country in 1850: Wisconsin was 52% immigrant, 
Minnesota 38%, Michigan 19% (Ruggles et al, 2015).  
 
9 Given that the majority of repeals were effected via constitutional amendment, rather than as part of new 
constitutions – with the attendant written proceedings of each constitutional convention - there is far less record of 
public debate concerning the repeal of alien voting. 
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Modern scholars generally concur that the repeal of declarant alien voting was due to the 
rising anti-immigrant sentiment of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, although they differ in 
their opinions as to the sources of this changing sentiment. Factors that have been mentioned in 
the literature range from the assassination of President McKinley by a second-generation 
immigrant in 1901 (Rosberg 1977), to the shifting ethnic origins of immigrants from Northwest 
Europe to Southeast Europe in the late 19th century (Neuman 1993), to “the hysteria attending 
World War One” (Raskin 1993). 
In general, contemporary observers opposed declarant alien voting on the grounds that 
allowing non-citizen immigrants to vote presented a significant social cost to existing voters. 
Public opposition to alien voting tended to focus on a perceived lack of immigrant assimilation. 
As early as 1888, an article in the Topeka Weekly Capital suggests a modification of existing 
immigration law in order to foster immigrant assimilation, and exhorts lawmakers to “exclude 
every such alien from exercising the right to vote at any election until the full period of probation 
has expired and he has become a citizen.” A piece in the Morning Oregonian in 1893 serves as 
part warning, part public service announcement, apprising the reader that a number of “Western 
states… have extended the franchise to foreigners in advance of their acquisition of citizenship” 
and warns that the “ignorant Italian or Pole” has undue political influence because of these alien 
voting provisions, concluding by reassuring the reader that repealing alien voting would mean 
that “the evils of unrestricted immigration would be greatly diminished.”10 The tone of surprised 
indignation is echoed in the Washington Post in 1902, which, again, informs readers that “there 
are many States where an immigrant is not obliged to become a full-fledged citizen in order to be 
                                                          
10 Kansas would go on to repeal alien voting in 1918, Oregon in 1914.  
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the peer of the native on election day” and suggests the introduction of a language qualification 
for voting to ensure that voting immigrants are committed to American ideals.11  
2.3.3  Constitutional Change 
Scholars of alien suffrage have universally neglected to consider the role of the processes 
guarding constitutional change when attempting to explain the timing of adoption and repeal.12 
This is puzzling for two reasons: first, the legal basis for alien suffrage was constitutional, not 
statutory, and thus requiring constitutional overhaul or amendment to both enact and repeal. 
Second, states differed significantly in the manner by which they can change their constitutions, 
with the costs of constitutional change varying accordingly. In this sub-section, I briefly review 
the procedures by which constitutions can be altered, and discuss the potential relevance to the 
timing of alien voting adoption and repeal. 
In this era, states changed their constitutions in one of two ways: amending a part of an 
existing constitution, or crafting an entirely new constitution in a constitutional convention.13 
The constitutions themselves contain provisions on how to amend or how to call a convention, 
and the structure of the amending procedures tends to be stable across states: a proposed 
amendment must have originated in the state legislature and have achieved a certain fraction of 
legislative support (1/2, 3/5, or 2/3), and have passed with that level of support either once or 
                                                          
11 This is echoed in academic work of the era. Chaney (1894) writes that Michigan’s expansion of the electorate in 
1850 to include declarant aliens “now looks so queer… and makes people wonder why a mere declaration of 
intention should ever have been thought enough of a preliminary for the most important right that can be exercised 
of any qualified citizen.”  
 
12 In their study of the timing of adoption of state-level women’s suffrage, Braun and Kvasnicka (2013) 
acknowledge that this may have been a relevant factor. 
 
13 Several states also have initiative procedures in which a proposed amendment may start as a petition and, given 
enough popular support, may be subject to a popular vote for ratification; however, these are rare even today, and 
virtually nonexistent in the early 20th century (Friedman 1988) 
 81 
twice. If the amendment so passed, it was then referred to the public for a popular vote, in either 
a general or special election, and was required to achieve a majority of public support in order to 
become enshrined in the constitution. Crucially, states differed in the effective fraction of 
support in the popular ratification required for passage in the next general election.14 
Specifically, certain states require that the fraction of the popular vote needed for ratification 
constitutes a majority of all votes at that election, and other states require only a majority of 
votes from those voting on that particular amendment. Given the practice of “roll-off voting”, in 
which individuals are less likely to vote for ballot questions of lower prominence on the physical 
ballot, or about which they are less informed, a larger number of votes will be cast for President, 
for example, than a proposed constitutional amendment (Bullock and Dunn 1996, Augenblick 
and Nicholson 2016). The stronger is this phenomenon, the higher the effective threshold 
required for popular passage in states that require a majority of all voters for ratification.15 
The procedures for adopting an entirely new constitution are relatively more 
heterogeneous. Certain states, in early versions of their constitutions, allowed a convention to be 
called by the state legislature alone;16 most – but not all – states required a certain standard of 
                                                          
14 Certain states also placed a cap on the number of amendments that may be voted on in any one election, although 
this is relatively rare. 
 
15 Certain states implicitly acknowledge the importance of how a popular majority is calculated. Florida, in article 17 
of its 1868 constitution, requires a “majority of the voters voting at such election” in order to call a constitutional 
convention, and mandates that “in determining what is a majority of the electors voting at such election, reference 
shall be had to the highest number of votes cast at such election for the candidates for any office or on any 
question.” Delaware, in Article 9 of its 1831 constitution, requires that a constitutional convention may be formed 
only after achieving a “majority of all the Citizens in the State, having the right to vote for representatives”, and then 
clarifies that “the majority of all citizens in the State having the right to vote for representatives shall be ascertained 
by reference to the highest number of votes cast in the State at any one of the three general elections next preceding 
the day of voting for a convention, except when they may be less than the whole number of voted voted both for and 
against a convention, in which case the said majority shall be ascertained by reference to the number of votes given 
on the day of voting for or against a convention…” 
 
16 Alabama, 1861; Florida, 1838, 1861, 1865; Georgia 1864 and 1877; North Carolina, 1776 and 1868; South 
Carolina, 1790, 1861, 1865;  Teas, 1861 and 1866 
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legislative support for a proposal to call a convention, either to be passed once or twice in 
successive legislative sessions, and then required that the proposal be submitted to votes for 
approval or rejection. If approved, the constitutional convention convenes in order to draft an 
entirely new constitution, and the resulting document is either approved or rejected by a popular 
vote. Nine states did not specify a process for constitutional convention in their constitutions 
from 1830-1930, and at least six states during this era had a further stipulation that required 
popular vote for a proposed constitutional convention at fixed intervals.17  
Despite the heterogeneity, the costs of the modal procedure for constitutional replacement 
exceed those for constitutional amendment. Procedurally, voters were required to agree to an 
“extra step”: the act of calling a convention. Moreover, this was no guarantee that the new 
constitution – the product of the convention – would be approved, and, in fact, conventions often 
failed: from 1790-1992, states held constitutional conventions 233 times, but only adopted 145 
new constitutions (Dinan 2010, Berkowitz and Clay 2004). Constitutional amendments, 
however, are a much more frequent phenomenon: as of 2000, state constitutions had been 
amended almost 12,000 times (Wallis 2000). States did not, generally, amend their constitutions 
prior to 1860: Michigan, for example, attempted two amendments in the 1850s, twelve in the 
1860s, thirteen in the 1870s, eighteen in the 1880s, and thirteen from 1890-1897 (Michigan 
Legislative Manual 1897). 
 Research indicates that the details of the amendment process matter for the frequency of 
amendments: states that require a higher fraction of legislative support, or multiple successive 
legislative approvals (or both) have lower rates of constitutional amendment than states that 
                                                          
17 Virginia, every 20 years; Oklahoma, every 20 years; New York, every 20 years; Michigan, every 16 years, 
Maryland, every 20 years; Iowa, every 10 years. 
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require only a single majority vote (Lutz 1994). There is also narrative evidence to suggest that 
the implied standard for majority popular vote was salient for the repeal of alien voting: 
Arkansas tried to abolish alien suffrage in a proposed constitution in 1918, which subsequently 
failed; then, a constitutional amendment proposed in 1920 passed (87,237-49,751), but not with 
the support needed to constitute a majority of all votes cast in that election (190,113). The issue 
went to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which, ultimately, passed the amendment, thus 
disenfranchising aliens, in 1926 (Biennial Report of the Secretary of State of Arkansas, 1919-
1920, 1925-1926; Aylsworth 1931). Similarly, Nebraska in 1910 attempted to disenfranchise 
non-citizen immigrants and the referendum passed, 100,450-74,878, but failed to achieve a 
majority of the 243,390 electors voting in the election (Nebraska Blue Book and Historical 
Register, 1918). Therefore, all else equal, states in which the costs of constitutional change are 
lower – perhaps because of requiring only a majority of voters voting on the particular proposed 
amendment, rather than a majority of all voters at a given election - should be more likely to 
either adopt or repeal alien voting.  
 2.4  What Drives Changes in the Franchise? 
In this section, I sketch a simple model based on the insight that, in this setting, 
expansion and contraction of the electorate is a voluntary act undertaken – or, at least, approved - 
by popular vote.18 Therefore, the decision can be modeled through the costs and benefits to a 
median existing voter. This occurs within a given jurisdiction, with a given method of 
constitutional amendment. Consider an economy with a population of P individuals, C of which 
                                                          
18 This was inspired by Bertocchi and Strozzi (2010) who use a version of the median voter model to model the 
decision of countries to offer either jus solis or jus sanguinis citizenship. 
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are existing voters (either because they are native-born, or naturalized immigrants) and N of 
which are not permitted to vote: P = C + N, and C>N.  
Both voters and non-voters obtain utility from consumption of a private good, ci, and bear 
the social costs of either exclusion or inclusion into the franchise in the following manner: 
𝑢𝑖 =  𝑐𝑖 − 𝑘 ∗ 1(𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒) − 𝑗 ∗ 1(𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑑𝑒), 
Society bears costs of voter exclusion, k, and inclusion, j. Let k be the social cost of excluding 
non-voters (that is, non-citizens) from the franchise. This cost increases with the share of non-
citizens in the population, reflecting the possibility that a large pool of non-eligible voters may 
lead to social unrest or reduced immigrant assimilation.19 I define the exclusion cost, k, as 
𝑘 = ℎ ∗
𝑁
𝑃
 
where h > 0. The social cost of including new voters in the electorate, j, depends on a function of 
the socio-cultural distance between existing voters, C, and non-voters N. This distance is positive 
and increasing in “dissimilarity” of the prospective voters and existing voters, along, for 
example, ethnic or religious lines. Additionally, the cost of inclusion also depends positively on 
the fraction of non-citizens in the population since the larger the population of new voters, the 
greater the threat to the existing power structure if those new voters vote as a bloc: 
𝑗 = 𝑑(𝑁, 𝐶) + 𝑓 ∗
𝑁
𝑃
 
where f > 0. Individual i faces a budget constraint of: 
                                                          
19 In the mid-19th century United States, the possibility of social unrest of the disenfranchised was not purely 
academic: in  Rhode Island in 1841, opponents of the property qualification for suffrage elected their own governor, 
and attempted to seize control of the state arsenal (Keyssar 2000, pages 71-74). 
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𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑦𝑖. 
Prior to expanding the franchise, the expression for the indirect utility of the median 
citizen voter, with income 𝑦𝑐∗, is given by: 
𝑣𝑐∗ = 𝑦𝑐∗ −  𝑘. 
Following expansion, the indirect utility for that same voter – who, depending upon the 
dimension under consideration, may no longer be the median voter – with income 𝑦∗ is given by: 
                                                                    𝑣∗ = 𝑦∗ −  𝑗. 
The median citizen voter, therefore, faces a simple set of costs and benefits when 
considering the decision to expand voting rights to non-citizens. If non-citizens cannot vote, the 
citizen voter incurs the social exclusion cost k, and earns income 𝑦𝑐∗. If non-citizens vote, then 
the median citizen voter avoid the social cost of exclusion but incurs the social cost of inclusion, 
and earns income 𝑦∗. Thus, the median citizen voter will decide to grant voting rights to 
noncitizens if and only if:  
    𝑦𝑐∗ −  𝑘 ≤ 𝑦∗ − 𝑗                                    (1) 
where the left-hand side of the inequality is the median voter’s indirect utility when non-citizens 
cannot vote, and the right-hand side is his utility when they can vote. Conversely, the median 
voter will decide to contract the electorate is the opposite of equation (1) holds.20 
The basic model can be extended to consider potentially relevant economic and political 
factors. An economic motivation for franchise expansion can be rationalized if it is expected that 
                                                          
20 Given that C > N, disenfranchisement could occur even if no noncitizen voted for their own disenfranchisement: 
the median voter would not be disenfranchised. 
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allowing non-citizens to vote would result in mass in-migration. If labor is scarce, and so the 
marginal product of additional labor is high, then this new labor pool may serve to increase 
income for existing voters (that is, 𝑦∗ rises). Similarly, a political motivation for franchise 
expansion can be modeled as a reduction in j: if the median voter believes that the additional 
voters added to the electorate would vote in a similar fashion to himself – by, for example, 
joining the same political party – then the costs of including new voters falls, and franchise 
expansion is more likely. Conversely, if this distance is large – manifested by the presence of 
anti-immigrant or nativist sentiment – then franchise expansion is less likely.  
The median voter is more likely to vote for franchise contraction – that is, excluding non-
citizens from the electorate – when exogenous factors increase the benefits (or decrease the 
costs) of exclusion. Shifts in the ethnic origins of new immigrants may increase the socio-
cultural distance between non-citizen and citizen voters, thereby increasing the costs of 
inclusion; a higher fraction of the population that is non-citizen would both increase the cost of 
exclusion and may increase the costs of inclusion. Finally, if the non-citizen labor ceases to 
complement citizen labor, and instead competes with it, then the median voter’s income would 
be lower under non-citizen voting, and the franchise is more likely to be contracted.  
 2.5  Empirical Evidence on Determinants of Adoption and Repeal of Alien Voting 
2.5.1 Data 
I test these hypotheses using a variety of data on economic, demographic, and political 
characteristics of the era. I assembled dates of adoption and repeal from a variety of sources, 
including (Keyssar 2000), Hayduk (2006), state constitutions, blues books, legislative manuals, 
territorial Organic acts, and the territorial legislative record. These dates, with primary sources, 
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are presented in appendix tables 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 Data on gubernatorial elections are from Burham 
et al (1991); data on the partisan composition of state legislatures are from Burnham (1989); data 
on farm values are from Haines et al (2016); data on improved acreage and manufacturing output 
are from Haines (2010); demographic data are generated from aggregated Census microdata 
(Ruggles et al, 2015). I create an original dataset of amending procedures of all state 
constitutions based on from the original text of all state constitutions that apply at each decade 
from 1830-1930. See the data appendix 2.1 for more detail on data construction.  
2.5.2. Method 
In general, data availability poses a challenge to analysis, since many state-level 
covariates are typically not available until the state is admitted to the union. Even for established 
states, certain covariates are unavailable for earlier years: for example, the population of foreign 
born males is not available until 1850 (whereas, Wisconsin adopted alien voting in 1848). Given 
that the fourteen of states and territories adopted alien voting as either territories (ID, KS, MN, 
MT, NE, NV, ND, OR, OK, SD, WA, WY) or upon admission to the union (CO, WI), pre-
adoption data is not available for the majority of states or territories that ever expanded the 
franchise to include declarant aliens. 
I account for this by estimating the hazard of alien voting adoption as of a particular 
decade, rather than estimating the hazard of adoption in the next decade (for example, 
Wisconsin, which enacted alien voting in 1848, is coded as having adopted alien voting by 
1850). This allows for the inclusion into the sample of the fourteen states that adopted alien 
voting prior to, or upon, admission to the Union, but may, to some degree, confound fast-moving 
responses to adoption with determinants of adoption. I address this concern in greater detail 
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below. Territories that had enacted alien voting prior to admission to the union, and continued 
that upon admission, are coded as having adopted alien voting upon admission.21  
I create a pooled cross-section of states from 1850-1890 and link on the economic, 
demographic, and political data mentioned above. In order to estimate determinants of adoption 
of alien voting, I estimate a hazard model: that is, a model of the probability of a state adopting 
alien voting laws, given that it has not adopted alien voting laws up until that point. I use a 
proportional hazard model, as it has the advantage of remaining agnostic as to the actual shape of 
the underlying baseline hazard of adoption (Fishback and Kantor 1998; Braun and Kvasnicka 
2013). I implement this by estimating a complementary log-logistic specification using 
maximum likelihood, as this is the discrete time analog of the underlying continuous 
proportional hazards model (Prentice and Gloeckler 1978). Specifically, I estimate: 
   ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 1 − exp (−𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑎𝑡 +  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡))                                 (2) 
I do not impose a functional form on the baseline hazard, and instead allow it to vary 
non-parametrically by including decade indicators (𝑎𝑡). Given that a state is no longer at risk of 
adopting alien voting following adoption, states drop out of the sample following adoption. I 
include a variety of covariates (explained more below), and 𝛽 is the vector of parameters of 
interest. I standardize continuous covariates (calculated from pre-adoption census year), so 
estimates should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation increase of a given 
covariate. Estimates are scaling factors of an underlying baseline hazard of adoption: coefficients 
greater than one imply that, all else equal, a one standard deviation leads to a greater (or earlier) 
risk of adoption, and coefficients smaller than one imply a reduced (or later) hazard of adoption. 
                                                          
21 Given that admission to the union required territories create a state constitution (to be approved by Congress), if a 
state includes existing alien voting in the constitution, it implicitly re-approved the policy.  
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Hypothesis tests, therefore, use a null hypothesis that a particular covariate is equal to one. 
Standard errors are clustered at the state level.22 
2.5.3 Results on Determinants of Adoption 
 Results are presented in table 2.1. First, I test for the impact of various demographic 
characteristics on the hazard of adoption. If labor scarcity was a motivating factor in the adoption 
of alien voting, then a lower population, a lower percentage of the population that are adult 
males, and slower population growth should all be associated with an increased hazard of 
adoption. A larger foreign-born population may either increase or decrease the hazard of 
adoption, depending on whether it is perceived that the disenfranchised immigrants may agitate 
for inclusion, or, once included, may threaten the existing power structure. Finally, a larger 
percentage of immigrants from “new” sending countries should serve to increase the socio-
cultural distance of these news voters if included in the electorate, and should, therefore, reduce 
the hazard of adoption.  
These coefficients are reported in Column (1). Consistent with an economic motivation 
for adoption, there is evidence that states with a lower proportion of the population that are adult 
males were more likely to adopt alien voting: a one standard deviation increase in the percentage 
of adult males in the population reduces the hazard of adoption by 76.2%.23 A larger population 
was also associated with a lower probability of adoption, but this effect is not statistically 
significant. Interestingly, states with faster population growth were significantly more likely to 
                                                          
22 If jurisdictional competition drove the timing the adoption, then the assumption of independence of adoption 
between state clusters may be violated. However, clustering standard errors at the region level does not 
meaningfully change the statistical significance of any estimates hazard for both adoption and repeal. 
 
23 This is based on the coefficient .238. Relative to a null hypothesis of 1, this is a reduction in the hazard of (1-
.238)/1, which equals 76.2%.  
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adopt alien voting: a one standard deviation increase in population growth is associated with a 
215% increase in the hazard of adoption. This suggests that states may have used alien voting to 
accelerate already existing growth.  
There is no evidence that the fraction of the population that was foreign-born affected the 
timing of adoption, but, contrary to the model, a greater fraction of “new” immigrants is 
positively associated with the hazard of adoption. This appears to be due to the influence of 
South Dakota which, in 1890, had the highest fraction of its immigrant population from new 
sending countries (15.31%). Excluding this observation reduces the magnitude of the estimate so 
that it is statistically indistinguishable from zero (estimate = .305, p value = .357).  
 Column (2) further suggests that there was an economic motivation for franchise 
expansion: states that had more agriculturally improved land area were significantly less likely to  
adopt alien voting. Specifically, an additional standard deviation of improved acreage is 
associated with a roughly 80% reduction in the hazard of adoption. Moreover, states with a less 
developed manufacturing sector were also more likely to adopt alien voting: a one standard 
deviation increase in the natural log of the real value of per capita manufacturing output is 
associated with a 49% reduction in the hazard of adoption. Together with the results from 
column (1), this is consistent with the hypothesis that alien voting was used as an economic 
development strategy meant to accelerate economic growth.  
 Contrary to the qualitative evidence, though, there is no evidence that alien voting was 
politically motivated.  Column (3) presents coefficients from various measures of the political 
strength of the Democratic Party. I use state-level measures of political presence – statehouse 
composition and gubernatorial election results – rather presidential vote share in order to capture 
state-level political dynamics. The Democratic presence in the upper and lower chambers of the 
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state legislature is intended to estimate the effect of elected Democrats on the hazard of adoption 
(and, later, repeal), while the percentage of the gubernatorial vote going to the Democratic 
candidate is intended to reflect the general support for the Democratic Party among voters. I find 
no evidence that either measure of strength of the Democratic Party affected the hazard of 
adoption of alien voting.  
Finally, I test for the role of procedural costs in altering the constitution. I test for the 
effects of three covariates which measure different aspects of the amending process: the fraction 
of legislative support needed to introduce a constitutional amendment, the number of successive 
approvals required by the legislature for amendment, and an indicator for whether popular 
ratification requires only a simple majority of voters voting on that particular ballot question 
(coded as a 1), or a majority of all voters voting at the election (coded as a 0). Finally, I include 
an indicator variable for whether the state re-wrote its constitution for exogenous reasons – either 
to re-enter the Union following the Civil War, or in order to transition from territorial status to 
statehood. To the extent that states did not strategically enter the Union in order to adopt alien 
voting, this captures an exogenous reduction in the fixed costs of constitutional change: if the 
costs of altering the constitution deterred adoption of alien voting, then this should have a 
positive effect on the hazard of adoption.  
Results are presented in column (4). I find that the details of the constitutional amending 
process had no impact on the hazard of adoption of alien voting. This is not surprising, given that 
states did not tend to alter their constitutions via amendment until the late 19th century. There is 
strong evidence that the fixed costs of constitutional change deterred adoption of alien voting: 
states that had were either writing constitutions for the first time, or in order to re-enter the Union 
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following the Civil War, were over twenty times more likely to adopt alien voting than 
established states that did not re-write their constitutions.  
Using this estimation strategy, it is possible that fast-moving consequences of alien 
voting may be conflated with causes of alien voting. For example, Indiana, which adopted alien 
voting in 1851, is coded as having adopted as of 1860; if Indiana adopted alien voting in order to 
attract settlers because of a dearth of adult males, and if, upon adoption of alien voting in 1851, 
adult males flooded into the state, then by 1860, it would appear as if the fraction of the 
population that is adult male positively predicts adoption. The empirical distribution of dates of 
adoption, however, suggests that this concern may be somewhat mitigated: only three out of 
twenty-two states in my estimation sample adopted alien voting in the first half the decade, and 
the median base 10 modulus for year of adoption in the estimation sample is eight (e.g., 1868, 
1878, and so on). As a further check for this, I re-estimate specification (1) without the alien 
voting states that adopted in the first half of a given decade, to minimize the scope for immediate 
response affecting the estimated results. Results are presented in appendix table 2.2, and do not 
differ substantively from those in table 2.1. 
2.5.4  Results on Determinants of Repeal 
 I re-estimate specification (2) on a cross-section of states from 1890-1920 in order to test 
for the role of economic, demographic, and constitutional factors on the hazard of repeal. Given 
that repeal occurred, on average, 38 years following adoption, data availability is not as binding a 
constraint – therefore, I estimate hazard rates for repealing alien voting within the next decade.24 
                                                          
24 Two states – Montana and Wisconsin – included grandfathering provisions in the repeal of alien voting rights: 
Montana repealed alien voting right upon entry to the Union in 1889, but continued to allow existing voters to vote 
until 1894; Wisconsin voted to repeal alien voting in 1908, but allowed existing voters to vote until 1908. Given that 
this paper models the decision to repeal, I use the earlier dates in the analysis. However, results do not substantively 
change using the grandfathered dates. Results available upon request. 
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However, the sample size is significantly smaller than in the previous section, as, necessarily, 
this sample includes only those states that had ever adopted alien voting: these are the only states 
that were at risk of repeal.  
 Results are presented in table 2.2. There is suggestive evidence for the role of social costs 
in determining the timing of repeal. States with higher proportions of the population that were 
foreign-born were relatively more likely to repeal alien voting earlier: one additional standard 
deviation of foreign-born population is associated with a 47% increase in the hazard of repeal. 
There is some scope for outliers influencing these results: excluding Georgia – which repealed 
early, in 1877, and had only 1% of the population that was foreign-born – increases both the size 
and statistical significance of this estimate. Specifically, in this trimmed sample, a one standard 
deviation increase in the fraction of the population that is foreign born leads to a 146% increase 
in the hazard of adoption (p = .07). In the full sample, states with a higher proportion of foreign-
born individuals from Central or Eastern Europe were more likely to repeal, but this effect is not 
precisely estimated. 
 Column (2) presents estimated hazard rates for economic covariates. States with a greater 
fraction of improved acreage were significantly less likely to repeal alien voting, implying that 
less agriculturally developed states were more likely to repeal alien voting within a given decade. 
This is a striking result, given that states with less agriculturally developed land were 
significantly more likely to adopt alien voting, and may reflect a broad shift in attitudes against 
immigrants that was strongest in states in which immigrants did not play a significant role in the 
agricultural sector. That this may be driven by attitudes, rather than economic reality, is borne 
out by the lack of significant results for either agricultural values or manufacturing output. 
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 Estimates of hazard rates for political factors are presented in Column (3). If the repeal of 
alien voting was motivated – even in part – by the Republican Party seeking to reduce support 
for the Democratic Party, then, ceteris paribus, a higher fraction of Democratic Party support 
should make states less likely to repeal alien voting. However, I find no statistical evidence for 
any effect of Democratic Party support on the hazard of repeal.  
 Finally, in Column (4), I estimate the effects of constitutional amending procedures on 
the hazard of repeal. I find strong evidence that procedural costs mattered: states that required a 
simple popular majority for ratification of the amendment – as opposed to a majority of all those 
voting at that particular election – were eight times more likely to repeal alien voting in a given 
decade. This accords with the narrative evidence for the salience of the amending procedures, 
and, to the extent that states do not strategically adopt amendment procedures, lends credibility 
to research designs that exploit state-level constitutional change (as in Henderson 2017).  
2.6 County-level Support for Repeal of Alien Voting 
The state-level analysis supports the hypotheses that alien voting was adopted for 
primarily economic purposes, with the goal of inducing much needed in-migration, and repealed 
due to the social costs of immigration. Moreover, the evidence suggests a significant role for 
procedural factors in the timing of both adoption and repeal. However, it does not (and, 
mechanically, can not) control for within-state forces leading to change in the franchise. 
Therefore, in this section, I supplement the previous analysis by exploiting the fact that 
constitutional amendments had to pass a popular referendum for ratification. Using newly 
collected county-level vote totals on the repeal of alien voting, I estimate the roles of the 
demographic, economic, and political factors for popular support for the repeal of alien voting 
within alien voting states. This analysis is descriptive, not causal; however, this is still a useful 
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exercise insofar as I am able to test for correlates of support for repeal controlling for unobserved 
within-state factors. 
 I collected vote totals for alien voting repeal from 1,122 counties in thirteen states. The 
states and totals are listed in table 2.3; the counties are mapped by the support for alien voting 
repeal, in figure 2.2. There is considerable variation in support for repeal, ranging from .06 
(Duval County, Florida, 1894) to 1.0 (Bennett County, South Dakota, 1918). The average level 
of support across counties is 63.3% - which is consistent with the fact that all of these measures 
passed at the state level – and a majority of the voting population supported repeal in 926 of 
1,122 counties. I test for effect of a parsimonious set of county-level economic, political, and 
demographic covariates on the fraction of the voters supporting alien voting repeal using the 
following specification: 
                 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑌𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑠 = 𝛼𝑠 +  𝜷𝑋𝑐𝑠 +  𝜀𝑠𝑡                              (3) 
Fraction Yescs is the measure of support for the proposed amendment in county c, state s, and Xcs 
is a vector of county-level covariates: the fraction of the population that is foreign-born, the 
fraction of the immigrant population that are from “new” sending counties, the fraction of votes 
for the Democratic in the most recent gubernatorial election, and the log of the real value 
manufacturing output per capita. With the exception of the gubernatorial election data, which in 
general is from the election coinciding with, or immediately prior to, the year of repeal, all 
covariates are taken from the decadal census prior to the repeal election. I include state fixed 
effects in order to capture unobservable time-invariant differences across states in attitudes 
toward immigrants. Standard errors are calculated using wild bootstrap in order to account for 
the small number of state clusters (Cameron et al 2008). 
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 Results are presented in table 2.4. Consistent with social costs of immigration driving the 
repeal of alien voting, I find that counties with a higher fraction of the population that are foreign 
born tend to support the repeal of alien voting more strongly; however, the effect sizes are small 
and imprecisely measured. Contrary to the narrative evidence that suggests that the Democratic 
party had an interest in keeping non-citizen immigrants in the electorate, support for the 
Democratic gubernatorial candidate is positively related with support for repeal of alien voting, 
but, again, the effect sizes are imprecisely estimated. Finally, there is no evidence that real 
manufacturing values are related to the intensity of support for alien voting.  
 These results mask heterogeneity among states. I re-estimate specification (3) using all 
four covariates on each state individually, and present each coefficient in the corresponding 
quadrant in figure 2.3 (with underlying results in appendix tables 2.3.1, 2.3.2, and 2.3.3). The 
fraction of the population that is foreign born is positively associated with support for repeal in 
Missouri and Texas, and negatively so in Kansas and Nebraska; moreover, the fraction of the 
immigrant population that is from “new” sending countries is significantly negatively associated 
with support for alien voting in Wisconsin and South Dakota, and nearly so in North Dakota and 
Michigan, but positively related in Arkansas. There is considerable variance among states in the 
relationship between support for the Democratic Party and support for repeal of alien voting: the 
two are generally positively related in Southern states, negatively related for states bordering the 
Great Lakes, and positive for more western states. Finally, the relationship of manufacturing 
values to support for repeal varies significantly as well: it is (statistically significantly) positive 
in Arkansas, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Colorado, but smaller in magnitude and less precisely 
estimated in all other states. The heterogeneity of effects across states suggests that the costs and 
benefits of restricting the franchise are local, and may explain why scholars have in general 
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failed to document significant state-level predictors for the timing of women’s suffrage: the 
factors that predict support in one state may not do so in another (Miller 2008). 
 While these regressions are informative as to the differing correlates of support for repeal 
of alien voting within state, this can not account for unobserved county-specific factors which 
may influence attitudes toward alien voting (and which may also be correlated with the 
covariates). In order to control for county fixed effects, I leverage the fact that Missouri 
attempted to repeal alien voting twice: first, unsuccessfully, in 1912, and then again, 
successfully, in 1924. I re-estimate specification (3) on these years for only Missouri, and 
include both year fixed effects and county fixed effects. I present these results, together with the 
cross-sectional results from 1924, in panels A and B of Table 2.5.  
 The results suggest the importance of unobserved, time-invariant factors in determining  
support for alien voting repeal. From Panel A, it is clear that, in the 1924 cross-section, counties 
in Missouri with a higher fraction of foreign born individuals were significantly more likely to 
support the repeal of alien voting. However, increasing the fraction of the population that is 
foreign born within a county does not increase the support for alien voting repeal and, if 
anything, weakly reduces it: the coefficient on the fraction foreign born ranges from -.445 to        
-.535 in Panel B. Similarly, counties in Missouri in 1924 with higher per capital real 
manufacturing output value were more likely to support alien voting repeal, but, again, there is 
no statistical evidence for the within-county effect of an increase in manufacturing values on 
support for alien voting repeal.  
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2.7 Conclusion 
 This paper studies the determinants of a little-known expansion and contraction of the 
electorate that took place from 1848 to 1926 and that affected 24 states and territories: the 
political inclusion, and exclusion, of non-citizen immigrants. I find evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that less agriculturally developed states enacted alien voting in order to induce 
immigration: a lower fraction of adult males in the population, less improved agricultural 
acreage, and a smaller manufacturing sector all predicted earlier adoption of alien voting. 
Notably, despite speculation in the academic literature, there is no evidence that states 
enfranchised aliens in order to bolster support for the Democratic Party. 
There is also no evidence that economic hardship drove the exclusion of immigrants from 
the electorate, nor is there evidence that the Republican Party strategically excluded immigrants 
in order to reduce the political power of Democrats. Instead, the results are consistent with social 
costs driving disenfranchisement:  states in which immigrants comprised a greater fraction of the 
population, and, of the immigrant pool, where Central and Eastern European immigrants were 
more populous, were more likely to repeal alien voting earlier. I corroborate this using newly 
collected data on county-level support for the repeal of alien voting: support for repeal of alien 
voting is positively related to the fraction of the population that is foreign-born, although there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the correlates of support across states.  
The strongest state-level results indicate that the details of the constitutional amending 
process significantly affected the timing of adoption and repeal. States that re-wrote their 
constitutions for exogenous reasons were more than 20 times more likely to adopt alien voting 
than established states, suggesting that the fixed costs of constitutional overhaul presented a 
significant barrier to adoption. Moreover, states in which ratification of a proposed constitutional 
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amendment required only a majority of voters voting on that particular amendment, instead of a 
majority of all voters voting at the ratification election, were eight times more likely to repeal 
alien voting in a given decade. This finding implies that identification strategies based on the 
timing of constitutional change may be promising in terms of exogeneity, although more work is 
needed to understand the distribution of amending procedures across states. 
 While alien voting may have been intended to induce in-migration and economic 
development, this paper does not address whether or not this strategy succeeded. The fact that 
population growth was a predictor of adoption suggests that economic development may have 
occurred even in the absence of alien voting. The demographic, economic, and political 
consequences of alien enfranchisement are important questions in economic history, and I leave 
it to future research for further exploration.
 100 
 
2.8 Works Cited 
Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Platt Boustan and Katherine Eriksson. 2014. “A Nation of Immigrants: 
Assimilation and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration”, Journal of Political 
Economy, 122(3): 467-506. 
Abramitzky, Ran and Leah Platt Boustan. 2016. “Immigration in American History.” Journal of 
Economic Literature. 
Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Platt Boustan and Katherine Eriksson. 2016. “Cultural Assimilation 
during the Age of Mass Migration.” NBER Working Paper 22381. 
Abramitzky, Ran and Leah Platt Boustan. 2016. “Immigration in American History.” Journal of 
Economic Literature. 
Abramitzky, Ran, Leah Platt Boustan and Katherine Eriksson. 2012. “Europe’s Tired, Poor, 
Huddled Masses: Self-Selection and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration.” 
American Economic Review, 102(5): 1832-1856. 
Acemoglu, Dron and James A. Robinson. 2000. “Why did the West extend the Franchise? 
Democracy, inequality, and Growth in a Historical Perspective.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 115(4): 497-551. 
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2001. “A Theory of Political Transitions.” American 
Economic Review, 91(4): 938-963. 
Aidt, Toke S. and Bianca Dallal. 2008. “Female voting power: The contribution of women’s 
suffrage to the growth of social spending in Western Europe (1869- 1960)”, Public Choice, 
134(3-4): 391-417. 
Augenblick, Ned and Scott Nicholson. 2016. “Ballot Position, Choice Fatigue, and Voter 
Behavior,” Review of Economic Studies, 83(2): 460-480. 
Aylsworth, Leon E. 1931. “The Passing of Alien Suffrage,” The American Political Science 
Review, 25(1):114-116. 
Bandiera, Oriana, Myra Mohnen, Imran Rasul, and Martina Viarengo. 2016. “Nation-Building 
Through Compulsory Schooling During the Age of Mass Migration.” Manuscript. 
Bandiera, Oriena, Imran Rasul, and Martina Viarengo. 2013. “The Making of Modern America: 
Migratory Flows in the Age of Mass Migration.” Journal of Development Economics, 102: 23-
47 
Benlemech, Efraim, and Toby Moskowitz. 2010. “The Political Economy of Financial 
Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century.” Journal of Finance, 
65(3): 1029-1073. 
Berkowitz, Daniel, and Karen Clay. 2005. “American Civil Law Origins: Implications for State 
Constitutions.” American Law and Economics Review, 7(1): 62-84 
 101 
Bertocchi, Graziella. “The Enfranchisement of Women and the Welfare State.” European 
Economic Review, 55(4): 535-553. 
Bertocchi, Graziella and Chiara Strozzi. 2010. “The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic and 
Institutional Determinants.” The Journal of Law & Economics, 53(1): 95-136. 
Braun, Sebastian and Michael Kvasnicka. 2013. “Men, Women, and the Ballot: Gender 
Imbalances and Suffrage Extensions in the United States.” Explorations in Economic History, 
50: 405-426. 
Bullock, Charles S. III and Richard E. Dunn. 1996. “Election Roll-Off: A Test of Three 
Explanations.” Urban Affairs Review, 32(1): 71-86.  
Burnham, W. Dean. PARTISAN DIVISION OF AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENTS, 1834-
1985. Conducted by Massachusetts Institute of Technology. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-
university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 198?. 
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR00016.v1 
Burnham, W. Dean, Jerome M. Clubb, and William Flanigan. STATE-LEVEL 
CONGRESSIONAL, GUBERNATORIAL AND SENATORIAL ELECTION DATA FOR THE 
UNITED STATES, 1824-1972. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for 
Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1991. 
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR00075.v1 
Cameron, Colin A, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller. 2008. “Bootstrap-based 
Improvements for Inference with Clustered Standard Errors.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 90(3): 414-427 
Cascio, Elizabeth and Ebonya Washington. 2014. “Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of 
Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics: 379-433 
Conley, John P. and Akram Temimi. 2001. “Endogenous Enfranchisement when Groups’ 
Preferences Conflict.” Journal of Political Economy, 109(1): 79-102. 
Dinan, John J. 2010. “The Political Dynamics of Mandatory State Constitutional Convention 
Referendums: Lessons from the 2000s Regarding Obstacles and Pathways to their Passage.” 
Montana Law Review, 71(2): 395-432 
Fishback, Price and Shawn Kantor. 1998. “The Adoption of Workers’ Compensation in the 
United States.” The Journal of Law and Economics, 41(2): 305-342. 
Goldin, Claudia. 1994. “The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the United States.” 
The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy. University of Chicago 
Press.  
 
Haines, Michael, Price Fishback, and Paul Rhode. United States Agriculture Data, 1840 - 2012. 
ICPSR35206-v3. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[distributor], 2016-06-29. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR35206.v3 
 
 102 
Haines, Michael R., and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
Historical, Demographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-2002. 
ICPSR02896-v3. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research 
[distributor], 2010-05-21. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR02896.v3 
 
Harper-Ho, Virginia. 2000. “Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current 
Prospect for Change,” Immigration and Nationality Law Review, 21:477 
Hayduk, Ron. Democracy for all: Restoring Immigrant Voting Rights in the United States. 
Taylor and Francis Group, 2006 
Henderson, Morgan. 2017. “What Drives Expansions and Contractions of the Electorate? 
Evidence from Alien Voting in the United States.” Manuscript. 
Hill, Melvin B. Jr. and Laverne Williamson Hill. 2008. “Georgia: Tectonic Plates Shifting.” In 
The Constitutionalism of the American States, eds. George E. Connor and Christopher W. 
Hammons. University of Missouri Press. 
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. United States Historical Election 
Returns, 1824-1968 [Computer File]. ICPSR00001-v3. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university 
Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1999-04-26. 
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR00001.v3 
Keyssar, Alexander. 2000. The Right to Vote: The Contested History of democracy in the United 
States, Basic Books. 
Lamoreaux, Naomi R. and John J. Wallis. 2016. “States, not Nations: The Sources of Poltical 
and Economic Development in the Early United States.” Manuscript. 
Lemke, Jayme S. 2016. “Why Statehood? A Note on Interpreting Jurisdictional Competition in 
U.S. History.” Manuscript. 
Lizzeri, Alessandro and Nicola Persico. 2004. “Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? 
Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s “Age of Reform”.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2): 707-765. 
Lott, John and Lawrence Kenney. 1999. “Did Women’s Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of 
government?” Journal of Political Economy, 107(6) 
Lutz, Donald S. 1994. “Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment”. The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 2 pp. 355-370 
McCulloch, Albert J. 1929. Suffrage and Its Problems. Warwick and York, Inc: Baltimore. 
Miller, Grant. 2008. “Women’s Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in 
American History”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(3):1287–1327 
Meltzer, A. H., and S. F. Richard. 1981. “A rational theory of the size of government.” Journal 
of Political Economy, 89: 914-927  
Meltzer, A. H., and S. F. Richard. 1983. “Tests of a Rational Theory of the Size of Government.” 
Public Choice, 41(3):403-418 
 103 
Neuman, Gerald. 1992. “We are the People: Alien Suffrage in German and American 
Perspective”, Michigan journal of International Law  
Nikolova, Elena. 2015. “Destined for Democracy? Labour Markets and Political Change in 
Colonial British America.” British Journal of Political Science, 47: 19-45. 
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2003. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. MIT Press: 
Cambridge, MA. 
Porter, Kirk Harold. 1918. A History of Suffrage of the United States. University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago.  
Prentice, R. L. and L. A. Gloeckler. 1978. “Regression Analysis of Grouped Survival Data with 
Application to Breast Cancer Data.” Biometrics, 34(1): 57-67. 
Raskin, James. 1993. “Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: the Historical, Constitutional, and 
Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
Rosberg, Gerald M. 1977. “Aliens and Equal Protections: Why Not the Right to Vote?” 
Michigan Law Review. 
Rosenbloom, Joshua L. and William A. Sundstrom. 2011. “Labor-Market Regimes in U.S. 
Economic History.” In Paul W. Rhode, Joshua L. Rosenbloom and David F. Weiman, eds. 
Economic Evolution and Revolutions in Historical Time, Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Ruggles, Steven, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek. Integrated 
Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0 [dataset]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 
2015. http://doi.org/10.18128/D010.V6.0. 
Shertzer, Allison. 2013. “Immigrant Group Size and Political Mobilization: Evidence from 
European Migration to the Unites States.” Journal of Public Economics, 139: 1-12. 
Wallis, John J. 2005. “Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and 
Constitutional Change.” Journal of Economic History, 65(1): 211-256. 
Wallis, John Joseph, “NBER/University of Maryland State Constitution Project”, 
www.stateconstitutions.umd.edu 
Ward, Zach and Michael J. Greenwood. 2016. “Immigration Quotas, World War I, and Emigrant 
Flows from the United States in the Early 20th Century.”  Explorations in Economic History, 
55(1): 76-96 
 
 104 
 
Figure 2.1.1: Map of Adoption of Alien Voting 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1.2: Map of Repeal of Alien Voting 
 
 
 
Notes: dates of adoption and repeal are from Keyssar (2000), Hayduk (2006), state constitutions, state blue 
books state legislative manuals, and territorial constitutions. See the appendix for details. 
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Figure 2.2: Support for Repeal of Alien Voting, County Level 
 
 
 
 
Notes: election returns on constitutional amendments are from various state legislative manuals, blue 
books, and canvassing board reports. See appendix table 1B for the exact source for each state. 
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Figure 2.3: Correlates of County-level support for Repeal of Alien Voting, by 
State 
 
 
 
Notes: each point in each graph is the coefficient for a state-specific regression of the fraction of voters 
supporting alien repeal on the fraction of the population that is foreign born, the fraction of immigrants 
from “new” sending countries, the fraction of support for the democratic gubernatorial candidate at the 
most recent election, and the natural log of the real value of manufacturing output per capita in the county. 
Underlying regression coefficients are presented in appendix tables 2A – 2C. 
 
Data are from county-level elections for constitutional amendments repealing declarant alien suffrage in 13 
states (AR, CO, FL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, SD, TX, WI). In general, gubernatorial election data 
are from the election corresponding, or just prior to, the date of repeal. I used gubernatorial election data 
from 1920 for Arkansas, since it voted to repeal alien voting in 1920. Moreover, gubernatorial election data 
was not available for Florida in 1892, so I used values from 1888 (the next most recent election). In North 
Dakota, the Democratic Party was not represented in the 1898 gubernatorial election, so values for the 
“Fusion” candidate were used in place of support for the Democratic candidate. Similarly, in Minnesota in 
the 1896 gubernatorial election, values for the “People’s and Democrat” party were used. Standard errors 
are estimated using wild bootstrap, clustered at the state level.  
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Table 2.1: Determinants of Adoption of Alien Voting 
 Adopt 
(1) 
Adopt 
(2) 
Adopt 
(3) 
Adopt 
(4) 
Ln(Population) 0.714    
 (0.77)    
Fraction Adult Male 0.238    
 (3.18)***    
Fraction Foreign Born 0.941    
 (0.19)    
Fraction 'New' Immigrants 1.800    
 (2.02)**    
Population Growth 3.149    
 (3.75)***    
Fraction improved acres  0.197   
  (2.97)***   
Ln(Real Value of Farms Per Acre)  1.273   
  (0.53)   
Ln(Real Mfg. Output p.c.)  0.508   
  (2.11)**   
Fraction of Gub. Votes Dem   0.885  
   (0.51)  
Fraction of Upper House Dem.   1.786  
   (0.55)  
Fraction of Lower House Dem.   0.501  
   (0.67)  
Exogenous Constitutional Change    23.865 
    (4.27)*** 
% Leg. Approval    0.963 
    (0.70) 
Successive Approvals    0.327 
    (1.08) 
Simple Majority    0.908 
    (0.80) 
N 143 144 137 123 
Z-statistics reported in parentheses. Estimates are from a non-parametric discrete-time hazard model, and 
so tests of significance are based upon a null hypothesis that the coefficient is 1. All continuous covariates 
are measured in effect sizes, so estimates should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation 
increase. Sample sizes differ due to data availability – certain states did not have constitutional amendment 
procedures in place until the late 19th century. ID and OK are excluded from the sample, as they both 
adopted, and repealed, alien voting as territories. Decade fixed effects are included in all specifications, and 
standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Repeal of Alien Voting 
 Repeal 
(1) 
Repeal 
(2) 
Repeal 
(3) 
Repeal 
(4) 
Ln(Population) 0.581    
 (0.72)    
Fraction Adult Male 1.218    
 (0.29)    
Fraction Foreign Born 1.466    
 (0.92)    
Fraction 'New' Immigrants 1.091    
 (0.22)    
Population Growth 0.498    
 (1.46)    
Fraction improved acres  0.482   
  (2.26)**   
Ln(Real Value of Farms Per Acre)  1.07   
  (0.04)   
Ln(Real Mfg. Output p.c.)  1.572   
  (1.32)   
Fraction of Gub. Votes Dem   1.163  
   (0.35)  
Fraction of Upper House Dem.   0.357  
   (1.59)  
Fraction of Lower House Dem.   1.826  
   (0.92)  
Exogenous Constitutional Change    . 
    . 
% Leg. Approval    1.048 
    (1.06) 
Successive Approvals    1.694 
    (0.67) 
Simple Majority    9.000 
    (2.19)** 
N 72 71 44 36 
Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. Estimates are from a non-parametric discrete-time hazard model, 
and so tests of significance are based upon a null hypothesis that the coefficient is 1. All continuous 
covariates are measured in effect sizes, so estimates should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard 
deviation increase. Montana repealed alien voting upon entry to the union in 1889, and so political and 
constitutional data are unavailable prior to 1890. I exclude Nevada and South Carolina from the estimation 
sample, as they both adopted and repealed alien voting within the 1860s: that is, as of 1860, they had not 
yet adopted alien voting, and so were not yet at risk of repeal. All specifications include decade fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 2.3: Popular Support for Repeal of Alien Voting 
 
State Year of Repeal Vote Result 
AR 19261 87,273-49,757 
CO 1902 44.769-27,077 
FL 1894 11,691-5,664 
IN 1921 130,242-80,574 
KS 1918 238,453-91,617 
MI 1894 117,088-31,537 
MN 1898 97,980-52,454 
MO 1924 175,580-152,713 
NE 1918 123,292-51,600 
ND 1898 21,177-16,329 
OR2 1914 164,879-39,847 
SD 1918 49,318-28,934 
TX 1921 57,622-53,910 
WI 1908 86,576-36,733 
For sources for county-level votes for repeal, see sources section in Appendix Table 1B. 
1: The vote actually took place in 1920, but failed to obtain a majority of the voters voting at that election. 
The Supreme Court eventually abolished alien voting  in 1926.  
2. I was not able to locate county-level breakdowns for this election. 
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Table 2.4: County-Level Support for Repeal of Alien Voting 
 Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Fraction Foreign Born 0.007 0.012 0.033 0.029 
 (0.048) (0.061) (0.096) (0.101) 
Fraction 'New' Immigrants  -0.011 -0.012 0.007 
  (0.066) (0.061) (0.065) 
Fraction Dem., Gubernatorial   0.196 0.149 
   (0.257) (0.273) 
Ln(Real Value Mfg. Output per Capita)    0.010 
    (0.008) 
R2 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.37 
N 1,108 1,108 1,104 978 
Data are from county-level elections for constitutional amendments repealing declarant alien suffrage in 13 states (AR, CO, FL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, 
SD, TX, WI). In general, gubernatorial election data are from the election corresponding, or just prior to, the date of repeal. I used gubernatorial election data 
from 1920 for Arkansas, since it voted to repeal alien voting in 1920. Moreover, gubernatorial election data was not available for Florida in 1892, so I used 
values from 1888 (the next most recent election). In North Dakota, the Democratic Party was not represented in the 1898 gubernatorial election, so values for the 
“Fusion” candidate were used in place of support for the Democratic candidate. Similarly, in Minnesota in the 1896 gubernatorial election, values for the 
“People’s and Democrat” party were used. Standard errors are estimated using wild bootstrap, clustered at the state level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Table 2.5: County-Level Support for Repeal of Alien Voting in Missouri 
 Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Panel A: 1924 Cross-Section 
Fraction Foreign Born 1.696 1.854 1.954 1.346 
 (0.596)*** (0.620)*** (0.632)*** (0.564)** 
Fraction 'New' Immigrants  -0.042 -0.044 -0.051 
  (0.053) (0.053) (0.049) 
Fraction Dem., Gubernatorial   0.107 0.081 
   (0.108) (0.101) 
Ln(Real Value Mfg. Output per Capita)    0.032 
    (0.008)*** 
R2 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.18 
N 114 114 114 114 
Panel B: 1912 and 1924 County-Year Panel 
Fraction Foreign Born -0.515 -0.535 -0.502 -0.445 
 (0.694) (0.710) (0.703) (0.730) 
Fraction 'New' Immigrants  0.007 0.012 0.011 
  (0.031) (0.034) (0.033) 
Fraction Dem., Gubernatorial   -0.408 -0.368 
   (0.398) (0.401) 
Ln(Real Value Mfg. Output per Capita)    0.040 
    (0.053) 
R2 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89 
N 228 228 228 228 
Data are from county-level elections for constitutional amendments repealing declarant alien suffrage in Missouri in 1912 and 1914. Standard errors are corrected 
for heteroskedasticity. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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2.9 Appendix 
 
Data Appendix 2.1: Data Sources and Construction 
 
Population estimates from 1850 onward are made by aggregating Census microdata 
(Ruggles et al 2015). The value per acre of farmland and buildings is from Haines, 
Fishback, and Rhode  (2016). This is scaled by the historical CPI from the Minneapolis 
Fed. Data on improved acreage and manufacturing output are from Haines (2010). Note 
that manufacturing output is missing for 1910, so is linearly interpolated from 1900-1920. 
 
Data on statehouse composition are from Burnham (1989) (ICPSR 16). To account for 
the differential timing of statehouse elections, the fraction of the upper and lower houses 
that are democratic in each decade is estimated by averaging  number of seats that are 
Democrat in the 10 years for the previous decade (for example, from 1840-1849 for the 
1850 value), and dividing by the total number of seats available in that chamber averaged 
in the same way.  Gubernatorial election data are from Burnham, Clubb, and Flanigan 
(1991) (ICPSR 75). To account for the differential timing of gubernatorial elections 
across states, the fraction of votes for the democratic candidate in each decade is 
estimated by averaging the fraction of votes going to the Democratic candidate in the 10 
years in the previous decade (for example, from 1840-1849 for the 1850 value).  
 
County level gubernatorial data are from ICPSR 1. The fraction of votes going to the 
Democratic candidate is generated using candidate-level vote totals. In instances where 
there was no Democratic candidate, I use the Democratic equivalent (for example, the 
Fusion party).  
 
Features of state constitutions were coded from the original texts of every constitutional 
version, in every state, from 1830-1930. I relied heavily, but not exclusively, on Wallis 
(2000), which is a database of the text of constitutions from 1776 onward for (almost) 
every state.  
 
The start and end dates of alien voting were culled from a variety of sources. To start, 
dates were obtained from Keyssar (2000) and Hayduk (2006). These did not entirely 
concur, however, and multiple sources had noted the difficulty in obtaining correct dates. 
Therefore, I cross-checked these with the suffrage provisions in every version of every 
state’s constitution from 1830-1930, and also consulted state blue books, legislative 
manuals, and reports of secretary of state. For territories, I checked suffrage provisions in 
the compiled territorial statutes. I verified starting dates by documenting that prior to year 
t, the previous constitution allowed only citizen suffrage. This is noted in appendix table 
2.1.1. Ending dates of alien voting were more straightforward, since 14 of these were 
subject to popular ratification votes, with much more by way of documentation. The 
precise sources used for both start and end dates each are noted in Appendix tables 2.1.1 
and 2.1.2. 
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Appendix Table 2.1.1: Declarant Alien Voting Start Dates, with Sources 
State Year 
Start 
Mode Sources 
AL 1867 New Constitution Constitutions of 1865, Article 8  (citizen suffrage) and 1867, Article 7 (alien suffrage) 
AR 1868 New Constitution Constitutions of 1864, article 4 (citizen suffrage) and 1868, Article 8 (alien suffrage) 
CO 1876 New Constitution 
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Colorado, February 28, 1861, Section 
5 (Citizen suffrage); Constitution of 1876, Article 7 (alien suffrage) 
FL 1868 New Constitution Constitutions of 1865, Article 6 (citizen suffrage) and 1868, Article 14 (alien suffrage) 
GA 1868 New Constitution Constitution 1865, Article 5 (citizen suffrage) and 1868, Article 2 (alien suffrage) 
ID 1863 Territorial Act An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for Territory of Idaho, March 3, 1863, Section 51 
IN 1851 New Constitution Constitutions of 1816, Article 6 (citizen suffrage) and 1851, Article 2 (alien suffrage) 
KS 1854 Territorial Act 
An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, May 30, 1854, Section 5 (alien suffrage); 
Kansas Constitution of 1859, article 5 (alien suffrage) 
LA 1879 New Constitution Constitution of 1868, Article 6 (citizen suffrage) and 1879 (Alien Suffrage) 
MI 1850 New Constitution Constitutions of 1835, Article 2 (Citizen suffrage) and 1850, Article 7 (alien suffrage) 
MN 1849 Territorial Act 
An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Minnesota, March 3, 1849, Section 5 (alien suffrage); 
1857 Constitution, Article 7 (alien suffrage) 
MO 1865 New Constitution Constitutions of 1820, Article 3 (citizen suffrage) and 1865, Article 2 (alien suffrage) 
MT 1864 Territorial Act 
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Montana, May 26, 1864, Section 5 
(alien suffrage) 
NE 1854 Territorial Act 
An Act to Organize the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, May 30, 1854, Section 5 (alien suffrage); 
Constitution of 1859 Article 5 (alien suffrage) 
ND 1861 Territorial Act 
An Act to provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Dakota, and to create the Office of the 
Surveyor General therein, March 2, 1861, Section 5 (alien suffrage); 1889 Constitution, Article 5 (alien 
suffrage) 
NV 1861 Territorial Act An Act to Organize the Territory of Nevada, March 2, 1861, Section 5 (alien suffrage) 
OR 1848 Territorial Act 
An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Oregon, August 14, 1848, Section 5 (alien suffrage); 
Constitution of 1857, Article 2 (alien suffrage)  
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OK 1890 Territorial Act 
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Oklahoma, to Enlarge the Jurisdiction 
of the United States Court in the Indian Territory, and for other purposes, May 2, 1890, Section 5 (alien 
suffrage) 
SC 1865 New Constitution Constitutions of 1861, Article 1 (Citizen suffrage), and 1865, Article 4 (Alien suffrage) 
SD 1861 Territorial Act 
An Act to provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Dakota, and to create the Office of the 
Surveyor General therein, March 2, 1861, Section 5 (Alien suffrage); Constitution of 1889, Article 7 
(Alien suffrage) 
TX 1869 New Constitution Constitution of 1866, Article 3 (Citizen suffrage); Constitution of 1869, Article 3 (Alien suffrage) 
WA 1853 Territorial Act 
An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Washington, March 2, 1853, Section 5 (Alien 
suffrage) 
WI 1848 New Constitution 
An Act Establishing the territorial government of Wisconsin, 1836, Section 5 (Citizen suffrage); 
Constitution of 1848, Article 3 (alien suffrage) 
WY 1868 Territorial Act 
An Act to Provide a Temporary Government for the Territory of Wyoming, July 25, 1868, Section 5 
(alien suffrage) 
Notes: for every state, it was verified that, prior to the adoption of alien voting, the standard of citizen voting was in place. This is noted in parentheses in the 
table.  Italics denotes a new constitution upon entry into the Union. Underline denotes that the state continued alien voting upon entry to the union. 
1: The territorial Act did not specify declarant alien voting; rather, it permitted all free white male inhabitants the right to vote, and, it specifies that state 
legislature will decide on voting qualifications in all subsequent elections.   
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Appendix Table 2.1.2: Declarant Alien Voting End Dates, with Sources 
 
State Year 
End 
Mode Sources 
AL 1901 New Constitution Constitution of 1901, Article 8 
AR 1926 Amendment Biennial Report of the Secretary of State, 1925-1926, 1919-1920 
CO 1902 Amendment Legislative Manual, 1903  
FL 1894 Amendment Report of the Secretary of State of Florida, 1893/1894 
GA 1877 New Constitution Constitution of 1877, Article 2 
ID 1874 Territorial Act Keyssar (2000) pg 138; General Laws of the Territory of Idaho (1874-1875)  
IN 1921 Amendment Yearbook of the State of Indiana 1921 
KS 1918 Amendment Biennial Report of the Secretary of State, 1917/1918 
LA 1898 New Constitution Constitution of 1898, Section 197 
MI 1894 Amendment Michigan Legislative Manual and Official Directory, 1895-96, 1897 
MN 1896 Amendment Legislative Manual of the State of Minnesota, 1897 
MO 1924 Amendment Official Manual of the State of Missouri, 1925-1926 
MT 18891 New Constitution Compiled Statutes of Montana 1889, Section 1007; Constitution of 1889, Article 9 
NE 1918 Amendment Official Report of the Nebraska State Canvassing Board, 1918 
ND 1898 Amendment State of North Dakota Legislative Manual, 1899 
NV 1864 New Constitution Constitution of 1864, Article 2 
OR 1914 Amendment State of Oregon Blue Book and Official Directory, 1921-1922 
OK 1890 Territorial Act The Statutes of Oklahoma 1890, Chapter 33, Section 1s 
SC 1868 New Constitution Constitution of 1868, Article 8 
SD 1918 Amendment South Dakota Legislative Manual 1921 
TX 1921 Amendment Supplemental Biennial Report of the Secretary of State, 1922 
WA 1889 New Constitution Constitution of 1889, Article 6 
WI 19081 Amendment The Blue Book of the State of Wisconsin, 1909 
WY 1894 New Constitution Constitution of 1890, Article 6 
Italics denotes a new constitution upon entry into the Union. 
1: Montana included provisions in repeal to allow existing non-citizen immigrants the right to vote until 1894; Wisconsin, until 1912.  
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Appendix Table 2.2: Determinants of Adoption of Alien Voting for States 
Adopting Late in a Given Decade 
 Adopt 
(1) 
Adopt 
(2) 
Adopt 
(3) 
Adopt 
(4) 
Ln(Population) 0.511    
 (1.55)    
Fraction Adult Male 0.344    
 (2.04)**    
Fraction Foreign Born 0.975    
 (0.08)    
Fraction 'New' Immigrants 2.141    
 (2.37)**    
Population Growth 3.176    
 (3.48)***    
Fraction improved acres  0.100   
  (3.88)***   
Ln(Real Value of Farms Per Acre)  1.000   
  (0.00)   
Ln(Real Mfg. Output p.c.)  0.621   
  (1.19)   
Fraction of Gub. Votes Dem   0.971  
   (0.11)  
Fraction of Upper House Dem.   1.729  
   (0.46)  
Fraction of Lower House Dem.   0.503  
   (0.57)  
Exogenous Constitutional Change    29.862 
    (3.92)*** 
% Leg. Approval    0.955 
    (0.85) 
Successive Approvals    0.336 
    (0.99) 
Simple Majority    0.944 
    (0.46) 
N 137 138 131 118 
Z-statistics reported in parentheses. Estimates are from a non-parametric discrete-time hazard model, and 
so tests of significance are based upon a null hypothesis that the coefficient is 1. All continuous covariates 
are measured in effect sizes, so estimates should be interpreted as the effect of a one standard deviation 
increase. Sample sizes differ due to data availability – certain states did not have constitutional amendment 
procedures in place until the late 19th century. ID and OK are excluded from the sample, as they both 
adopted, and repealed, alien voting as territories. Also excluded are IN (1851), KS (1861), and NV (1864), 
since they adopted alien voting in the first half of a given decade. Decade fixed effects are included in all 
specifications, and standard errors are clustered at the state level. * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 2.3.1: Individual County-Level Regressions for Support for Repeal, by state - SOUTH 
 
 Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Arkansas 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Florida 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Missouri 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Texas 
Fraction 
Foreign Born 
1.265 -0.666 1.346 0.407 
 (1.212) (0.466) (0.564)** (0.210)* 
Fraction 'New' 
Immigrants 
0.138 -0.288 -0.051 -0.001 
 (0.051)*** (2.242) (0.049) (0.084) 
Fraction 
Dem., 
Gubernatorial 
0.318 0.691 0.081 0.612 
 (0.209) (0.429) (0.101) (0.061)*** 
Ln(Real Value 
Mfg. Output 
Per Capita) 
0.044 0.088 0.032 0.002 
 (0.015)*** (0.062) (0.008)*** (0.008) 
R2 0.30 0.13 0.18 0.38 
N 74 34 114 132 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 2.3.2: Individual County-Level Regressions for Support for Repeal, by State – MIDWEST 
 
 Fraction Voting 
for Repeal 
Indiana 
Fraction Voting 
for Repeal 
Kansas 
Fraction Voting 
for Repeal 
Michigan 
Fraction Voting 
for Repeal 
Minnesota 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Wisconsin 
Fraction Foreign Born 0.089 -0.368 0.021 0.130 -0.071 
 (0.313) (0.123)*** (0.100) (0.149) (0.241) 
Fraction 'New' 
Immigrants 
0.117 -0.009 -0.346 0.120 -0.607 
 (0.075) (0.028) (0.262) (0.113) (0.158)*** 
Fraction Dem., 
Gubernatorial 
-0.804 -0.202 -0.639 -0.265 -0.878 
 (0.205)*** (0.099)** (0.138)*** (0.099)*** (0.098)*** 
Ln(Real Value Mfg. 
Output Per Capita) 
-0.005 -0.008 0.011 -0.003 0.041 
 (0.013) (0.003)** (0.018) (0.007) (0.015)*** 
R2 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.07 0.61 
N 92 96 80 75 70 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Appendix Table 2.3.3: Individual County-Level Regressions for Support for Repeal, by State – MIDWEST and WEST 
 
 Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Colorado 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
North Dakota 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
Nebraska 
Fraction Voting for 
Repeal 
South Dakota 
Fraction 
Foreign Born 
0.149 -0.104 -0.473 -0.085 
 (0.139) (0.122) (0.151)*** (0.232) 
Fraction 'New' 
Immigrants 
0.139 -0.491 0.011 -0.255 
 (0.118) (0.322) (0.035) (0.072)*** 
Fraction Dem., 
Gubernatorial 
0.463 0.144 0.056 0.547 
 (0.290) (0.277) (0.133) (0.241)** 
Ln(Real Value 
Mfg. Output 
Per Capita) 
0.053 -0.008 0.014 0.010 
 (0.018)*** (0.017) (0.007)** (0.012) 
R2 0.32 0.11 0.23 0.38 
N 54 25 77 55 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Chapter 3 
 
How Well Do Automated Linking Methods Perform? Evidence from the LIFE-M Project1 
(joint with Martha Bailey, Catherine Massey, and Connor Cole) 
New large-scale longitudinal and intergenerational data are revolutionizing the study of U.S. history, the long-term 
effects of early life influences, and population health and aging. Innovations in automated linking methods have 
facilitated these developments. This paper uses new ground truth data to evaluate the performance of four commonly 
used automated record-linking algorithms and two phonetic name-cleaning methods. Our results show high match 
rates for each algorithm, but we document important shortcomings of each. First, no method (including the ground 
truth) appears representative. Second, automated linking results in a very high incidence of Type I errors (erroneous 
matches), ranging from 17 percent to over 60 percent. Third, the use of phonetic name cleaning such as NYSIIS or 
Soundex increases Type I errors by at least 60 percent. Finally, Type I errors are positively correlated with Type II 
errors (missed true links) suggesting that current methods used to increase match rate decrease the share of true 
matches. These findings hold in multiple ground truth data, including internally simulated ground truth, LIFE-M data, 
and the Early Indicator’s genealogically linked Oldest Old sample of Union Army veterans. Measurement error 
introduced by different automated linking methods could have substantial (and difficult to sign) effects on inferences. 
As an illustration, we show that estimates of intergenerational income elasticities for father-son pairs in the 1940 
Census vary by linking method, with some linking methods reducing them as much as 67 percent. We conclude with 
constructive suggestions for improving automated methods without using clerical review or genealogical methods. 
 
3.1 Introduction 
An explosion of large-scale record linkage is transforming the study of U.S. history, the 
long-term effects of early life influences, and population health and aging. Between 1980 and 
2010, only 15 papers using linked data appeared in economics journals, but this number has been 
growing exponentially since 2010 (Figure 3.1).  
                                                     
1 This project was generously supported by the National Science Foundation (SMA 1539228), the University of 
Michigan Population Studies Center Small Grants (R24 HD041028), the Michigan Center for the Demography of 
Aging (MiCDA, P30 AG012846-21), and the Michigan Institute on Research and Teaching in Economics (MITRE). 
We gratefully acknowledge the use of the services and facilities of the Population Studies Center at the University of 
Michigan (R24 HD041028). We are grateful to Dora Costa, Shari Eli, Adriana Lleras-Muney, Joseph Price, and the 
board members of the LIFE-M project, including Eytan Adar, George Alter, Hoyt Bleakley, Matias Cattaneo, William 
Collins, Katie Genadek, Maggie Levenstein, Bhash Mazumder, and Evan Roberts, for their helpful suggestions. We 
are also grateful to Sarah Anderson, Garrett Anstreicher, and Hanna Zlotnick for their excellent contributions to the 
LIFE-M project and assistance with this analysis. 
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Data availability and developments in automated linking methods have fueled this growth.  
The recent release of the 1940 full-count Census (the first census to contain educational attainment, 
income from wages, and many other outcomes of interest to economists), digitization and linkage 
of historical censuses to the 1880 full-count Census (Ruggles 2006, Ruggles et al. 2015), and new 
availability of indexed Vital Statistics records allow researchers to break new ground on old 
questions and are opening entirely new areas of inquiry.  
These data facilitate several large-scale linking initiatives. The Census Bureau has linked 
the complete count 1940 Census to current administrative data (Census Longitudinal Infrastructure 
Project, CLIP). The Minnesota Population Center is planning to link the 1940 Census to historical 
censuses. The Longitudinal, Intergenerational Family Electronic Micro-Database (LIFE-M) is 
linking millions of vital records to the 1940 Census (Bailey et al. 2016). Entrepreneurial 
researchers have also combined large datasets to illuminate other questions of interest. 
Despite these recent advances, less is known about the quality of these linked data. 
Although most papers that use linked data report match rates and evaluate the representativeness 
of their samples, the incidence and characteristics of Type I (false matches) and Type II errors 
(missed matches) remain unknown. Moreover, the role of linking-induced errors could have 
important effects on inferences based on these linked samples. 
This paper uses new ground truth to evaluate the performance of the most commonly used 
automated linking algorithms.2 We quantify performance in terms of (1) match rates, (2) 
representativeness, (3) Type I (false matches) errors, and (4) Type II errors (unmatched true links) 
by comparing the links made by Ferrie (1996), the Iterative Method (Abramitzky et al. 2012b), 
random disambiguation of multiple matches (Nix and Qian 2015), and one regression-based, 
                                                     
2 “Ground truth” is used in record linkage to mean correctly linked data, typically obtained by direct observation. 
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supervised machine learning approach (Feigenbaum 2016a) to those in three ground truth samples: 
the Longitudinal Intergenerational Family Electronic Micro-database’s (LIFE-M) sample of Ohio 
boys linked to the 1940 Census, a synthetic ground truth  we create for testing purposes, and a 
genealogically linked sample of Union Army veterans from the Early Indicators Project (Costa et 
al. 2017).  We also examine how two commonly used phonetic name-cleaning methods, Soundex 
and NYSIIS, affect performance. 
The results of our analysis reveal high match rates for all automated methods, but less 
encouraging results for other performance measures.  First, none of the linked samples (including 
LIFE-M) appears representative of the population. Second, automated methods yield distressingly 
high rates of incorrect links (Type I errors), ranging from 17 to 61 percent in the LIFE-M ground 
truth. Careful review suggests a large share of links that are matched by automated methods are 
likely links to the wrong person.  Recent implementations of machine learning such as those by 
Feigenbaum (2016a) have not fixed the problem. Erroneous links also appear to be selected on 
different baseline characteristics of the sample, potentially suggesting a role for more systematic 
measurement error. Third, the incidence of Type I errors increases by 60 to 100 percent with the 
use of phonetic name cleaning, because these techniques clean out meaningful variations in 
spelling used by humans.3  Randomly choosing among multiple matches Nix and Qian (2015) 
dramatically worsens the false positive rate. Fourth, Type I errors are positively correlated with 
Type II errors (missed true links) suggesting that current methods used to increase match rate tend 
to decrease the share of true matches. 
                                                     
3 An automated matching method would, for example, link Rupert Hermann 65 to Robert Hermann 65 (an exact match using 
NYSIIS) over Rupert Hermann 66. Human trainers tend to select the latter match, treating the difference between Robert and Rupert 
as a meaningful variation in spelling but tolerating a one year age difference. 
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A final exercise demonstrates how the combined effects of Type I and Type II errors 
ultimately affects inference. Using a common sample of father-son pairs linked to the 1940 Census, 
we show that estimates of intergenerational income elasticities range from 0.10 to 0.30. The 
estimates do not vary with Type I error rates as one would expect with classical measurement error, 
suggesting a role for non-classical error or selection under linking methods.  We conclude with 
constructive suggestions for low-cost ways of improving automated linking methods. 
3.2 Advances in Historical Record Linking Methodology 
Record linkage has long been a mainstay of historical demography and economic history. 
But recent developments in computational speed, data availability, and fuzzy linking algorithms 
have increased the scale and accuracy of record linkage and dramatically expanded what is 
possible. This section provides a brief overview of record linkage in historical contexts with a 
focus on the methods evaluated in this paper. 
3.2.1 Innovations in Blocking and Population Indexes 
The first set of innovations in historical linkage relates to “blocking.” In computer science, 
blocking refers to the partition of a dataset into “blocks” (or clusters of records) using a record 
attribute (Michelson 2006). Blocking methods limit the number of potential matches according to 
the attribute, thereby improving computational efficiency while maintaining accuracy. For 
instance, blocking on place of birth and sex means that a linking algorithm would only search for 
Franklin Jones born in Kentucky within the set of candidate matches of men born in that state.   
Historical methods have effectively used “blocking” techniques since their inception. The 
earliest methods involved identifying a group of individuals in a particular location (e.g., township, 
county, or state) in one census and manually searching for the same person within the same region 
(the block) in the subsequent census (Malin 1935, Curti 1959, Bogue 1963, Thernstrom 1964, 
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Guest 1987). This blocking strategy, however, missed individuals who relocated or changed names 
between census years, generating unrepresentative samples (Ruggles 2006).  
The creation of state population indexes4 facilitated the next innovation in blocking. 
Improving on previous methods, researchers drew a random sample of households with children 
at least 10 years old in a historical census. They then searched for the same household in the 
previous census using the birth state of the child to narrow the search (Schaefer 1985, Steckel 
1988). This technique, therefore, could find individuals who moved between the census years, but 
it was similarly limited by geographic mobility between birth and first enumeration in the census. 
It also restricted the sample of linked households to those with children surviving to age ten.  
3.2.2 Innovations in Automated Link Generation 
The second major innovation was the use of automated matching, effectively replacing the 
time-intensive human search with computer queries.  Leveraging newly created national 
population indexes and Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS), automated matching generated a 
set of candidate links based on record attributes.  Atack et al. (1992) created probabilistic matching 
software, called PC Matchmaker, to link to census samples in a DOS environment. PC 
Matchmaker coded names using Soundex or NYSIIS phonetic codes and allowed for user-
specified blocking and weighting schemes.5  Before recent developments in probabilistic matching 
had become standard, the purpose of phonetic string cleaning programs was to increase match rates 
by correcting for orthographic differences: minor spelling differences, name Anglicization, and 
                                                     
4 A state “index” is a list of individuals living in a state at a point in time.  
5 Soundex was developed in the early 20th century to examine census links. It groups similar sounding names like “Smith,” “Smyth” 
and “Smythe” to the same code (in this example, S530). NYSIIS, the acronym for the New York State Identification and Intelligence 
System, was developed in 1970 as an improvement to the Soundex algorithm. NYSIIS transforms names like “Wilhem” and 
“William” to WALAN. 
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transcription errors. This software was then used to create a linked sample between the agricultural 
and population censuses between 1850 and 1880 (Atack 2004).  
Building on this approach, Ferrie (1996) linked men 10 years and older between the 1850 
and 1860 U.S. Census samples. To achieve large-scale record linkage in the age before recent 
advances in computational technology and machine learning, Ferrie (1996) began by selecting a 
sample of uncommon names from the 1850 Census.6  The purpose of limiting the sample in this 
way was to save computation time for the records that would likely not be disambiguated later in 
the process (for example, “John Smith”).  Like Atack et al. (1992), Ferrie’s method transformed 
the last name strings using NYSIIS codes, and also truncated the untransformed first name after 
the fourth letter. Both of these procedures aimed to correct for minor spelling variations, 
diminutives, etc.  Ferrie then linked forward to the 1860 Census, eliminating as potential links all 
individuals not born in the same state and not living with the same family.  To account for 
misreporting and age heaping, Ferrie did not require an individual’s year of birth to be exactly the 
same between a record and its candidate match but allowed for a 5 difference in age. If more than 
two links remained, Ferrie chose the link with the smallest age difference.7  This method produced 
a linked sample of 4,938 men (9 percent of the total population of men, 19 percent of the population 
of men with uncommon names) from 1850 to 1860 and, since, has become the foundation for much 
of the historical linking literature.  
More recently, Abramitzky et al.’s (2012b) iterative method refined the Ferrie method to 
use a more inclusive set of names. As summarized in their web appendix (Abramitzky et al. 2012a), 
                                                     
6Ferrie (1996) notes that he only searched for 25,586 of the 55,852 men in the 1860 Census whose surname and first name appeared 
ten or fewer times in 1850.  
7 Ferrie (1996) does not specify his process for multiple match disambiguation – in his linking from 1850-1860, there were no ties 
after minimizing the difference in age. 
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they select a sample of boys ages 3 to 15 with unique names in the 1865 Norwegian Census, 
standardize first and last names using the NYSIIS, and look for exact, unique matches.  If there 
are multiple exact matches, they do not link the observation. If they do not identify a link in the 
first step, they search for an exact match within a 1 year band in the second step and, if they do 
not find a link, repeat this process up to a 2 band around the reported birth year. This method’s 
major innovation is to select the potential match for a census record that has the smallest difference 
in year of birth as opposed to dropping all records with multiple potential matches (regardless of 
age). This iterative method drops records only if the record has multiple exact candidate matches 
with identical years of birth or a year of birth falling outside a specified interval. They ultimately 
link a sample of 2,613 migrants and 17,833 non-migrants of a baseline sample of 71,644 
individuals with unique names for a match rate of 29 percent.  
The Ferrie and Iterative methods form the basis for record linkage in a number of high 
profile papers. Abramitzky et al. (2012b) show that the returns to migration were relatively low, 
and Abramitzky et al. (2013) show that immigrants from Norway to the U.S. were negatively 
selected based upon parents’ wealth. To study migrant assimilation for 16 sending countries, 
Abramitzky et al. (2014) make use of the iterative method to link men between the ages of 18 and 
35 across the 1900, 1910, and 1920 U.S. Censuses, producing a sample of 20,225 immigrant and 
1,650 native-born men.8 In another application of the iterative method, Boustan et al. (2012) 
produce a sample of men ages 30 to 40 years old linked from the 1920 to the 1930 U.S. Censuses 
to study migration responses to natural disasters.9 Hornbeck and Naidu (2014) use the same linked 
sample restricted to 1920 and 1930 links to study black migration out of the Mississippi Delta after 
                                                     
8 Abramitzky et al. (2014) achieve match rates across the 1900, 1910, and 1920 Censuses of 12 percent for immigrants and 16 
percent for natives. 
9 Boustan et al. (2012) achieves a match rate of 24 percent across the 1920 and 1930 Censuses. 
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the 1927 Flood. Aizer et al. (2016) use an updated Ferrie method to link male children of applicants 
to the mother’s pension programs between 1911 and 1935 to the Social Security Death Master File 
to study the effect of cash transfers on later-life outcomes. With a match rate of 52 percent to 
mortality records, they find that mother’s pension programs increased longevity of recipient 
children by one year relative to children of mothers who were denied benefits.  
Nix and Qian (2015) propose an extension of the iterative method to achieve much higher 
match rates. Similar to Ferrie (1996) and the Iterative Method, they standardize names using a 
phonetic string cleaning software10 and use name, birth place and age to generate candidate 
matches. They also allow a 3 difference in age. An iterative procedure then generates a sample 
of potential matches for each individual, which is scored according to the “perfect”, Ferrie (but 
using Soundex), or Jaro-Winkler string distance.11 If, after applying these different scoring 
procedures there are ties (multiple matches), their key innovation is to randomly select among 
multiple candidate matches. This approach clearly increases match rates above what is typical in 
the historical linking literature, which they argue increases their samples sufficiently to measure 
of racial fluidity. 
3.2.3 Innovations in Probabilistic Matching 
The Minnesota Population Center (MPC) has pioneered incorporating the latest advances 
in probabilistic matching into historical record linkage as described in Goeken et al. (2011). MPC 
standardized surnames minimally but standardized first name strings that occurred at least 100 
times (Vick and Huynh 2011). Within race and birth place blocks, MPC uses the Freely Extensible 
Biomedical Record Linkage (FEBRL) software to score age and name similarity. Next, MPC 
                                                     
10 They use Phoenex which combines of Soundex and Metaphone methods (Snae 2007).  
11 This is a commonly used statistic capturing the “distance” between two strings.  
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constructed training data to use with a Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier.  Goeken et al. 
(2011) writes,  
…we selected a random sample of potential links, and had a group of MPC data 
entry operators code each potential link as a “yes” or “no” based on a visual 
examination of names and ages of potential links (with yes indicating that it was in 
their opinion a true link). If a majority had the potential link as a “yes,” then it was 
coded as a “yes” in the training data (with the remainder coded as “no”) (p. 3). 
Using these training data, Support Vector Machine (SVM) classified all potential links as true or 
false.  A final step eliminates cases with numerous potential links.  
This approach creates the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Linked Representative 
Samples of the 1880 Census, which contains matches to the 1850 to 1930 Census one-percent 
samples (Ruggles et al. 2010). Researchers have used these samples in a variety of research 
questions including the economic effects of racial fluidity (Saperstein and Gullickson 2013), long-
term differences in black and white women’s labor-force participation (Boustan and Collins 2014) 
and intergenerational co-residency (Ruggles 2011).  
Other researchers have also incorporated probabilistic and machine learning into their 
record linkage. Mill and Stein (2016) and Mill (2013) describe and use a method that also employs 
string comparators and scoring of matches, using an Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm 
and maximum likelihood estimation to determine the probability of a true match. Similar to the 
MPC, Antonie et al. (2014) and Wisselgren et al. (2014) use a text-string comparator and estimate 
probability scores using truth data and Vector Machine Learning.12   
                                                     
12 Antonie et al. (2014) describe the linkage system they developed to link across historical Canadian census data and their 
application of this system to linkage of men from the 1871 Canadian Census to the 1881 Canadian Census. Their linkage rates 
range from 17.5 percent (Quebec) to 25.5 percent (New Brunswick). Wisselgren et al. (2014) use an approach similar to Antonie 
et al. (2014) and the MPC to link the 1890 and 1900 Swedish Censuses. Depending on their treatment of names (standardized 
names versus constructed name variables) they achieve match rates ranging from 18 percent to 70 percent for men and 24 percent 
to 66 percent for women (Wisselgren et al. 2014, pp. 148). They use Parish records as “truth” data to assess Type I error in their 
linkages, of which they find very little (less than 3 percent).  Preliminary work by (Eriksson 2016) shows the error rate of the 
Swedish linked data increases by as much as 24 percent if linked using county of birth – a significantly more aggregated geography 
– than parish of birth, which contributes to the significantly lower error rates found by Wisselgren et al.  
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Another use of probabilistic matching makes use of Ancestry.com’s search algorithm to 
link records. Bailey et al. (2011) link records of lynching to the 1900 to 1930 U.S. Censuses to 
determine which community characteristics were associated with lynching. Collins and 
Wanamaker (2015) enter information on name, age, and place of birth for black males ages 0 to 
40 resident in Southern states in the 1910 Census into Ancestry to search for individuals who 
uniquely match these criteria. They match 19.4 percent (5,465/28,215) of individuals to a unique 
person in 1930. 
Bleakley and Ferrie (2016) link individuals eligible for Georgia’s Cherokee Land Lottery 
of 1832 (and their sons) to examine the long-run effects of income on the human capital and 
economic outcomes of their children. Using a variant of Ferrie’s (1996) method, they link sons 
from 1850 using name, year of birth, birth place, and parents’ birth places to the 1880 full-count 
Census. In addition, they used Ancestry’s search algorithm to search for individuals who were not 
linked.  For part of their analysis, they weighted observations by 1/n where n is the number of 
candidate matches to make use of multiple matches.  Their combination of methods produces a 
match rate of 46 percent from the baseline sample of 32,738 men in 1850. 
Recent unpublished papers continue to extend this frontier. Eli et al. (2016) use 
probabilistic matching to link military records from the War and Treasury Departments to study 
the effect of the Civil War on migration decisions for those living on the border of Union and 
Confederate states. Eli et al. limit the age window to 3 years and also discard candidate matches 
with a Jaro-Winkler scores less than 0.9.   
Most recently, Feigenbaum (2016b) extends the MPC methods by introducing a 
supervised, regression machine learning approach. Using single clerically reviewed data, he uses 
non-linear regression models to predict the probability of a match using observed features of the 
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linked and unlinked data. These features include name similarity scores, differences in age, 
indicators for Soundex matches of first and last name, and whether truncated parts of the first and 
last name match. After calibrating his model using tuning parameters, he uses it to predict matches 
for a large number of men in the 1915 Iowa Census linked to the 1940 Census.13 
In summary, existing methods involve complex procedures that may improve match rates 
and accuracy.  Comparisons of methods are further complicated by the fact studies link different 
data (censuses, vital records, and administrative records) in different countries or geographic areas 
for different periods and samples. Many variations on linking methods across studies suggest the 
need for a more systematic analysis of these methods.  Which method or combination of methods 
should researchers use in different historical contexts? What are the trade-offs when using different 
automated linking methods and phonetic name cleaning algorithms? The next sections address 
these questions using a common sample. 
3.3 Metrics of Automated Method Performance 
This paper uses new ground truth samples to evaluate the performance of commonly used 
linking methods. The reviewed methods are Ferrie (1996); the Iterative Method (Abramitzky et al. 
2012a); random tie breaking (Nix and Qian 2015); and supervised, regression-based machine 
learning (Feigenbaum 2016b). Detailed web appendices, published articles, and posted code make 
replicating these methods straightforward. Ferrie (1996) describes the construction of his method 
in a step by step basis, which we implemented exactly as described; we also examine its robustness 
                                                     
13 Computer scientists have also taken a recent interest in historical record linkage. Using each decennial Lancashire census from 
1841 to 1901, Fu et al. (2014a) develop a model for an automated pairwise linking process that uses both a supervised SVM method 
and a similarity threshold model. To compare first and last name strings they employ Q-grams and Jaccard measures of string 
distance. Their match rates range from 44 to 48 percent depending on the two censuses used in the linkage (Fu et al. 2014, pp. 219). 
Building upon this work, Fu et al. (2014b) use graph-based methods to link households across U.K. census data. After data cleaning, 
the first step of their linkage process involves the scoring of pairwise links and the use of logistic regression to score record pair 
similarity, which is used in the selection of record pairs. They then construct a graph for each household and perform graph 
matching. Vertex matching and graph similarity calculations are used to select the final matched household pairs.  
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to inclusion of more common names.14 Abramitzky et al. (2012a) posted their Stata code at the 
American Economic Review, which we use directly.15 We implement Nix and Qian’s (2015) 
method of random match disambiguation by randomly selecting one link in the 1940 Census from 
the set of (multiple) perfect ties.  This method is implemented for the sample of Ferrie’s (1996) 
matches using the sample of more common names.16  
We evaluate the performance of each algorithm for the same base sample of Ohio born 
boys to the 1940 full-count U.S. Census. This eliminates the possibility that differences across 
datasets and periods affect this paper’s comparisons across methods: only the differences in the 
design of the linking algorithm should influence the results.  The links of each automated linking 
algorithm and LIFE-M ground truth are evaluated in the following four dimensions:  
(1) Match rate: The match rate is calculated as the share of records that were successfully matched 
from the original sample. This dimension of match quality is reported in almost all linking 
papers.  
(2) Representativeness: We compare the characteristics of the linked samples to the characteristics 
of the original sample (including non-links). In terms of characteristics on the birth records, 
these comparisons include the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of exact day of birth 
distributions and t-tests of the differences in the share of fathers and mothers who are foreign 
born, the number of siblings in the reconstituted family, the number of characters in the infant, 
                                                     
14 Four other modest deviations reflect the fact that we do not limit links based on family continuity or limit our baseline sample 
on the basis of age (because this does not make sense to do with birth certificates). In addition, we treat records with multiple 
matches after the last step as having no link, although Ferrie reports having none of these instances and, therefore, does not indicate 
how he would have dealt with them. We limit our analysis of the 1940 Census to men born in Ohio, obviating the need for a 
restriction on birthplace. 
15 The code was retrieved in February 1, 2016, from this link: https://www.aeaweb.org/aer/data/aug2012/20100051_data.zip. We 
have made one major change this code. If implemented as written, the code deletes the best link if there are multiples and matches 
to the second best link.  This results in a substantially higher Type I error rates (documented in earlier drafts of this paper). The 
results we present here alter the posted code to match from the birth certificate data forward to the 1940 census, which eliminates 
this problem. Our revised code is available upon request. 
16 As noted in Ferrie (1996), the uncommon name sample has almost no multiple matches to disambiguate. 
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mother and father’s names, and the share of records with at least one misspelling or 
transcription error.   
Although these first two measures are the most common statistics reported for linked 
samples, they are not sufficient statistics for link quality.  This is easily illustrated in an example. 
Consider a matching algorithm that randomly links individuals between two datasets. This 
algorithm would perform very well in terms of match rates (criteria 1, 100 percent!) and 
representativeness (criteria 2, perfect performance!), because the entire matched sample would be 
matched and identical to the baseline sample in observed characteristics. Few researchers, 
however, would want to work with these data, because the incidence of false positives would 
approach 100 percent in large samples. If false links are random with respect the relationship of 
interest, they would tend to attenuate it. A systematic relationship between the false links and the 
independent variable of interest could have an unknown effect on an estimated relationship.   
Two more criteria are, therefore, particularly important for assessing the quality of 
statistical inferences (Abowd and Vilhuber 2005, Kim and Chambers 2012): 
(3) False positives (Type I errors): We compare links obtained from each automated method to the 
LIFE-M ground truth. If the method’s link and ground truth link agree, we treat the link as 
correct. In the case of disagreements between the linking algorithm and the ground truth, we 
re-review these links by staging the equivalent of a “police line-up.” In the line-up, reviewers 
see the LIFE-M link, the automated link, and a number of similar potential links arising from 
our probabilistic match procedure. This re-review gives each method a fair shot at having its 
link chosen; it also allows trainers the opportunity to identify potential errors in the ground 
truth. We report the share of links for each method that human trainers ultimately code as 
erroneous matches. The false positive rate for each method is defined as the fraction of links 
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deemed erroneous by trainers in the police line-up. As an additional check on the quality of 
the reviewers, we also examine how well automated linking methods perform against an 
objective ground truth sample of synthetic data. 
(4) False negatives (Type II errors): this metric is intended to capture the fraction of “true” links 
that are not found by each method. We construct this as (1 – Match Rate*(1 – Type 1 Error 
Rate)). The Type I errors are those computed after the police line-up described in (3) above. 
3.4 A Comparison of Links by Automated Methods and LIFE-M 
The primary challenge to evaluating historical linking methods is that there is very little 
“ground truth” data against which to evaluate the quality of different linked samples. Because a 
central focus of a growing historical literature is linking to the newly available 1940 census, we 
begin our analysis by examining the performance of automated methods using LIFE-M sample of 
19,090 Ohio boys linked to the 1940 census.   
3.4.1 The LIFE-M Sample of Ohio Boys Linked to the 1940 Census 
LIFE-M’s linked sample of Ohio boys is created by matching birth certificates to the 1940 
full-count U.S. Census.  The process is semi-automated, making use of both computer 
programming and human input.  After cleaning and standardizing the data, we use a bi-gram 
matching procedure to generate a list of candidate matches based upon name similarity and age 
for men born in Ohio.   
From this list of candidate links, LIFE-M creates links using an independent, blinded 
human review process. “Data trainers” first participate in a rigorous orientation process. During 
this period, they receive detailed feedback on their accuracy relative to an answer key. They 
continue this process (this takes 10 to 20 hours of data training) until their matches agree with the 
truth dataset 95 percent of the time.   
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After completing this orientation, trainers become part of a team that conducts independent, 
blinded clerical review. Each potential match is reviewed by two trainers who choose from a set 
of candidate matches generated using a probabilistic, bigram match on name, date of birth (or age), 
and birth state (Wasi 2014). In the cases where the two initial reviewers disagree, the records are 
re-reviewed by an additional three individuals to resolve these discrepancies. Our automated 
system randomly assigns batches among the 15 to 30 trainers who are employed at any time, so it 
is difficult for trainers to coordinate with peers.  Any discrepancies between the two trainers results 
in additional reviews by three other trainers who also make independent determinations about 
whether the candidate records are true links. Random “audit batches” provide feedback to trainers 
about the accuracy of their decisions, and weekly meetings encourage discussions of difficult cases 
to help trainers achieve consistent and accurate matches.  The result of this process is a highly 
vetted, hand-matched ground truth dataset for a random sample of 19,090 Ohio birth certificates—
boys born between 1881 and 1940—linked to the 1940 Census (Bailey et al. 2016). 
To validate the quality of the LIFE-M ground truth, the Family History and Technology 
Lab at Brigham Young University (BYU) employed research assistants to use genealogical 
methods to hand link a sample of 543 boys, 225 of which had been linked by LIFE-M. They used 
multiple sources of genealogical data (only a subset of which were used in the LIFE-M linking) to 
create correct record linkages and complete family trees. Although genealogical linking is cost 
(and time) prohibitive for larger projects, the advantage of the genealogical approach is that it 
produces a very low rate of false links.  The BYU team had no knowledge of LIFE-M’s links while 
doing this exercise, so their work can be viewed as independent and blinded.   
BYU’s genealogical method ultimately linked 392 of 543 boys for a match rate of 72 
percent. This was 151 more links than the LIFE-M team found and can be attributed to the use of 
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multiple data sources and more intensive searching to distinguish between seemingly similar 
matches. However, for the 225 links found by LIFE-M, the BYU team agreed with these matches 
96 percent of the time. Only 16 of LIFE-M’s links differed from those found by the genealogical 
method. Taking the genealogical method as the gold standard, this implies that LIFE-M’s false 
positive rate would be 4 percent, which is substantively identical to rates calculated in section 
IV.D. of this paper. 
3.4.2 Match Rates 
Figure .1 describes the match rates for the LIFE-M ground truth and for each automated 
algorithm. These match rates represent the share of the baseline sample of boys born in Ohio from 
1881 to 1940 who were successfully matched to the 1940 complete count Census.  LIFE-M’s 
ground truth matched 51 percent of the baseline sample. Ferrie’s (1996) method matches between 
19 and 38 percent of baseline sample depending on the use of phonetic name cleaning. For the 
Ferrie method, match rates fall as phonetic name cleaning creates more potential matches than 
permitted using the uncommon name sample restriction.17  As expected, relaxing the uncommon 
name sample restriction (labeled “Ferrie 1996 – all potentials”) results in higher match rates, 
ranging from 42 to 50 percent.  Due to great similarities with Ferrie’s method, Abramitzky et al.’s 
(2012a) iterative approach yields comparable match rates, ranging from 43 to 47 percent, 
depending upon the phonetic name cleaning procedure. As intended, the Nix and Qian (2015) 
method of randomly choosing a match for records with multiple matches effectively increases the 
match rate to 60 to 76 percent. This is very close to their reported match rate of 61 to 67 percent 
across the 1880-1940 Censuses (Nix and Qian 2015). These match rates are higher than the Ferrie 
                                                     
17 This restricts the set records to be linked to names that have fewer than 10 potential links. Because the match relies on truncated 
first name and either last name or a phonetic code for last name and variation is lost using phonetic codes, the loss of variation in 
last name results in fewer matches when using phonetic codes. 
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method (with more common names) and highlight the importance of record disambiguation in 
historical linkage: methods that help choose among multiple matches can significantly improve 
match rates! Finally, Feigenbaum’s (2016a) regression-based machine learning method matches 
approximately 26 percent of the baseline sample.   
These results highlight how the use of phonetic name cleaning software can increase or 
decrease match rates, depending upon how it interacts with record disambiguation. While phonetic 
cleaning can correct for orthographic errors and increase the match rate, it may also removes 
meaningful spelling variation from names, making match disambiguation more difficult and 
decreasing links. This interaction is important for the Ferrie (1996) method. This method’s 
uncommon name restriction means that the sample that Ferrie tries to link (i.e., that has fewer than 
10 potential matches in the 1940 Census regardless of age) falls from 50, to 42, to 27 percent with 
the use of NYSIIS and Soundex, respectively. However, because the Nix and Qian (2015) method 
does not require unique matches, the use of phonetic name cleaning unambiguously increases 
match rates.  
Also noteworthy is that our match rates are higher than published elsewhere. For instance, 
the Ferrie (1996) method matches between 19 and 38 percent of our sample versus his published 
figure of 9 percent of all men between 1850 and 1860.  Similarly, the Abramitzky et al. (2012b) 
algorithm links 43 to 47 percent of our sample, whereas it links only 29 percent of Norwegian men 
in their published work. Higher match rates may occur here for several reasons. First, the LIFE-M 
sample has better information on the complete and correct name. This is the case because formal 
birth name—often including middle names—was recorded on the birth certificates was the exact 
date of birth. The presence of a formal name and birth date removes nicknames and measurement 
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error in age from the primary record, which improves match rates for all methods.18 Second, the 
LIFE-M data link the Ohio boys as men in the 1940 Census at fairly young ages when mortality 
and outmigration may have been lower than in other contexts.  In summary, our context is 
conducive to higher match rates and, presumably, higher quality matches due to the higher quality 
of name and age reporting as well as a greater likelihood for the right link to be in the linked 
dataset.  
3.4.3 Representativeness of the Linked Samples 
We next compare the representativeness of the linked records. Because birth certificates 
do not contain socio-demographic measures found in the census (race, age, or incomes of the 
parents), we make use of alternative features of these data.  First, we test whether the distribution 
of exact day of birth (1-366, due to leap year) in the baseline sample and in the linked subsamples 
are drawn from the same probability distribution using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  Exact day 
of birth is ideal because it is as close to a continuous measure as we can get in historical records, 
and season of birth is strongly correlated with socio-economic in modern data (Buckles and 
Hungerman 2013). 
Figure 3.3 shows the p-values for each linking method for the null hypothesis that the 
distribution of day of birth is identical in a given linked sample relative to the baseline sample of 
males born in Ohio. Two linking methods appear to fail this distribution test at conventional levels 
of significance: Nix and Qian (2015)’s method using full names, and Nix and Qian (2015)’s 
method using Soundex. For the other linking methods, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject 
equality at the 10 percent level.   
                                                     
18 Massey (2017) shows that decreasing the noise in age results in higher match rates and lower Type I error  rates 
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A second test examines differences in a handful of individual characteristics from the 
baseline records as well as features of the records themselves for the linked and unlinked portion 
of the baseline sample across linking methods. For the LIFE-M data, these features include the day 
of birth, share of mothers and fathers who were foreign born (parents’ place of birth is reported on 
the birth certificate), and the number of siblings in the family. In addition, we examine the number 
of characters in the infants’ (boys’), mothers’, and fathers’ names—a characteristic which is 
strongly positively correlated with years of schooling and income from wages in the 1940 Census. 
We also examine the share of family records in the family with a misspelled mother or father’s 
name, which we expect to be negatively correlated with years of schooling and income (Aizer et 
al. 2016).19    
The results for the LIFE-M sample are presented in Table 3.1. Each point estimate in the 
table is from a separate regression of the variable indicated in the column header on a binary 
variable for whether the linking method matched the observation. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses below each estimate.  
We find that none of the linking methods creates perfectly representative samples along 
the observable characteristics. The LIFE-M ground truth sample is less likely to link boys with 
foreign-born parents is more successful in linking records with more characters in the infant’s, 
mother’s, and father’s names, and is somewhat less likely to link records in which the father’s 
name is misspelled. All methods are more likely to link children with longer names, indicating that 
they tend to represent more affluent families, and in general, methods are more likely to code links 
for individuals with native-born parents (except for the Ferrie method, which is more likely to link 
                                                     
19 We are able to calculate this by leveraging the unique structure of LIFE-M records: we have multiple observation of each parent’s 
name (one for each sibling in the family).  
139 
children of foreign-born parents).   Interestingly, Feigenbaum (2016a) is both more likely to link 
foreign-born parents and more likely to link longer names (positively correlated with education 
and income) and less likely to link boys in families where a father’s name is misspelled on a record 
(negatively correlated with education and income).  
In summary, these results provide little evidence that LIFE-M’s clerical review or the 
automated linking methods provide representative samples of the population.  This is consistent 
with findings in multiple papers (Abramitzky et al. 2012b, 2014, Collins and Wanamaker 2015). 
This could imply limited external validity of results using these samples, especially because the 
linked samples tend to include native born and more educated individuals.  
3.4.4 False Positives (Type I Errors) 
A third indicator of performance considers the incidence of Type I errors using different 
linking algorithms. Our first analysis compares the links of each automated algorithm to the LIFE-
M clerically reviewed sample.  Having “the same link” means that a particular individual in the 
Ohio birth certificate data is linked to the same individual in the 1940 Census using the automated 
method and in the LIFE-M ground truth. These agreements are treated as correct.  However, 
discordant links are reviewed by two additional trainers in a “police line-up” process, where the 
ground truth and algorithm links are presented alongside close candidate matches.  Without 
knowing which is the LIFE-M link or the link chosen by the automated method, trainers select the 
best match from the group using name, age, and place of birth information. This gives each method 
as well as LIFE-M an equal chance at being chosen.  
Figure 3.2.2 presents the results of this process.  In 2 percent of original LIFE-M matches, 
the trainers reverse the original LIFE-M linking decisions. This could happen because LIFE-M’s 
choices to block eliminated a better link and because two trainers occasionally make the same 
mistake. Consistent with the BYU validation, these reversals are very rare.   
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In contrast, the incidence of false positives for the automated methods are distressingly 
high, ranging from 17 percent to 61 percent. In his 1996 paper, Ferrie used NYSIIS, which is 
associated with a 22 percent false positive rate in our sample.20 The share of false positives using 
Abramitzky et al.’s  (2012b) iterative method and Nix and Qian’s (2015) random choice among 
multiples do not fare better. At least 19 percent of the links generated by Abramitzky et al.’s 
(2012b) method are false positives, increasing to 29 percent with the use of NYSIIS (as they used 
in their papers) and 40 percent with the use of Soundex.21 In the case of Nix and Qian (2015), Type 
I error range from 35 to 61 percent. This high rate of type I error is not surprising because—by 
construction—this method randomly selects a link from sets of potential matches with identical 
names and ages, only one of which is correct. Although this method ensures a high match rate, this 
random disambiguation is unlikely to identify the correct match in the majority of cases. 
Feigenbaum’s (2016b) supervised, regression-based machine learning model produces one of the 
lowest Type I error rates of 24 percent. After 20 years of research on historical linking, Ferrie’s 
(1996) method still achieves the lowest Type I error rate. 
Another important finding is that the incidence of Type I error universally increases with 
the use of phonetic name cleaning in our sample. Across methods, using Soundex increases Type 
I error rates by roughly 60 to 100 percent above those observed using an uncleaned name.  This 
is the result of the phonetic codes removing meaningful variation from names, as well as 
orthographic differences.  This name cleaning interacts with requirements in most automated 
methods that names match exactly, while allowing for differences in other characteristics like age. 
For instance, automated methods requiring an exact match on name would link William Alvin 
                                                     
20 This error rate consistent with Massey (2017) who uses contemporary administrative data linked by Social Security Number as 
the ground truth. She finds that Ferrie and Long’s method (2013) (which use Soundex) , which is associated with a 30 percent false 
positive rate in this sample.   
21 Using the uncorrected AER code results in a 29 to 58 percent Type I error rate, as reported in previous drafts of this paper. 
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Gibbons 45 to William A. Gibbons 47 rather than William Alvin Gbbons 45, whereas humans 
identify and adjust for the likely transcription error.  Similarly, human reviewers are adept at 
recognizing nicknames and diminutives, whereas automated algorithms requiring exact name 
matches tend to link Margaret Alva Billingsworth 31 to Margaret Billingsworth 33 over Peggie 
Alva Billingsworth 31 (human reviewers tend to choose the latter).   
A second analysis of these erroneous links examines their relationship to baseline sample 
and record characteristics. Table 3.2 repeats the representativeness tests presented in Table 3.1, 
this time coding only a method’s false links as ones in the analysis and the remaining links as 
zeros.  This reveals whether the false links are random errors (in which case they should exhibit 
no relationship with given characteristics) or systematically differ in terms of their relationships 
with baseline record features.  The false positives in LIFE-M appear to be very similar to the rest 
of the core sample in terms of their baseline characteristics, with only two characteristics 
statistically different for LIFE-M (instance of misspelled mother’s and father’s name), which were 
also small in magnitude.  On the other hand, the false positives for other methods appear 
systematically correlated with a variety of baseline characteristics, suggesting that these linking 
methods may introduce more systematic measurement error into analyses using these datasets.  
3.4.5 False Negatives (Type II Errors) 
A fourth indicator of performance is the incidence of Type II errors—records that are not 
made or made incorrectly. Across all methods, the horizontal axis in Figure 3.2.3 shows that Type 
II error rates are high, ranging from a low of 50 for LIFE-M to 88 percent for Ferrie (1996)-
Soundex (with the original uncommon name restriction). Mortality and under-enumeration likely 
accounts for around 15 percent of missed links:22 a fraction of the individuals in the birth records 
                                                     
22 Based on life tables from 1939 to 1941, we calculate that 8.27 percent of our sample should be un-linkable due to death prior to 
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will not have survived until the 1940 Census, meaning that there is no “true” link for this 
individual. However, differences in mortality and under-enumeration are not likely driving the 
differences between methods in these indicators—all automated methods and LIFE-M should be 
affected equally. 
Figure 3.2.3 also plots the relationship between Type I and Type II errors. In this plot, the 
best linking method would locate at the origin with a zero Type I and Type II error rate. This would 
mean that every individual was linked and linked correctly. One typically thinks about a trade-off 
between Type I and Type II errors, with Type II errors being higher with lower Type I errors and 
vice versa.  Surprisingly, the plot exhibits a positive relationship, with Type II error rates tending 
to be higher where Type I error rates are higher. This suggests that existing methods that increase 
match rates have tended to worsen Type I errors and increase Type II errors!  The (much more 
expensive) human reviewed data, LIFE-M, is attains both a lower Type I and Type II error rate 
relative to automated methods.  Ferrie (1996) unrestricted to the uncommon name sample and 
Abramitzky et al. (2012b) without phonetic name cleaning are the second best in terms of 
proximity to the origin. 
In summary, this analysis suggests that a large share of links used for inference in historical 
settings are likely erroneous. In addition to these samples not being representative, these findings 
imply that measurement error may play a potentially large role in the findings of studies using 
linked samples.  
 
 
                                                     
1940 (National Office of Vital Statistics 1948). Moreover, census analyses estimate that around 5.4 percent of individuals were 
missed in 1940 (West and Robinson 1999). 
143 
3.5 How Well Automated Methods Perform in Alternative Ground Truth Samples 
Given high variability in record quality over time, differences in enumerated versus self-
reported surveys, and the care with which microfilmed data are transcribed, the results from the 
LIFE-M sample may not generalize. Moreover, an obvious critique of the “police-line up” exercise 
in section IV is that the LIFE-M project trained the human reviewers. And, as a consequence, those 
reviewers make decisions more likely to favor the LIFE-M ground truth.  To address both 
concerns, we use two alternative ground truth samples. First, we simulate a ground truth dataset, 
so that we know objectively the true link. Therefore, our objective truth should not be influenced 
by human reviewers at all. This exercise presents an internal validity check of our analysis.  
Second, we use the Oldest Old Sample from the Early Indicators Project that was linked by 
genealogists and is known to be highly accurate. This section presents the results of each of these 
analyses using our four performance criteria. 
3.5.1 The Synthetic Ground Truth 
One of the issues in historical linking is that the sample to be linked is often much smaller 
than the dataset of potentials (we will call this the “using” dataset for short).  We construct our 
using dataset in two steps.  First, we take all of our Ohio born boys, randomly drop 10 percent to 
reflect mortality and emigration and drop another 5 percent to reflect under-enumeration.23 There 
is also considerable scope for orthographic error. The original Census enumerators may have 
misspelled respondent names, the household respondent may have reported incorrectly, or the 
individual may have changed their name (perhaps using a middle name or diminutive in place of 
the given name). Compounding this, digitization may have mis-keyed handwriting from original 
                                                     
23 See footnote 22. 
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Census forms.24 Consequently, we also add noise to names and ages to reflect age heaping and 
transcription error.25  
Second, to mimic the size and scale of the 1940 census, we append an additional sample 
of boys born in Michigan and Indiana (states that neighbor Ohio) from the 1940 Census. We 
choose Michigan and Indiana to allow for regional similarity in names but preclude the possibility 
that these data contain any true links (our boys were all born in Ohio and not Michigan or Indiana). 
We then limit the number of these additional individuals so that our using dataset matches the size 
of the sample of all Ohio born boys of the relevant ages in the 1940 Census (3,133,982 individuals). 
We can then examine the performance of automated methods relative to a set of objective links. 
Figure 3.4.1 presents our match rates. These simulation results closely match the results 
presented above: Ferrie’s (1996) method links 45 percent of the master sample without phonetic 
name cleaning, and links 36 percent and 23 percent using NYSIIS and Soundex, respectively 
(compared to 38, 30, and 19 percent of the LIFE-M ground truth, respectively). Again, Abramitzky 
et al.’s (2012b)  method yields higher match rates, ranging from 49 to 54 percent.  And, as before, 
the Nix and Qian (2015) method of random match disambiguation results in very high match rates: 
66 to 81 percent.  By design, the “true” match rate is 85 percent, because 15 percent of the original 
                                                     
24 Our comparison of two independently transcribed versions of the 1940 Census suggest that 25 percent of names are not identical.  
Moreover, in a recent paper, Goeken et al. (2016) document that in two enumerations of residents of St. Louis in the 1880 Census, 
nearly 46 percent of records linked between the two enumerations are not perfect matches on first name. 
25 Age-heaping reflects the fact that respondents tend to round their age to the nearest multiple of 5 and has been used as a metric 
of historical innumeracy  (A'Hearn et al. 2009)). To mimic this, we round 25 percent of observed ages to the closest multiple of 5. 
We introduce orthographic problems as follows: In 10 percent of cases, the first and middle name are transposed (if a middle name 
exists). In 5 percent of cases, the first and last name are transposed. In 3 percent of cases, the first character of the first name is 
randomly changed. In 3 percent of cases, the first character of the last name is randomly changed; in 4 percent of cases, the second 
character of the first name is randomly changed; in 4 percent of cases, the second character of the last name is randomly changed; 
in 4 percent of observations, the third character of the first name is randomly changed; in 4 percent of observations, the third 
character of the last name is randomly changed. In 5 percent of cases, the first names have a letter randomly repeated (for example, 
James -> Jamees). In 5 percent of last names, a letter is randomly repeated in the last name. In 5 percent of cases, a random letter 
is dropped from the first name (for example, Matthew -> Mathew). In another 5 percent of cases, a random letter is dropped from 
the last name. In 5 percent of first names, a random pair of adjacent letters are transposed (for example, William -> Willaim).  And, 
in 5 percent of last names, a random pair of adjacent letters are transposed. 
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links are absent in the perturbed data. In short, these findings corroborate the findings made by 
humans in section IV.   
Figure 3.4.2 presents rates of Type I error for the automated linking algorithms on the 
simulated data. False links are defined as those where the “true” link in the using dataset differs 
from the link identified by the automated method. The incidence of false matches is again high, 
and ranges from 18 to 58 percent over the matching methods. Ferrie’s (1996) method again 
performs well,  with Type I error ranging from 21 to 27 percent. As above, error rates are highest 
for the Nix and Qian (2015) method, ranging from 38 to 58 percent. Feigenbaum (2016)’s method 
performs also well, with an 18 percent Type I error rate. As with the LIFE-M ground truth, Type 
I error rates increase universally with phonetic name cleaning.   
Figure 3.4.3 shows the relationship between Type I and Type II error from each method 
using the synthetic truth data. Again, Type I and Type II errors exhibit a strong, positive 
relationship, suggesting that current methods aimed at increasing match rates do not reduce Type 
II errors. Methods with higher match rates tend to have both higher Type I and Type II errors.  
In short, these results support the internal validity of the LIFE-M results. For a very similar 
sample (including errors in name and age, mortality, emigration, under-enumeration, and 
transcription errors), we find very similar patterns in method performance.  We are able to replicate 
the approximate levels and ordering of match rates, Type I, and Type II errors as well as problems 
with phonetic name cleaning. The next section seeks to understand how well these results 
generalize to other samples and eras. 
3.5.2 Early Indicators Oldest Old Sample of Union Army Veterans 
The Oldest Old sample of Union Army veterans from the Early Indicators project provides 
another ground truth sample. Using genealogical methods and a rich set of supplementary 
information, Costa et al. (2017) created this oversample of 2,096 individuals at least 95 years old 
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linked to the 1900 complete count Census. These veterans tended to report very complete and 
accurate information to ensure they would receive their army pensions and benefits. Moreover, 
sources such as gravestone databases, obituaries, newspaper accounts, veterans associations and 
pension files allow multiple cross-validation exercises to create an extremely high match rate of 
90 percent.  This exercise treats matches coded as the highest quality (quality 1 and 2) as another 
ground truth sample.26  
Figure 3.5.1 describes the match rates of the oldest, old Union Army veterans and the 1900 
complete count census.  Ferrie’s (1996) method matches a larger share of the Union Army veterans 
sample, ranging from 37 and 43 percent versus 19 to 38 percent in the LIFE-M data.  Abramitzky 
et al.’s (2012b) iterative method also yields slightly higher match rates in this sample. As with 
both the LIFE-M ground truth and synthetic ground truth samples, Nix and Qian’s (2015) method 
of randomly choosing a match among multiple matches substantially increases the match rates for 
the unrestricted sample: here, they range from 53 to 64 percent versus 60 to 76 percent in LIFE-
M. Finally, Feigenbaum’s (2016a) supervised, regression-based machine learning method matches 
a considerably higher percent of the surviving veterans, 43 percent, versus 26 percent in the LIFE-
M data. These higher match rates may reflect the fact that we are linking a sample that has already 
been linked which, by construction, excludes records that were unlinkable for the Early Indicators 
team. Another interesting feature of the data is that the use of phonetic cleaning appears to have 
less of an effect on match rates than in the LIFE-M sample, perhaps reflecting differences in the 
representation of names over time.27 
                                                     
26 The Early Indicators project scores matches on a scale of 1 to 4 to indicate their confidence in a match. Quality indicators equal 
to 1 or 2 indicate their most confident matches. 
27  The different effects of NYSIIS and Soundex could reflect differences in the quality of transcribed names in the baseline samples, 
differences in the types of names and spelling variations over time, or other differences in the socio-demographic composition of 
the samples (i.e., differences in country of origin of parents, socio-economic characteristics of individuals represented, etc.). 
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Table 3.3 presents an analysis of the representativeness of the linked samples by testing for 
balance in observable factors between the linked and unlinked samples for each method. Data 
availability requires that we use a set of different covariates than in the LIFE-M sample: age, 
whether the individual speaks English, owns a farm or house, is married, and is foreign born.  
These results show that all of the linked individuals are more likely to speak English across all 
methods, and are more likely to be married across most methods.  In addition, the Abramitzky et 
al. (2012b)-name and the Feigenbaum links appear to be more affluent and older. In short, we find 
little support for the hypothesis that the linked samples are representative of the underlying sample 
of oldest, old veterans. 
 Type 1 error rates for the different methods are captured in Figure 3.5.2, which are 
calculated as the share of observations linked by a given method that differ from the Early 
Indicators links. (Because of the extensive genealogical work done to create this sample, we 
assume that links from the Union Army veterans to the 1900 Census are correct).  As with the 
results from the LIFE-M ground truth, the incidence of false positives for the automated methods 
is high, ranging from 14 percent to 40 percent. The performance of Ferrie’s (1996) method is 
comparable to in the LIFE-M ground truth, with false positive rates ranging from 20 (Name) to 23 
percent (Soundex).  The false positives using Abramitzky et al.’s (2012b) iterative method are also 
slightly better, ranging from 21 to 29 percent versus 19 to 40 percent in LIFE-M. As before, Nix 
and Qian’s (2015) method appears to generate very high Type I error for high match rates, ranging 
from26 to 40 percent—high, although slightly better than in the LIFE-M sample. Feigenbaum’s 
(2016a) supervised, regression-based machine learning model produces the lowest Type I error 
rate for the sample of 14 percent versus 24 percent in the LIFE-M sample.  
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As a summary of these findings, figure 3.5.3 plots Type I error rates against Type II error 
rates by method. Type II errors – which can be read off the x-axis - range for all but the ground 
truth range from 62 to 73 percent—rates that are relatively close to those from the LIFE-M and 
synthetic ground truth samples. Because differential mortality is not an issue (all individuals in the 
Oldest Old Union Army sample survived to be at least 95 years old), these numbers imply that 
roughly two out of every three possible links is not captured in automated methods versus 1 in 10 
using genealogical methods. Moreover, as in the LIFE-M and synthetic ground truth, we document 
a strong positive relationship between Type I and Type II errors.  Overall, differences in the types 
of records and the period affect linking and error rates in the LIFE-M and Union Army ground 
truths, but both samples reveal similar patterns in match rates, representativeness, and Type I 
errors. This analysis also supports the conclusion that phonetic name cleaning universally increases 
Type I errors.  
In summary, this section shows that different samples for different periods in history and 
in different contexts provide very similar results.  Across the board, automated methods tend to 
produce higher than desired Type I error rates as well as very high Type II error rates.  Phonetic 
name cleaning almost universally increases Type I error rates while also increasing Type II error 
rates. 
3.6 How Automated Methods Affect Inferences 
Following the literature on intergenerational mobility (Solon 1999, Black and Devereux 
2011), this analysis considers the following benchmark specification,  
log (y1) = π log (y0)+   (1) 
where this equation refers to deviations from population means. The dependent variable, log(y1), 
refers to the log of son’s income in adulthood in the 1940 Census. The key independent variable, 
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log(y0), refers to the parent’s log income in the 1940 Census.  Within this framework, π is 
interpreted as the intergenerational earnings elasticity. A higher π indicates that parents’ incomes 
play a stronger role in determining their children’s income. Intergenerational mobility is often 
measured as 1- π.  
3.6.1 How Type I and Type II Errors May Affect Inferences 
Within this framework, it is well known that mean zero measurement error in son’s income 
(the dependent variable in the regression) will still allow us to estimate π consistently using OLS, 
though the estimates will be less precise.  We, therefore, focus on three other types of measurement 
error in father’s income due to linking that occurs for some portion of the sample, αm, where the 
Type I error rate varies by linking method, m.   
At first consideration, linking to the wrong son may seem like measurement error in the 
dependent variable (which we note should only reduce precision).  However, linking a boy on a 
birth certificate to the wrong adult in the 1940 census means that the son’s observed income is, in 
fact, linked to the wrong father—the cases for the following three variants of Type I errors. 
First, classical measurement error would occur when a father’s income is measured with 
error, or z1= log(y0)+u, where u is an additive error term drawn from N(0,1).  This functional form 
assumes that z0 is correlated with log(y0), but that the father’s observed income is a noisy estimate 
of a father’s actual income.28  With classical measurement error, the estimand of interest converges 
in probability to the following quantity, 
plim πm̂ = αm (
σy0
2
σy0
2 +σu
2) π + (1 − α
m)π.  (2) 
                                                     
28 This correlation could occur if fathers are linked within the same birth state, race, and class of names. 
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Second, we consider measurement error where z2=, where ~N(0,1). In this case, z2  
log(y0) and captures the instance where the linked observation for father’s income is independent 
of his actual income. That is, an erroneous link is a random draw from the father’s income 
distribution. In this case, the estimand of interest converges in probability to the following quantity, 
plim πm̂ = (1 − αm)π. (3) 
Third, we assume a special case of non-classical measurement error with z2= log(y0)+µ, 
where σy0,μ=cov(log(y0),µ)>0. In this case, the estimand of interest converges in probability to 
plim πm̂ = αm (
σy0
2 +σy0,μ
σy0
2 +σμ
2 +2σy0,μ
) π + (1 − αm)π.  (4) 
We use these three formulae as benchmarks against which to compare our actual regression 
estimates.  
The role of Type II error enters through the selective representation of different groups in 
the linked sample. For instance, this paper finds that being linked is positively associated with the 
length of name and, by extension, income (Olivetti and Paserman 2015). This differential 
representation matters to the extent that different groups have heterogeneous intergenerational 
income elasticities. For instance, they may differ between whites and blacks (Duncan 1968, Margo 
2016, Collins and Wanamaker 2016) or farmers and non-farmers (Hout and Guest 2013, Xie and 
Killewald 2013).  If less mobile groups are over-represented in the linked data, this would tend to 
overstate estimates of π and understate the historical rate of intergenerational mobility.  
To make this point concretely, assume there is a high mobility, h, and low mobility, l, 
group, with intergenerational income elasticities of πh and  πl, respectively. The share of the 
population in each group is ∅h and ∅l. In the absence of Type I (αm=0) and Type II errors (βm =
0), the population intergenerational income elasticity can be written as the weighted average of 
elasticities in the two groups converges in probability to the following quantity,  
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plimπ̂ = ∅hπh + ∅lπl . (5) 
Now suppose that expected population shares of the high and low groups change differentially as 
Type II errors grow or, more specifically, that ∅h ≠ E(Link|h = 1 , β > 0) > 
E(Link|l = 1 , β > 0) ≠ ∅l. This implies that estimates of π should tend to be too small (high 
mobility implies lower π) relative to the population parameter. This could lead to an overstatement 
of mobility in linked historical samples. The reverse could be true if increases in Type II errors 
disproportionately reduced link rates for the high mobility group. Moreover, variation in the type 
and incidence of Type II errors by linking method could lead to an under- or overstatement of the 
parameter of interest.  
3.6.2 Results: Intergenerational Elasticity Estimates from the 1940 Census 
We quantify the role of Type I and Type II errors by comparing intergenerational income 
elasticities resulting from different linking methods.  Our sample consists of 19,090 birth 
certificates for Ohio-born boys which we link to the 1940 census. We supplement these data with 
a single sample of their fathers linked to the 1940 census using the LIFE-M method as generation 
0. Therefore, the only differences in outcomes across automated linking methods are driven by 
differences in the link for sons.29   
We report estimates of the intergenerational elasticity of income in Figure 3.6.1 using sons 
matched from birth certificates to the 1940 census by each linking method. From the LIFE-M 
ground truth data, we estimate an income elasticity of 0.27 between fathers and sons. While similar 
to Chetty et al. (2014) estimate of 0.33 for the late 20th century, we expect these estimates misstate 
the true intergenerational income elasticity for several reasons.  
                                                     
29 Fathers are on the Ohio boys birth certificates but there is no income information on the birth certificate. We therefore link these 
fathers to the 1940 Census using the LIFE-M clerical review process. It may seem odd to think of measurement error in father’s 
income when the set of linked fathers is the same across linking methods.  However, an incorrect link for the son means that his 
income is attached to the wrong father. This problem is, therefore, analogous to the Type I error discussion in section IV.A. 
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First, the age structure in the data likely results in considerable life-cycle bias (Mazumder 
2005, Haider and Solon 2006, Black and Devereux 2011), which may attenuate  the 
intergenerational elasticities regardless of matching method (Mazumder 2015).  Second, wage 
income observed in the 1940 Census is an imperfect measure of permanent income, and we expect 
the single observation of income for both generations allows its transitory component to generate 
sizable attenuation (Solon 1992, Zimmerman 1992, Mazumder 2005).  On the other hand, the 
absence of farm and self-employed income in 1940 may lead this analysis to overstate mobility by 
excluding father-son pairs of famers—an occupation that tends to be highly persistent across 
generations (Hout and Guest 2013, Xie and Killewald 2013). Although these data limitations will 
lead us to misstate the true (population) intergenerational income elasticity, they should 
nonetheless affect all methods equally. The purpose of this exercise is to make comparisons of 
estimates obtained using different linking methods for this period and sample rather than making 
comparisons of these estimates to other periods or samples. 
Generally, methods with higher Type I error rates have smaller elasticities. For instance, 
the Nix and Qian (2015) method which results in Type I error rates from 0.35 to 0.61 yields 
intergenerational income elasticity estimates of 0.12 to 0.20, whereas the Ferrie (1996) name 
method, which results in Type I error rates from 0.17 to 0.30, delivers intergenerational income 
elasticity estimates of 0.19 to 0.24. Consistent with phonetic name cleaning introducing 
considerable Type I errors of the classical variety (equations 2 and 3, Figure 3.2.2), Figure 3.6.1 
shows that intergenerational income elasticity estimates tend to fall with the use of NYSIIS and 
Soundex, with Soundex generally reducing the estimates relative to LIFE-M by 30 (Ferrie 1996) 
to 55 percent (Nix and Qian 2015). Most results are very similar to what would be expected with 
the second variety of Type I error—orthogonal draws of fathers income in equation 3.  Ferrie 
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(1996) with Soundex implies a 30 percent Type I error rate and the intergenerational elasticity 
estimate obtained from these links is 0.19—a 30 percent (0.08/.27) attenuation of the LIFE-M 
estimate (from equation 2, 0.70 is the set of true links × 0.27=0.19). Similarly, Nix and Qian (2012) 
with Soundex implies a 61 percent Type I error rate. The intergenerational elasticity estimate 
obtained from these links is 0.12—roughly 0.39 × 0.27=0.11).  
Owing to small sample sizes, many of the methods produce s elasticities statistically 
indistinguishable from the LIFE-M matched sample. Estimates from the Ferrie (1996) method are 
statistically indistinguishable from the LIFE-M estimate of 0.27, with p-values ranging from 0.14 
to 0.35. Results from the Ferrie (1996) method without the uncommon name restriction, however, 
statistically differ from the LIFE-M estimate (p-value of 0.07 using name, 0.04 using NYSIIS, and 
0.001 using Soundex). Similarly, the estimates derived from Abramitzky et al.’s (2012b) method 
increasingly differ from the LIFE-M estimate with the use of phonetic name cleaning (p-value of 
0.12 using name, 0.07 using NYSIIS, and 0.001 using Soundex). All estimates from Nix and 
Qian’s (2015) method differ from the LIFE-M estimate (all p-values under 0.001). Finally, the 
estimate of 0.23 from Feigenbaum’s (2016) method is statistically indistinguishable from the 
LIFE-M estimate. 
In terms of deviations from these predictions in section 3.6.1 there may be several 
explanations: (1) The incomes of falsely linked fathers are uncorrelated with the incomes of the 
true father (i.e., the Type I error structure is similar to classical measurement error). (2) The 
measurement error in falsely linked fathers’ incomes is non-classical and positively correlated with 
fathers’ incomes. (3) The Type II errors introduce upward bias in the estimates (i.e., individuals 
with lower mobility, or higher intergenerational income elasticities, are overrepresented in our 
linked sample).  
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It is difficult to assess the first two possibilities. However, a final analysis addresses the 
third.  To what extent do variations across these methods reflect differences in representativeness 
due to Type II errors? To answer this question, we use inverse propensity-score weights  (DiNardo 
et al. 1996, Heckman et al. 1998) to reweight the linked sample to look like the population as a 
whole.30 Figure 3.6.2 presents the reweighted intergenerational income elasticities. Across all 
methods, the propensity-score reweighted intergenerational income elasticities are larger in 
magnitude than the unweighted estimates in Figure 3.6.1, which is consistent with linked samples 
underrepresenting low-mobility individuals (e.g., groups with higher 𝛑). Of course, this 
reweighting does not address Type I errors, which are associated with substantial downward bias 
in these estimates, as they were in Figure 3.6.1.  In Figure 3.6.2, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
at the 10-percent level that estimates from the Ferrie (1996) method (using name, NYSIIS, or 
Soundex) and the Feigenbaum (2016) method equal the reweighted LIFE-M estimate of 0.30. All 
other linking methods, however, yield estimates that are statistically different than the reweighted 
LIFE-M estimate at the 10-percent level. P-values range from 0.001 to 0.08 for the Ferrie (1996) 
using all names, 0.02-0.07 for the Abramitzky et al. (2012b) method, and 0.0001-.003 for the Nix 
and Qian (2015) method. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Large-scale record linkage is one of the only means to produce longitudinal and 
intergenerational microdata for the 20th century US, but current approaches to this process are 
imperfect at best, and at worst, the choice of method contributes heavily to inferences using these 
                                                     
30 To construct these weights, we first run a probit model of matched status (per each method) on an indicator variable for presence 
of milled name, length of first, middle, and last name, polynomials in day of birth, polynomials in age, an index for first name 
commonness, an index for last name commonness, indicators for whether parents were born in the US or abroad, number of siblings, 
an indicator variable for presence of siblings, and length of father’s and mother’s names. Our probit regressions estimate the 
propensity of being matched or unmatched (𝑝) for each method, which then use to reweight the matched cases by 
(𝑝 (1 − 𝑝) ∗ (1 − 𝑞) 𝑞⁄⁄ ), where 𝑞 is the share of matched cases. 
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data.  We document staggering problems with false links in the most popular historical linking 
algorithms and demonstrate how these errors may have important implications for inferences using 
these linked samples. Our findings recommend several changes to current standard practice in 
historical record linkage.  
First, we recommend comparing linked samples across several automated methods (Stata 
do-files are available with this paper).  This approach could be used to diagnose Type I errors and 
their causes, allowing researchers to improve their matching algorithms. It is also a low-cost 
method to discard problematic cases and reduce Type I error rates.   
Second, we strongly recommend against using NYSIIS and Soundex to improve match 
rates as these name cleaning algorithms increase Type I errors dramatically without reducing Type 
II error rates. In many cases, they lead to substantial attenuation in estimates of intergenerational 
income elasticities. Moreover, the errors arising from these name-cleaning algorithms appear 
systematically related to a number of record characteristics, making it unclear how they should 
affect inferences.   
Third, we recommend careful consideration of record features to assess and improve 
sample representativeness. Many papers do this, but this should become even more important if 
researchers attempt to purge false matches from their samples.  Making greater use of common 
record features such as name length or other socio-demographic information also allows 
researchers to use of standard survey research methods to create weights.  These features may also 
be used to create inverse-propensity weights for linked samples, which could help balance both 
observed and potentially unobserved characteristics (DiNardo et al. 1996, Heckman et al. 1998).  
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Figure 3.1: Papers in Economics Using Longitudinally Linked Samples, by Year 
  
 
Source: Authors calculations of papers published in journals or as working papers by year.  
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Figure 3.2 Performance of Automated Linking Methods using the LIFE-M Ground-Truth 
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3.2.3 Share of Type I Errors (False Matches) versus Type II Errors (Missed Matches) 
Notes: Panels A to C are based on the LIFE-M sample of Ohio boys linked to the 1940 Census using different linking 
methods as described in the text. 
 
Figure 2.3: Tests of Equality of Linked and Baseline Day-of-Birth Distributions, by 
Linking Method 
 
Notes: Figure plots p-values for a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of day-of-birth (1-366, including 
February 29 in leap year) distributions for the linked observations versus the unlinked observations.   
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Figure 3.4: Performance of Automated Linking Methods using Synethic Ground-Truth 
3.4.1 Match Rates 
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3.4.3   Share of Type I Errors (False Matches) versus Type II Errors (Missed Matches) 
 
Notes: Panels A to C are based on the simulated ground truth sample. We assume that only 85 percent of the sample 
can be linked due to under-enumeration by the Census Bureau, mortality, and emigration. 
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Figure 3.5: Performance of Automated Linking Methods using the Early Indicators 
Ground-Truth 
3.5.1 Match Rates 
 
3.5.2 Type I Error Rates (Share of False Matches) 
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3.5.3 Share of Type I Errors (False Matches) versus Type II Errors (Missed Matches) 
 
Notes: Panel A to C present results based on the genealogically linked Early Indicators Oldest-Old sample of Union 
Army veterans linked to the 1900 Census using different automated linking methods. 
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Figure 3.6: Intergenerational Income Elasticity Estimates 
3.6.1  Unweighted Results 
 
3.6.2 Propensity-Score Weighted Results 
 
Notes: Wage incomes are from fathers and sons from the Ohio boys sample linked to the 1940 Census. Differences 
across estimates represent differences in the characteristics and incidence of Type I and Type II errors. 
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Table 3.1: Differences in Characteristics of Linked Samples from Baseline Sample of Ohio Boys, by Linking Method  
  Foreign Born Number 
of 
Siblings 
Length of Name of 
Percent of Siblings with 
Mispelled 
  
Day of 
Birth Mother Father Boy Mother Father Mother's Name Father's Name 
LIFE-M 0.68 -0.018*** -0.012* 0.049 0.046*** 0.267*** 0.217*** -0.002 -0.005* 
 (1.525) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.018) (0.047) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) -0.15 -0.014** -0.009 0.145*** 0.081*** 0.130*** 0.087* -0.001 -0.001 
 (1.580) (0.006) (0.007) (0.044) (0.018) (0.048) (0.049) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) 2.14 0.032*** 0.045*** 0.107** 0.088*** 0.600*** 0.558*** -0.006 -0.009*** 
 (1.659) (0.007) (0.007) (0.046) (0.019) (0.051) (0.051) (0.004) (0.003) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) 2.09 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.144*** 0.129*** 0.463*** 0.474*** -0.008** -0.011*** 
 (1.931) (0.008) (0.008) (0.053) (0.023) (0.059) (0.060) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) + common names -1.44 -0.063*** -0.067*** 0.095** 0.068*** 0.029 0.001 0.004 0.004 
 (1.526) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.018) (0.047) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) + common names 1.39 -0.010* -0.008 0.060 0.070*** 0.240*** 0.222*** -0.002 -0.002 
 (1.526) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.018) (0.047) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) + common names -0.44 0.010 0.015** 0.082* 0.112*** 0.333*** 0.347*** -0.006* -0.009*** 
 (1.543) (0.006) (0.006) (0.043) (0.018) (0.047) (0.048) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (Name)  -0.97 -0.061*** -0.064*** 0.090** 0.056*** 0.036 0.017 0.007** 0.003 
 (1.530) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.018) (0.047) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (NYSIIS)  1.98 -0.007 -0.005 0.039 0.097*** 0.217*** 0.230*** 0.001 -0.006** 
 (1.529) (0.006) (0.006) (0.042) (0.018) (0.047) (0.047) (0.003) (0.003) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (SDX) -0.08 0.011* 0.013** 0.066 0.095*** 0.316*** 0.362*** -0.003 -0.012*** 
 (1.542) (0.006) (0.006) (0.043) (0.018) (0.047) (0.048) (0.003) (0.003) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (Name) -0.73 -0.136*** -0.158*** 0.182*** 0.152*** -0.253*** -0.232*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 (1.616) (0.006) (0.007) (0.045) (0.019) (0.049) (0.050) (0.003) (0.003) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (NYSIIS) -1.68 -0.127*** -0.150*** 0.108** 0.193*** -0.598*** -0.512*** 0.011*** 0.022*** 
 (1.855) (0.007) (0.008) (0.051) (0.022) (0.057) (0.057) (0.004) (0.004) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (SDX) -2.05 -0.081*** -0.099*** -0.067 0.294*** -0.281*** -0.271*** 0.010** 0.023*** 
 (2.297) (0.009) (0.009) (0.063) (0.027) (0.070) (0.071) (0.005) (0.004) 
Feigenbaum 2016 -0.39 0.042*** 0.062*** 0.135*** 0.100*** 0.358*** 0.319*** -0.008** -0.011*** 
  (1.739) (0.007) (0.007) (0.048) (0.020) (0.053) (0.054) (0.004) (0.003) 
Notes: Each estimate is a from a separate regression of the variable indicated in the column header on a binary variable for whether the linking method matched 
the observation. The sample size for every regression is n = 19,090. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below. * indicates statistically significant at the 10-
percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and * at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 3.2: Differences in Characteristics of Erroneous Links for Ohio Boys by Linking Method  
  Foreign Born Number 
of 
Siblings 
Length of Name of 
Percent of Siblings 
with Mispelled 
  
Day of 
Birth Mother Father Boy Mother Father 
Mother's 
Name 
Father's 
Name 
LIFE-M -2.66 -0.029 0.005 0.142 -0.028 -0.061 -0.109 -0.028* -0.028* 
 (7.494) (0.029) (0.031) (0.204) (0.085) (0.232) (0.233) (0.016) (0.015) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) -3.33 -0.043*** -0.035*** -0.035 -0.010 -0.150 -0.231** -0.011 0.003 
 (3.303) (0.013) (0.014) (0.090) (0.037) (0.102) (0.102) (0.007) (0.006) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) -3.50 0.019 0.029** -0.228** -0.094** -0.631*** -0.519*** -0.000 0.011 
 (3.320) (0.014) (0.014) (0.090) (0.037) (0.102) (0.103) (0.007) (0.006) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) 0.53 0.080*** 0.100*** -0.445*** -0.042 -0.396*** -0.332*** -0.009 0.012 
 (3.791) (0.016) (0.016) (0.105) (0.043) (0.115) (0.117) (0.008) (0.007) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) + common names 0.66 -0.034*** -0.037*** 0.110** 0.102*** 0.094** 0.062 0.005 -0.001 
 (1.567) (0.006) (0.006) (0.043) (0.018) (0.048) (0.048) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) + common names 2.34 -0.011* -0.006 0.141*** 0.100*** 0.518*** 0.453*** -0.000 -0.008*** 
 (1.614) (0.006) (0.007) (0.045) (0.019) (0.049) (0.050) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) + common names 0.05 -0.020*** -0.019*** 0.170*** 0.117*** 0.460*** 0.403*** -0.002 -0.008** 
 (1.753) (0.007) (0.007) (0.048) (0.020) (0.053) (0.054) (0.004) (0.003) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (Name)  -4.09 -0.042*** -0.045*** -0.132* -0.060* -0.181** -0.238*** 0.001 0.008 
 (2.853) (0.011) (0.011) (0.078) (0.031) (0.088) (0.088) (0.006) (0.005) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (NYSIIS)  -2.91 0.015 0.007 -0.218*** -0.136*** -0.809*** -0.656*** 0.001 0.011** 
 (2.459) (0.010) (0.010) (0.067) (0.027) (0.075) (0.076) (0.005) (0.005) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (SDX) -2.02 0.052*** 0.049*** -0.190*** -0.138*** -0.446*** -0.305*** -0.003 0.001 
 (2.395) (0.010) (0.010) (0.065) (0.028) (0.073) (0.073) (0.005) (0.005) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (Name) 0.94 -0.014** -0.015** 0.112** 0.103*** 0.123** 0.129*** 0.001 -0.006* 
 (1.619) (0.006) (0.007) (0.045) (0.019) (0.050) (0.050) (0.003) (0.003) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (NYSIIS) 3.01* 0.007 0.012* 0.161*** 0.116*** 0.563*** 0.551*** 0.001 -0.010*** 
 (1.719) (0.007) (0.007) (0.047) (0.020) (0.052) (0.053) (0.004) (0.003) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (SDX) 1.23 -0.005 0.003 0.225*** 0.092*** 0.402*** 0.411*** -0.005 -0.011*** 
 (1.979) (0.008) (0.008) (0.055) (0.023) (0.060) (0.061) (0.004) (0.004) 
Feigenbaum 2016 -4.61 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.128*** -0.328*** -0.217** -0.005 0.008 
  (3.492) (0.015) (0.015) (0.098) (0.041) (0.108) (0.109) (0.008) (0.007) 
Notes: Each estimate is a from a separate regression of the variable indicated in the column header on a binary variable for whether the linking method matched a 
false positive. In this table, we count false positives as “no link” (or zero), so this table captures the relationship of the “correct” links each method makes to 
observed characteristics. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below. * indicates statistically significant at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and 
* at the 1-percent level. 
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Table 3.3: Differences in Characteristics of Linked Samples from Baseline Sample of the Oldest Old, by Linking Method  
  Age Speaks English Owns Farm Owns House Married Foreign-Born 
Early Indicators 0.092 0.058*** 0.024 0.034** 0.059*** 0.007 
 (0.214) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) 0.011 0.038*** 0.027 0.022 0.056*** -0.007 
 (0.266) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) -0.302 0.037*** 0.032 0.014 0.040*** -0.011 
 (0.270) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) -0.027 0.033*** 0.029 0.013 0.038** -0.016 
 (0.282) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.012) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) + common names 0.166 0.030*** 0.015 0.015 0.040*** -0.004 
 (0.255) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) + common names 0.219 0.025*** 0.018 0.006 0.025* -0.003 
 (0.257) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) + common names 0.230 0.025*** 0.009 0.010 0.021 -0.007 
 (0.255) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (Name)  0.128 0.036*** 0.033* -0.007 0.048*** -0.004 
 (0.267) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (NYSIIS)  0.196 0.032*** 0.027 -0.002 0.033** -0.004 
 (0.262) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (SDX) 0.208 0.029*** 0.014 0.007 0.027* -0.008 
 (0.257) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (Name) 0.064 0.036*** 0.025 0.014 0.042*** -0.008 
 (0.248) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (NYSIIS) 0.137 0.034*** 0.023 0.011 0.035*** -0.000 
 (0.241) (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (SDX) 0.118 0.029*** 0.017 0.008 0.030** 0.001 
 (0.236) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) 
Feigenbaum 2016 0.812*** 0.034*** 0.032* -0.001 0.034** -0.022* 
  (0.277) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.011) 
Notes: Each estimate is from a separate regression of the variable indicated in the column header on a binary variable for whether the linking method matched the 
observation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below. * indicates statistically significant at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and * at the 1-
percent level.  
171 
 
Table 3.4: Differences in Characteristics of Erroneous Links from Baseline Sample of the Oldest Old, by Linking Method  
  Age 
Speaks 
English Owns Farm 
Owns 
House Married 
Foreign-
Born 
Early Indicators 0.092 0.058*** 0.024 0.034** 0.059*** 0.007 
 (0.214) (0.006) (0.015) (0.016) (0.011) (0.009) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) 0.011 0.038*** 0.027 0.022 0.056*** -0.007 
 (0.266) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.014) (0.011) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) -0.302 0.037*** 0.032 0.014 0.040*** -0.011 
 (0.270) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) -0.027 0.033*** 0.029 0.013 0.038** -0.016 
 (0.282) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021) (0.015) (0.012) 
Ferrie 1996 (Name) + common names 0.166 0.030*** 0.015 0.015 0.040*** -0.004 
 (0.255) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Ferrie 1996 (NYSIIS) + common names 0.219 0.025*** 0.018 0.006 0.025* -0.003 
 (0.257) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Ferrie 1996 (SDX) + common names 0.230 0.025*** 0.009 0.010 0.021 -0.007 
 (0.255) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (Name)  0.128 0.036*** 0.033* -0.007 0.048*** -0.004 
 (0.267) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.012) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (NYSIIS)  0.196 0.032*** 0.027 -0.002 0.033** -0.004 
 (0.262) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Abramitzky et al. 2012 (SDX) 0.208 0.029*** 0.014 0.007 0.027* -0.008 
 (0.257) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (Name) 0.064 0.036*** 0.025 0.014 0.042*** -0.008 
 (0.248) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.011) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (NYSIIS) 0.137 0.034*** 0.023 0.011 0.035*** -0.000 
 (0.241) (0.008) (0.017) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010) 
Nix and Qian 2015 (SDX) 0.118 0.029*** 0.017 0.008 0.030** 0.001 
 (0.236) (0.008) (0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010) 
Feigenbaum 2016 0.812*** 0.034*** 0.032* -0.001 0.034** -0.022* 
  (0.277) (0.009) (0.019) (0.020) (0.015) (0.011) 
Notes: Each estimate is from a separate regression of the variable indicated in the column header on a binary variable for whether the linking method matched the 
observation. Standard errors are reported in parentheses below. * indicates statistically significant at the 10-percent level, ** at the 5-percent level, and * at the 1-
percent level. 
Early 
Indicators 
